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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the drivers and dynamics of credit losses 
in Australasian banking over an extended period of time in order to improve the 
means by which financial institutions manage their credit risks and regulatory bodies 
safeguard the stability and integrity of the financial system. 
The analysis is based on a specially constructed data base of credit loss and 
provisioning data retrieved from original financial reports published by Australian and 
New Zealand banks. The observation period covers 1980 to 2005, starting at the time 
when such information was published for the first time in bank financial statements. It 
moreover covers the time of major crises which occurred in both Australia and New 
Zealand in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The heterogeneity of reporting the data both amongst banks and through time 
requires the development of a reporting typology which allows data extraction with 
equivalent informational content. As a thorough study of credit risks requires long 
data series often not available from third party data providers, the method developed 
here will provide value to a range of researchers. 
Based on an evaluation of many alternative proxies which track a bank’s credit 
loss experience (CLE), the thesis proposes a preferred model for impaired assets 
expense (as % of loans) as dependent variable, mainly because of its timely nature 
and good data availability. Explanatory variables include aggregate macro variables 
of which changes in unemployment and the return in the share markets are found to 
have the most significant influence on a bank’s credit losses. Bank-specific control 
variables include a pre-provision earnings proxy whose significance points to the use 
of provisions for the purpose of income smoothing by Australasian banks. The model 
also controls for size and nature of lending as smaller, retail-oriented housing lenders, 
on average, exhibit lower loan losses. Clear results are found with regard to the effect 
 iii
of rapid expansion which appears to be followed by a surge of bad debt provisions 2 
to 3 years later. Moreover, inefficient banks tend to suffer greater credit losses. 
An important part of the thesis looks at the characteristics of alternative CLE 
proxies such as stock of provisions, impaired assets and write-offs which have been 
used by earlier literature. Estimating the preferred model with such alternative CLE 
parameters confirms their peculiarities such as the memory character of stock of 
provisions and the delayed nature of write-offs. These measures correlate rather 
poorly amongst themselves which calls for caution in the comparative interpretation 
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1.1 Background: banks and credit risks 
The financial sector, in particular banking institutions, forms the backbone of any modern 
economy and it has long been recognized that developments in this sector will affect the 
economy as a whole. The banks’ role as important financial intermediaries is a key factor in this 
interaction. Banks attract savings from surplus agents and lend out the proceeds to agents that 
require such funds for consumption or investment purposes. The level of such lending will thus 
have a stimulating or a dampening effect on economic activity. 
Lending is not without risk, however. Not all borrowers will be able to meet their financial 
commitments and banks may suffer lending losses. The study of credit risk has thus become an 
important area of research by practitioners, consulting and rating companies and academics alike. 
From a bank’s perspective, management of credit risks is a key component for success in a 
competitive market and it will set up systems and procedures to control such credit losses. 
Increased sophistication of markets and banking products has encouraged the development of a 
wide range models to support financial institutions in their management of credit risks. These are 
now broadly used by banks, both as in-house solutions or externally sourced applications. 
Reference books such as Saunders & Allen (2002), Crouhy, Galai, & Mark (2001) or Schmid 
(2000) provide a good overview of credit risk models used in the financial industry.  
Prudential regulators and supervisors, on the other hand, need to understand and manage 
the dynamics of credit losses of the overall system. Very topical in this respect are rules of the 
revised Basel II Capital Accord (BCBS, 2004b) which seeks to increase the risk sensitivity of 
bank capital requirements. The accord also widens the view of what constitutes risk in banking 
by introducing, for instance, an operational risk category. Credit risk assessment nonetheless 
remains a key consideration as historically asset quality problems have ultimately triggered 
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failures of banks in an overwhelming number of cases.
1
 Because Basel II gives banks the option 
to use their own proprietary credit risk models to determine the base parameters for the 
calculation of minimum capital required, it has spurred a flurry of studies into the new accord’s 
potential systemic impacts (Allen & Gale, 1999; Borio, Furfine, & Lowe, 2001; Kupiec, 2006). 
With all these advances in credit risk related research, there are still a large number of open 
questions. A fundamental issue relates to the calibration of credit risk models. Basel II rules 
prescribe a minimum observation period of five years to determine some of the fundamental 
parameters like probability of default and loss given default (e.g. BCBS, 2004b, paragraph 463, 
466). While these parameters might well reflect the risk characteristics of the loan portfolio in 
‘normal’ course of business, they could be misleading in times of economic stress. In the words 
of Danielsson (2002), “market data are endogenous to market behaviour so statistical analysis 
made in times of stability does not provide much guidance in times of crisis”. 
This thesis takes a longer-term perspective to the analysis of credit cycles
2
 and focuses on 
Australasia for which specific studies on the subject have been rare. It examines the drivers of 
credit losses of Australian and New Zealand banks from 1980 to 2005, a period which includes a 
major crisis in both banking systems in the early 1990s. It attempts to identify the key factors 
that have affected the credit loss experience in the banking system. Ultimately, the insights 
gained through this research could improve the means by which financial institutions manage 
their credit risks and regulatory bodies safeguard the stability and integrity of the financial 
system. 
                                                 
1
 See Graham & Horner (1988) for research into causes of US bank failures of the 1980s (as shown 
in Congressional Budget Office, 1994, p. 20, table 2). International evidence on causes that have led to 
such asset quality problems is shown in Caprio & Klingebiel (1996, figure 3, p. 13) 
2
 Goodhart (2002) questions the use of the term ‘credit cycle’ in this respect. After all, the word 
cycle implies a certain degree of regularity yet experience shows how hard it is for anyone to predict the 
onset of a downturn accurately. 
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1.2 The data sample 
Results of this thesis are based on a specially derived database of financial and credit loss 
information of 23 Australian and 10 New Zealand banks for the period of 1980 to 2005. The 
sample essentially includes all registered banking firms operating during this time with activities 
in retail and/or rural banking but excludes (1) institutions that are predominantly wholesale 
and/or merchant banks as well as (2) non-bank financial institutions. As stated above, this 
observation period covers the major banking system crises in both New Zealand and Australia 
which occurred in 1990/1991. In New Zealand, it culminated with the 1990 collapse and 
subsequent government bail-out for Bank of New Zealand, the leading bank at the time. In 
Australia, the state banking system was affected by the 1991 demise of both the State Bank of 
South Australia (later absorbed into a predecessor of St. George Bank) and State Bank of 
Victoria (amalgamated into Commonwealth Bank of Australia). Other Australian banking firms 
also suffered greatly during these years, most notably market leader Westpac which paid the 
price for its involvement in some high profile commercial real estate projects.
3
 
With the inclusion of these troubled times into the data series, the empirical analysis 
includes at least one instance of a systemic crisis. Ideally, one should extend this analysis back 
even further but meaningful disclosure of credit loss and provisioning data in Australasia starts in 
1980 only. Before this time, such information was netted from income and loan assets and not 
divulged separately in the financial accounts. 
1.3 Methodological issues 
There are several important methodological issues that have to be tackled in the process of 
collecting historical information on credit losses. 
                                                 
3
 Westpac’s cumulative write-offs from 1990 to 1993 represented about 8% of loans outstanding. 
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One firstly finds that that there have been many variations of disclosure of loan loss and 
provisioning data, both through time and amongst banks. Accordingly, chapter 4 of this thesis 
proposes a reporting typology which classifies the accounting for loan losses which in turn 
defines the informational content of the bank’s reporting. This forms the basis of capturing the 
data into a standardized template. 
If we wish to describe the credit loss dynamics in Australasian banking, one has to decide 
on a suitable proxy which best tracks a bank’s actual credit loss experience (CLE). Earlier 
literature has employed a number of measures, mostly without mention of, or deliberations on, 
reasons for selecting a particular one. The first part of chapter 5 is thus dedicated to an 
investigation of properties of a range of potential CLE proxies.  
A great number of potential drivers of a bank’s CLE have been identified by previous 
research. They include aggregate macroeconomic factors such as the state of the economy (e.g. 
GDP growth, unemployment rate), asset shock proxies (e.g. share prices, property prices), and 
indebtedness of households to name just the major ones. Moreover, it is obvious that bank 
specific factors play a major role in the level of credit losses, respectively the level of provisions 
reported. The primary factor relates to the risk choice of the bank, e.g. with regard to its portfolio 
composition. Next, there is anecdotal evidence confirmed by some empirical studies (e.g. Clair, 
1992) that banks expanding (too) rapidly, are faced with elevated credit losses in subsequent 
years. There are behavioural aspects which have been found to influence the bank management’s 
decision to set the level of discretionary provisions. Many researchers have, for instance, 
reported on earnings smoothing activities when banks postpone necessary provisions in bad 
years but rather book them in subsequent better years (and vice versa). There are also 
behavioural theories regarding the signalling character of provisions, the impact of taxation and 
the effects of capital management. 
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1.4 Empirical analysis 
In chapter 6, the thesis models the CLE of Australasian banks by means of a distributed lag 
model which captures dynamic aspects of credit losses by the inclusion of lagged terms of 
explanatory variables. Model formulation and evaluation is conducted for the ratio of impaired 
asset expense as % of loans (IAE_LN) as the dependent variable because IAE_LN is identified 
as the most suitable CLE proxy in chapter 5. 
Regressors are primarily selected based on economic arguments in the spirit of Verbeek 
(2004). They are all grouped into functional groups which can be expected to gauge similar 
effects. The basic model formulation includes three alternative proxies for the state of the 
economy and three further aggregate macro variables. There are a total of 4 bank-specific 
variables in this model but for shorter period estimates (1990 to 2005) this choice becomes richer 
through two additional bank-specific risk proxies reported with the introduction of the Basel I 
capital adequacy rules in 1988.  
Equations are estimated for the combined sample for the full 1980 to 2005 period and 
shorter 1990 to 2005 period. There is also a separate analysis for the sub-samples of Australian 
and New Zealand banks. Results for both aggregate macro factors and bank-specific drivers are 
discussed in detail in chapter 6 (section 6.4).  
A preferred model which the best explanatory power amongst all basic formulations is then 
estimated for other CLE proxies to gauge the impact on the results when alternative dependent 
variables are employed. CLE proxies considered are the stock of provisions, the level of 
impaired assets as well as net and gross write-offs. There is a special analysis on the effect of a 
bank’s past growth on a bank’s subsequent credit losses. A formal test on potential country-
specific effects is conducted through the addition of a country dummy variable and interaction 
terms to the preferred form. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to the 
modelling of credit losses and provisions of financial institutions. Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of the Australasian banking system. The sample is defined in this chapter and brief 
profiles present the banks included. Chapter 4 then describes the typology of credit loss and 
provisioning reporting developed to extract such data along equivalent informational content 
from published financial reports. The methodology chapter (chapter 5) introduces the principal 
model to be employed in the empirical analysis in this thesis. It includes a review of both 
dependent and explanatory model variables. Chapter 6 conducts the concrete formulation of the 
model, the estimations and discussion of empirical results. Chapter 7, finally, summarizes the 
findings of the thesis. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is a review of literature related to credit loss and provisioning by 
deposit taking institutions. It thus provides motivation and justification for the collection of such 
data for the Australasian banking sector as it is conducted in this thesis. Such data have been 
applied to study a broad range of research questions. 
The chapter firstly introduces the basics of loan loss accounting in section 2.2. The 
following section (section 2.3) then reviews fundamental philosophies that influence loan loss 
provisioning by banks. Notwithstanding these fundamental philosophies, researchers have 
identified a number of additional factors that affect the levels of provisioning by the banks’ 
managers, in particular the more subjective, general component. These are discussed in section 
2.4. Another line of research applying loan loss and provisioning data are studies with a 
macroeconomic focus reviewed in section 2.5. 
2.2 A primer on loan loss provisioning 
‘In the ordinary course of business, financial institutions suffer losses on loans, advances 
and other credit facilities as a result of their becoming wholly or partially uncollectable 
(Australian Accounting Standards AAS 1032, 7.2.1, see AASB, 1996)
 4
. This section presents an 
overview of the fundamental accounting transactions which occur in this context. It also looks at 
the life cycle of loan loss provisions starting with the initial provision, subsequent write-off and, 
finally, recovery of some of the debts previously derecognized. 
                                                 
4
 Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) definitions on banking provisions have 
undergone some changes with the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
based AASB 139. In particular, the use of general provisions is more restricted and limited to assets with 
objective impairments. The term ‘collective’ provisions is used instead. This generalized description of 
provisions nevertheless remains valid in principle. 
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2.2.1 Basic accounting transactions 
Figure 2-1 visualizes these accounting transactions using the loan account as an example 
and without distinguishing between specific and general provisions in the first instance. The 
banks maintain a counter-asset provision account whose opening balance is the difference 
between the gross loan amount and the net loan amount, i.e. the portion of the loan portfolio it 
does not expect to collect. If it identifies potential loan losses during the accounting period, it 
will charge them to the profit and loss (P&L) statement while at the same time increasing 
(crediting) the loan loss provisions. This means potential losses are not immediately written off 
from the gross loan balance. Write-offs, also called derecognitions, will typically occur later 
when the bank actually loses control of its contractual rights, for example if the loan is sold or 
legal rights are otherwise extinguished.
5
 At that point, the corresponding provision is removed 
(debited) in an offsetting transaction. In some instances such derecognized bad debt might still 
be recovered, at which time the gross loan account is increased (debited) and the corresponding 
provision reinstated. Alternatively, some banks will apply recoveries directly to reducing the bad 
debt charge of the accounting period. 
 
                                                 
5 
In practice, write-offs occur once the debt has been crystallised and collateral has been liquidated but 
neither New Zealand nor Australian accounting standards before the introduction of IFRS have prescribed 
specific rules on the derecognition of financial assets (such as loans) equivalent to International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 39.35. This standard states that ‘an entity should derecognise a financial asset 
or a portion of it when, and only when, the entity loses control of the contractual rights that comprise the 
financial asset (or a portion of it)’. This practice is also recommended by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS, 1999, p. 15). 
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Figure 2-1: Provisioning for bad loans – generic description of method 
Beginning of period Transactions during period End of period
Profit & loss statement (P&L)
  - Bad debt charge
Provision account
Loan balance Provisons initial balance Loan balance
Gross loan amount  + New provisions made Gross loan amount
  - Debt write-offs
  + Recovery of debt 
    previously written off
Net loan amount Provisons final balance Net loan amount
Gross loan account
Opening balance
 +/- Loans issued/repaid
  - Debt write-offs
 + Recovery of debt 
    previously written off
Ending balance
 - Provisions initial
   balance
 - Provisions final
   balance
 
2.2.2 Life cycle perspective 
Another approach to understand accounting for bad debt is to follow the life cycle of a loan 
that suffers a loss. This is illustrated by means of a simplified numerical example in Figure 2-2 
which does not consider the complexities of accounting for interest earned on defaulted loans. 
When a loan is initiated, the bank typically recognises a general provision against it which 
is maintained as a global provision for a whole portfolio of loans, i.e. not for specific loans. As 
discussed for example in Wall and Koch (2000), there are at least three schools of thought as to 
how these should be set and there is even an argument whether they are justified for properly 
priced loans
6
. Whatever definition of general provisions is chosen, they are discretionary in 
nature being ultimately determined by judgment of the bank’s management.  
                                                 
6 
Borio and Lowe (2001, footnote 10, p.46), for instance, dispute the argument that a provision 
should be created at origination even on correctly priced loans given that default could occur before the 
interest margin has been earned. They reason that provisioning is about expected outcomes. Loans are not 
expected to systematically default before the payment of interest. The possibility of an unexpectedly high 
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Once a potential loss has been identified and becomes reasonably probable, the bank will 
raise a specific provision against the loan which is in turn charged to the P&L statement. If the 
loss is confirmed, derecognition (loan write-off) follows. Finally, some portion of the loan may 
eventually be recovered. If more than the carrying value of the loan can be recovered, the bank 
recognizes the excess collected as recovery income, either directly to the P&L or as reduction of 
provision levels. 
Figure 2-2: Life cycle of bad debt accounting, a simplified numerical example  





Bad debt provision 
expense
1,000   +50
950     
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Bad debt provision 
expense
350     
Loan write-off
(derecognition)
1,000   400     
 - 400  - 400
600     
Loan recovery
600      + 700
 + 100
-      




-      100     
Loan account Loan account
 
 
2.3 Loan loss accounting: fundamental philosophies 
The requirement to set aside reserves for bad loans is rooted in standards relating to true 
and fair value reporting and in particular to accounting for loss contingencies. Latter standards 
were formulated quite early in the history of accounting rule setting. In the US, for instance, FAS 
5 (FASB, 1975) issued in 1975 makes it a requirement to provision if (1) the future impairment 
                                                                                                                                                             
number of early defaults should be covered by capital. Borio & Lowe’s view is also embodied in the new 
IFRS which does not allow general provisions at the time of initial recognition of the loan. 
 11
of an asset is probable and (2) the amount of such a loss can be reasonably estimated. Similarly 
in New Zealand, SSAP 15 dealing with accounting for contingencies, later superseded by FRS 
15, was issued in 1982. As the sophistication of financial markets and instruments increased, 
supplementary and more specific standards relating to loan losses came into force. Until the 
phase-in of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2006, loan loss provisioning 
and reporting in Australasia has mainly been affected by rules regarding the disclosure of 
information by financial institutions (AAS 32; IAS 32; NZ: FRS-33), the recognition and 
measurement of financial instruments (IAS 39, AASB 139; IAS 39, ), the disclosure of these 
instruments (AASB 132; IAS 32) and, finally, the impairment of assets in general (AASB 136; 
IAS 36). 
Researchers have determined repeatedly, however, that despite the ‘rule making’ there is 
no such thing as an objective provisioning for credit losses. Rather they found evidence of some 
fundamentally different philosophies as to what constitutes an ideal provisioning regime. 
Wall & Koch (2000) review this in a US regulatory perspective. They identify three 
schools of thought regarding loan-loss accounting. The first one is what they term the 
economist’s view as perspective that it is intended to capture expected future losses that will 
occur if a borrower does not repay in accordance with the loan contract. In contrast, the primary 
concern of the accounting standard setters, in Wall & Koch’s case the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), is the measurement of a firm’s net income over a given period which 
should allow “general purpose” users of financial statements like equity investors to make 
informed decisions. What this means is that accounting standards focus on losses expected to 
result from events during a given period and explicitly exclude the expected effect of future 
events which would be taken into account under an economist’s provisioning regime.  
A third philosophy, according to Wall & Koch, views loan losses as a type of capital that 
should be built up during good times to absorb losses during bad times. This perspective 
advocated by prudential supervisors differs from that of the economist or the accounting 
standards in that it recommends maintaining loan loss provisions in excess of expected losses 
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during good times. Such a perspective of loan-loss accounting is implicit in the Basel I capital 
regulations, which have included part of the loan-loss allowance as an element of capital. Wall & 
Koch note that many banks in the US have historically maintained a loan-loss allowance in 
excess of expected losses. 
BIS researchers Borio & Lowe (2001) also discuss such conflicts of interest between the 
conservative regime of prudential regulation authorities and the ‘true and fair’ period accounting 
advocated for instance by securities market regulators. They note that the accounting principle of 
most countries is that financial statements should reflect the outcome of events that took place 
before the balance sheet date, and should not attempt to reflect events that have not yet occurred. 
In IFRS this view is codified by IAS 39 (IASB, 2005b) which is currently being adopted around 
the globe, including Australia and New Zealand. Under this standard, loans would normally be 
carried at their outstanding value unless there is “objective evidence” of impairment. This 
principle makes it difficult for a bank to create forward-looking general provisions. 
Borio & Lowe generalize the main approaches to provisioning they observe around the 
globe into four main categories (see Table 2-1 below). In particular, they contrast IAS 39 
discussed above with alternative methods. One category discussed are so-called dynamic, 
respectively statistical provisioning regimes which have been mandated in some countries 
(Banque de France, 2001; Spain: Poveda, 2000). In principle, these models can take account of 
likely future developments, including business cycle effects. Another method described is what 
Borio & Lowe (2001, p. 39) term “Fair Value Accounting” according to which the notion of 
provisioning for impaired loans would disappear. Instead, loans would be recorded directly at 
their fair value with changes in fair value flowing through to a bank’s income statement. One 
could also retain provisioning, with provisions set to equal the difference between the contractual 
amount and the fair value of any loan
7
. Finally, Borio & Lowe contrast all three methods with 
                                                 
7 While fair value accounting, in theory, appears as a superior concept, disadvantages in its 
practical implementation and moral hazard issues have been noted in many instances, especially with 
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the rules for determining expected losses according to the new Basel Capital Accord where the 
forward looking time horizon for losses is merely one year. 
Table 2-1 Approaches to provisioning and measuring expected losses (adapted from Borio & 








Basel II Capital 
regulation 
(expected losses) 
Trigger Objective evidence No No No 
Horizon Residual maturity for 
impaired loans 





Discount expected cash 
flow using original 
effective interest rate  
Discount 
contracted cash 
flows using market 
interest rate 
No discounting No discounting 
Provision at 
origination 
No Possible Yes Not applicable 
 
 
In summary, there are a number of competing provisioning philosophies and they are all 
coloured by the particular concerns of the respective regulators or standard setters.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses on behavioural factors affecting levels of loan loss provisions 
While the previous section identified a variety of estimation philosophies tailored to the 
needs of investors and regulators, a bank’s reported loan-loss provisions are ultimately largely 
under its managers’ control, and managers are likely to use any available discretion to attain their 
own goals. In this respect, research has suggested a range of motivations and, in line with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
regard to its application to financial instruments without observable market prices arising from active 
markets (see for example BCBS, 2004a, p. 5). 
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categorization suggested in Lobo & Yang (2001), they will be discussed under the following 
general headings (subsections 2.4.1 to 2.4.4): income smoothing, capital regulation, signalling 
and, finally, tax considerations. In essence, the literature looking at such behavioural aspects 
which determine level of loan loss provisions has mostly been researched with data on US banks 
and there is a relative paucity of studies using data from other banking systems. The final 
subsection 2.4.5 nevertheless reviews some of these articles.  
2.4.1 Income Smoothing 
In common accounting textbooks like Wild, Bernstein & Subramanyam (2001) income 
smoothing is described as a common form of earnings management, that is, managers may 
decrease or increase reported earnings to reduce volatility. The method used to smooth income 
involves not reporting part of earnings in profitable years through ‘hidden reserves’ or ‘earnings 
banks’, with these stored earnings reported in less profitable years. Given that loan loss 
provisions are generally the largest accrual expense item in a bank’s P&L statement, they are 
thus likely to play a significant role in a manager’s income smoothing strategy. 
While Buckmaster (1992;  1997) documents the existence of income smoothing literature 
as far back as 1898, the hypothesis that banks will use loan-loss provisions for income smoothing 
purposes was first explored for the US by Schreiner (1981)
8
 and in a more formal way by 
Greenawalt & Sinkey (1988) again with US data covering a period of 1976-1984. Over the years, 
considerable empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis has been accumulated. Scholes, 
Wilson, & Wolfson (1990, p. 646) show that loan-loss provisions are used in income smoothing 
in conjunction with unrealized securities gains. Collins & Shackelford (1995) document income 
smoothing but just for profitable banks while contrary to these findings, Bhat (1996) characterize 
an income smoothing bank “as a small one with high risk loans and poor financial conditions”. 
                                                 
8 As reported in Buckmaster (2001, p.179, 234), Schreiner (1981, p.123) concludes that “in general, 
banks do not appear to use the loan loss provision as a device to smooth net income”. 
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Looking at bank capitalization, Niswander & Swanson (2000) find income smoothing solely for 
banks above a certain critical capital adequacy threshold. 
Some studies, however, fail to find evidence of income smoothing through loan loss 
provisions. Examples are Wetmore & Brick (1994), Beatty, Chamberlain, & Magliolo (1995, 
5.1.2, p. 254), and Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas (1999).  
Most of above studies do not attempt an in-depth interpretation of the patterns of income 
smoothing. Explanatory hypotheses are however explored in Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Yang 
(2000) who argue that the level of current performance relative to the industry median is a key 
determinant of managers’ decisions to smooth income. In a later paper, the same lead authors 
(Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003) explore bank specific factors that explain income 
smoothing and conclude that the need to obtain external financing and the managers’ job security 
concerns
9
 appear to be a significant driver of income smoothing behaviour. 
No such motives are identified in an earlier more technical explanation by Kim & 
Santomero (1993) who see income smoothing as a consequence of Bayesian models used by 
banks when forecasting loan losses. These models update projected loan losses as a function of 
new information obtained from the new audit and the historical variance of loan loss rates over 
the bank's previous history. A series of good years will thus mean that provisions get smaller. On 
the other hand, successive bad outcomes reduce the bank's prior belief in the historical 
distribution. The corresponding provisions on average get larger because the bank becomes more 
sure that it is drawing outcomes from a distribution with higher average loss rates and 
probabilities. 
                                                 
9 Job security concerns are analysed in a framework developed by Fudenberg & Tirole (1995) 
which suggests that when current performance is poor, relative to other banks, managers have an 
incentive to shift future earnings into the current period to reduce the chance of dismissal or interference. 
Alternatively, when future relative performance is expected to be poor, managers have an incentive to 
shift current earnings to the future to reduce the likelihood of poor future performance.  
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2.4.2 Capital Regulation 
The capital management incentive has its root in the fact that regulators monitor the banks 
accounting based capital ratios which are affected by provisioning decisions. Basel I capital 
adequacy rules, for instance, allow loan loss provisions, subject to certain upper limits, to be 
counted as a component of regulatory capital (BCBS, 1988, items 18-21, p. 5-6). Capital 
management through loan loss provisions is also addressed later in this chapter in what we 
classify as literature with a macro prudential and bank regulatory focus in section 2.5. At this 
stage, this subsection will review the development of the capital management argument through 
time. 
The first paper that explicitly posits capital management through loan loss provisions is 
Moyer (1990, 3.1, p. 129-131). Her research looks at data before the introduction of the Basel 
regime with US regulations based on ‘primary capital adequacy ratios’ which allowed banks to 
prop up their ratios by inflating loan loss provisions. Accordingly, she tests and confirms the 
capital management hypothesis that predicts that the capital ratio is negatively related to 
discretionary loan loss provisions, i.e. the lower the capital ratio the greater the incentive to 
report higher provisions. Other researchers who confirmed her results also for sample periods 
before the introduction of the Basel capital adequacy regime are Collins, Shackelford & Whalen 
(1995) and Beatty, Chamberlain & Magliolo (1995). 
A later study by Kim & Kross (1998) studies the impact of the introduction of the Basel I 
rules in 1989 which brought about limitations on the use of provisions as part of a bank’s 
regulatory capital. The authors confirmed that the incentive of low capitalized banks to report 
provisions at high pre-1989 levels was indeed reduced. Kim & Kross’ findings were confirmed 
by Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas (1999) who conclude that the capital management motivation is 
the most important aspect in setting discretionary provisions, much more important than earnings 
management or signalling. 
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A more recent article by Luengnaruemitchai & Wilcox (2004) on capital management by 
US and Japanese banks looks at patterns in the use of discretionary provisions and charge-offs 
through time, in particular through what the authors call ‘troubled’ times. They firstly argue that 
in difficult times banking regulators are more lenient in the enforcement of capital requirements 
for fear of systemic repercussion (credit crunch, widespread bank failures) which in turn allows 
the banks to exercise more discretion, i.e. report lower provisions and charge offs when the 
banking system is in a troubled state. The authors secondly hypothesize that since supervisors are 
more likely to close ‘atypical’ banks, one should observe clustering of reporting behaviour when 
financial institutions seek ‘safety in similarity’. As to the results, Luengnaruemitchai & Wilcox 
find some evidence for their hypotheses when capital ratios were low in the banking crisis of the 
late 1980s but no systematic relation of capital ratios among peer banks in the generally healthier 
times of the late 1990s when these ratios were generally higher. Such behavioural patterns, the 
authors conclude, would help mitigate procyclical effects of Basel II as they are sometimes 
feared in the literature (e.g. in Borio, Furfine, & Lowe, 2001). 
 
2.4.3 Signalling 
The need for signalling arises when managers, who possess information indicating that 
bank values are higher than those assessed by the market, wish to have market values revised 
upward. Because of an adverse selection problem as described in Akerlof (1970) and the 
accepted wisdom that well-informed agents can improve their market outcome by signalling their 
private information to poorly informed agents (Milgrom, 1981; Spence, 1973), bank managers 
could likewise employ signalling tools to communicate concerns about stock undervaluation 
resulting from information asymmetry. 
Well known is the so-called dividend signalling theory which has given rise to an extensive 
literature going back to seminal articles by Bhattacharya (1979), Miller & Rock (1985) and John 
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& Williams (1985). This theory explains excess returns observed following announcements by 
firms of an increase in dividend. 
Less famous are papers that explore potential signalling effects of discretionary accounting 
items like loan loss provisions. One potential hypothesis is that a bank increases the loan loss 
provision to signal that it is strong enough to absorb future potential losses. Research by Beaver, 
Eger, Ryan, & Wolfson (1989, p. 169 and Table 2, p. 170) suggests that an increase in loan loss 
provisions is indeed interpreted as ‘good news’ in that management indicate the "the earnings 
power of the bank to be sufficiently strong that it can withstand a ‘hit to earnings’ in the form of 
additional loan loss provisions." In some respects, signalling may be related to income 
smoothing or also capital management activities of bank managers. If a bank engages in earnings 
management, this might well be used as a signalling device. In this respect, Wahlen (1994) 
provides evidence that bank managers increase the discretionary component of unexpected loan 
loss provisions when future cash flow prospects improve. In his view, too, increased unexpected 
loan loss provisions could be interpreted a ‘good news’ consistent with above results. 
An obvious way to test whether the provisioning is interpreted as ‘good’, respectively 
‘bad’ news is to observe the reaction by the capital markets as was done in Grammatikos & 
Saunders (1990) in a case study for Citicorp Group which, at the time, had a very substantial 
LDC loan exposure. Beaver & Engel (1996) follow a more sophisticated approach. They 
hypothesize that the capital market perceives the stock of loan loss provisions to be comprised of 
two components: a nondiscretionary component which is negatively priced and a discretionary 
component whose incremental pricing coefficient is positive. In their study they model the non-
discretionary portion of provisions as a function of subsequent loss experience and other factors 
while the remaining provision stock then becomes the discretionary portion. When regressing the 
market value of the bank with these two components, Beaver & Engel indeed find the predicted 
coefficients. This means market participants clearly interpret discretionary provisions as positive 
signals, and so bid up the share price. 
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Other hypotheses tested with regard to what makes provisioning good or bad news can be 
found in Liu, Ryan, & Wahlen (1997) who posit that increased loan loss provisions are good 
news only for banks with apparent loan default risk problems based on prior information. The 
data then confirm that loan loss provisions are good news only for such ‘at risk’ banks and bad 
news for ’not at risk’ banks. 
One recent example of researching loan loss provisions in the light of the signalling theory 
are Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Yang (2005). They look at bank specific factors that determine 
signalling with loan loss provisions and find that signalling differs across banks based upon the 
degree of information asymmetry. It varies negatively with bank size and positively with 
earnings variability, future investment opportunities, and degree of income smoothing. 
2.4.4 Taxation Management 
The use of loan loss provisions in tax minimization strategies is comparably less 
researched but there is generally broad agreement among researchers that tax considerations do 
have an impact on levels of reported loan-loss provisions. In the US (see for example in Collins, 
Shackelford, & Wahlen, 1995, pp. 268-270) and many other countries, tax authorities will only 
accept specific provision or actual loan write-offs as a tax deductible item. General provisions, 
on the other hand, do not reduce taxable income in many instances. The typical research design 
will thus test whether the marginal corporate tax rate affects the level of loan write-offs while 
discretionary non-deductible loan loss provisions should not be affected.  
Earlier studies that find evidence for tax optimization strategies being followed by banks 
are Scholes, Wilson, & Wolfson (1990) and Collins & Shackelford (1995). More recently, 
Niswander & Swanson (2000) document such behaviour for well capitalized banks, i.e. where 
there is a true discretion in setting loan loss reserves. 
No evidence of tax planning is however found in (Beatty, Chamberlain, & Magliolo, 1995, 
5.1.3, p. 254). The authors attribute the result to their “poor choice” of crude proxies for 
marginal tax rates. 
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2.4.5 Studies on behavioural aspects using non-US data  
The previous four subsections have reviewed hypotheses mostly developed for the US 
banking market which provides large and homogeneous data samples over long time periods. 
This is important since such behavioural effects might be quite weak. Even though banks in other 
countries may have different accounting rules, regulation and supervision, and possibly different 
incentives, only few researchers have looked at behavioural factors driving the discretionary loss 
provisions outside the US.  
One example is Hasan & Wall (2004) who test for signs of earnings management firstly 
with a sample of international banks and then especially with a smaller sample of Japanese and 
Canadian banks using Bankscope data from 1993 to 2000. They model levels of total loan loss 
provisions as a function of proxies for non-discretionary and discretionary components. The 
proxies for the discretionary component are the capital ratio at the beginning of the period, to test 
for potential signs of capital management, and the (pre-provision, pre-tax) return on assets 
(earnings ratio), to test for earnings management in general. Only effects of earnings 
management are found to be significant while the evidence for capital management is 
inconclusive. The coefficients on the earnings ratio are found to be positive and significantly 
lower for U.S. banks than for the non-U.S. banks. Hasan & Wall argue that these differences 
may reflect differences in the financial market benefits of managing earnings or in the flexibility 
that management has to manage earnings (i.e., the cost of managing earnings). They state that ”in 
at least some cases, the results may also reflect the banks’ determination to artificially boost 
reported net income, such as by realizing capital gains, in those periods where they need to 
increase their bad debt provisions.” 
Data on the 50 largest EU banks are used by Valckx (2004) which, among mainly 
macroeconomic aspects, also looks at behavioural issues of loan loss provisioning. The time 
period covered is 1997 to 2001 only but is extended back to 1988 for a smaller panel of 21 EU 
banks. The author of this working paper concludes that ”the data are broadly consistent with the 
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hypothesis that income smoothing takes place in the EU but the findings are more mixed with 
respect to capital management”. 
2.5 Literature with a macro prudential and bank regulatory focus 
This section reviews the use of loan provisioning but also other credit loss data in studies 
with a macroeconomic focus as they are, for instance, important for the purpose of prudential 
regulation and supervision of the banking system. The research focus of these studies differs 
from the literature of the previous sections in that authors explore loan loss provisions and write-
offs in the context of the wider economy and the financial system in particular
10
. They are 
typically concerned with questions such as effects of capital regulations (e.g. procyclical effects 
of loan loss provisions), loan loss patterns in a systemic view (e.g. vulnerabilities in the sector) 
or questions of system stability (e.g. to obtain parameters for system stress testing). A common 
feature of this research is that it is less concerned with the discretionary aspect of provisioning 
but rather with the credit losses they gauge. 
The strongest contributions in this area of research not surprisingly comes from authors 
associated with supervisory authorities who need to understand patterns in and influences on 
loan loss provisions. Many studies have been written in the past few years, a period which 
coincides with the design and development phase of the New Basel Capital Accord Basel 
(BCBS, 2004b). The following review of literature in this area is broken down into two 
subsections. It first lists studies with global data samples, followed by research with a country 
specific focus. For reference, Table 2-2 provides an overview of the data samples used in various 
loan-loss provisioning studies. 
The focal point of this thesis is akin to the type of work reviewed in the following. This 
applies both to the proposed methodology and analyses. In particular, it is similar to Salas & 
                                                 
10 Questions of capital management discussed in the previous section may have regulatory aspects 
as well. 
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Saurina (2002), Pain (2003) and Kearns (2004) who have all used data for specific European 
banking systems (Spain, UK, Ireland). This section proceeds with a review of studies using 
global data samples, followed by specific country or regional studies. 
 23
Table 2-2 Summary information on data samples of selected loan loss provisioning studies with 
a macro prudential and bank regulatory focus 
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Table 2-2 Summary information on data samples of selected loan loss provisioning studies with 
a macro prudential and bank regulatory focus (continued) 
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2.5.1 Studies with global data samples 
A major concern of regulators has been the potential for procyclical effects of capital 
regulation. We have mentioned BIS researchers Borio, Furfine & Lowe (2001) earlier in this 
thesis. In their comprehensive review of issues related to the procyclicality of the financial 
system they also touch on loan loss provisioning. They document that bank provisions are indeed 
one of the most procyclical variables, being highly negatively correlated with the business cycles 
(Borio, Furfine, & Lowe, 2001, Table 1, p. 15). Low (excessive) provisioning in good (bad) 
times then translates into a clear procyclical pattern in bank profitability. Whilst Borio et al. base 
their conclusions on a pure visual inspection of data for various countries, other researchers have 
conducted more formal empirical research. 
One example is a study sponsored by the World Bank (Cavallo & Majnoni, 2001) where 
the authors put the role of provisioning into the centre of the procyclicality debate and ask the 
question “Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times?”. They look at a sample of 1,176 
large commercial banks—372 of them in non-G10 countries—for the period 1988–99. The 
authors posit that a bank’s decision to set loan loss reserves may also be affected by agency 
problems between the different classes of banks’ stakeholders such as banks’ “outsiders” 
(minority shareholders or the fiscal authority) and banks’ “insiders” (bank managers and 
majority shareholders). The amount of legal protection granted to a firm’s outsiders affects the 
allocation of a bank’s earnings to provisions, income taxes and dividends. They find support in 
the data for their hypothesis that the protection of outsiders’ claims—the claims of minority 
shareholders in common law countries and of fiscal authorities in countries with high public 
debt—on bank income has negative effects on the level of bank provisions (insufficient 
provisioning). Cavallo & Majnoni confirm a positive association between pre-tax income and 
provisions for their sub-sample of G10 banks which means these institutions indeed provision 
more in good times. On the other hand, non-G10 banks, on average, seem to provision too little 
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in good times and are forced to increase provisions in bad times. In conclusion, the authors argue 
that cyclical shortages of banks’ capital may not only be due to the risk based regulation of bank 
capital but more importantly due to the lack of risk based regulation of loan loss provisioning 
practices.  
A more recent study by Dutch Central Bank researchers Bikker & Metzemakers (2003) 
investigates how bank provisioning behaviour has related to the business cycle. They use 8,000 
bank-year observations from 29 OECD countries over a period of 1991 to 2001. In their study 
they confirm what was noted by Borio, Furfine & Lowe (2001). Provisioning turns out to be 
substantially higher when GDP growth is lower, reflecting increased riskiness of the credit 
portfolio when the business cycle turns downwards, which at the same time increases the risk of 
a credit crunch.  
2.5.2 Specific country and system studies 
Specific country studies have a slightly longer history, pioneered by researchers in the US 
where large data sets have been available quite early. Seminal work in the US stems from Keeton 
& Morris (1988) and again from Sinkey & Greenawalt (1991)
11
. This section will, however, not 
follow the literature chronologically through time but will rather concentrate on country studies 
of the recent past which analyse (1) similar time periods as in this thesis and (2) banking markets 
with a comparable institutional setting as the one in Australasia. The list of studies also includes 
one for Australia (Esho & Liaw, 2002) which is discussed at the end of the section. 
The first two studies discussed are publications of the Central Bank & Financial Services 
Authority of Ireland (Kearns, 2004) and the Bank of England (Pain, 2003). This is followed by 
reviews of studies for the Austrian, Spanish and the Italian banking market. It concludes with 
some work by Keeton (1999) for the US market. 
                                                 
11
 Sinkey & Greenawalt (1991) regress loan loss rates observed in 1987 with bank specific 
variables of the preceding three years 
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In his Irish study, Kearns (2004) uses provisioning panel data of a total of 14 Irish credit 
institutions which yields a total of 132 annual time series observations starting mostly from the 
early to mid 1990s. The author estimates a model with predominantly macro factors as 
explanatory variables but with a fixed effect estimator to account for unobserved individual bank 
characteristics. He finds some evidence for Ireland that the level of loan losses, proxied by loan-
loss provisions, rises when GDP growth declines but more significantly when unemployment 
rises. Kearns then applies the coefficient estimates to run stress tests for the Irish financial 
system and concludes that the simulated increase in provisioning would differ across lenders but 
that every institution could afford the increase in provisions out of a typical year’s profit. 
Pain (2003) uses panel regression analysis to investigate factors that may lead to increases 
in loan-loss provisions for a sample of eleven major UK commercial and mortgage banks (1978-
2000). He finds that there are indeed a number of macroeconomic variables that can provide 
information about banks’ provisioning requirements, in particular real GDP growth, real interest 
rates and lagged aggregate lending growth. Because data are sourced from information-rich bank 
annual accounts instead of from generic databases, the author is also able to shed light on bank 
specific factors affecting provisioning such as the composition of the lending portfolio, the rapid 
credit expansion to certain sectors (e.g. commercial property lending) or collateral. All in all, the 
Pain paper follows a methodology (type of data used, analysis), which is most comparable to the 
one used in this thesis.  
Slightly earlier, a group of researchers associated with the Bank of Austria (Arpa, Giulini, 
Ittner, & Pauer, 2001) published some analysis of provisioning patterns of Austrian banks
12
. 
They confirm, again in line with global studies above, that Austrian banks increase risk 
provisions in times of falling real GDP growth rates (procyclical behaviour) and in times of 
rising bank operating income or operating results (income smoothing). 
                                                 
12 The authors also investigate macroeconomic factors that affect net interest, respectively operating 
incomes. 
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A study by Bank of Spain’s Fernández de Lis, Martínez, & Saurina (2000) reviews loan 
growth and provisioning in the Spanish market and at the same time presents the Central Bank of 
Spain’s approach to counteracting procyclical provisioning behaviour. In line with other banking 
supervisors (e.g. Banque de France, 2001), the Bank of Spain had at the time introduced a so-
called statistical provisioning regime aimed at proper recognition of forward looking, i.e. ex ante 
credit risk. The results of the study provide support for the new regime in that lending in Spain 
was found to have been strongly procyclical while provisions had shown a similarly procyclical 
bias, being largely linked to the volume of contemporaneous problem assets. In line with the 
results of the global sample studies, the authors conclude that book profits have tended to 
overstate true profits in periods of low non-performing loans and high credit growth (upturn) and 
understate them in periods of high problem loans and low credit growth (downturn). 
Also for the Spanish banking market Salas & Saurina (2002) analyze the credit risk in two 
institutional regimes: the Spanish commercial and savings banks. In particular, they study the 
determinants of bank problem loans using panel data of both macroeconomic and bank specific 
variables in the period of 1985–1997. Drivers of problem loans are the GDP growth rate, levels 
of corporate and consumer indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, the portfolio 
composition, bank size, net interest margin, capital ratio, and market power. However, the 
authors find significant differences between commercial and savings banks, which confirm the 
relevance of the institutional form. Like this thesis, Salas & Saurina partially rely on original 
bank annual reports for their data. 
The performance of Italian banks over a period of 1985 to 2002 is analysed in a paper by 
Quagliariello (2004). For a sample of 207 banks
13
, the author in particular investigates whether 
loan loss provisions and non-performing loans show a cyclical pattern. In line with research 
reviewed above, he finds that the flow of new bad debts and the provisions against loan losses 
                                                 
13  Bank accounting data are sourced from non-public reports to the Bank of Italy (for use in their 
supervisory statistics) for a period of 1985 to 2002. 
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tend to increase when economic conditions deteriorate. As an interesting twist, however, GDP 
growth turns out to be significant only when lagged by 1 and 2 years, implying that the cyclical 
impacts in Italy are not instantaneous, but delayed. Similar to Kearns (2004), the author then 
applies the sensitivity parameters found to stress test the impact of a recession. In line with 
results for the Irish market, he concludes that level of Italian banks’ earnings and capital buffers 
would be, on average, sufficient to absorb the effects of the shocks. 
Determinants of loan losses have also been analysed by regulators in the US. In fact, 
studies on the US banking market, due to its size and regional differences, could well be 
considered as multi-country analysis. Keeton (1999) focuses on bank specific factors that help 
predict loan losses. He conducts his investigation with a sample of quarterly call reports filed by 
US commercial banks for the period 1982 to 1996. On balance, his data provide some support for 
the intuitive result that faster loan growth leads to higher loan losses. Specifically, US States 
experiencing unusually rapid loan growth over the period tended to experience unusually big 
increases in delinquencies several years later. Keeton nonetheless puts a question mark behind 
this seemingly clear-cut relationship since in his theory only increases in loan supply, associated 
with relaxation of underwriting standards, should lead to credit losses down the track. 
Conversely, increases in demand for loans, leading to more stringent selection of credits, or a 
productivity shift should, in his view, not give rise to increased loss rates in the future. 
Finally, there is one study for Australia. A 2002 APRA study (Esho & Liaw, 2002) 
investigates appropriate levels of risk weights on lending secured by residential mortgages. The 
sample includes up to 16 Australian banks for sample periods ranging from 1991 to 2001 
(shorter period for some estimates) for which the authors in particular model the level of 
impaired assets as a function of the relative proportion of loans in the various Basel I risk weight 
categories. They find no significant difference in risk associated with varying the proportion of 
assets held between the 20% and 50% risk weight buckets from which they conclude that the 
Basel I 50% risk weight on housing lending might be excessive. 
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2.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter first provides an introduction to accounting for loan, respectively more 
generally, credit losses at banks. It highlights the competing philosophies in the estimation of 
such credit losses. While, for instance, equity market regulators prefer restrictive criteria for loan 
loss provisioning in order to prevent manipulations of earnings, prudential authorities may push 
banks to book higher levels of loan loss reserves.  
The second part of the chapter is dedicated to reviewing literature and hypotheses related 
to drivers of loan loss provisions of banks. A number of behavioural factors have been postulated 
such as the tendency of income smoothing by means of discretionary provisions. Income 
smoothing involves higher provisions in good years and, vice versa, postponing required 
provisions into the next period to keep earnings on target in a bad year. Researchers have also 
suggested that provisioning may be affected by a need to prop up capital (capital management 
theory), the intention to signal strength to the market (signalling theory) or efforts to reduce 
taxation expense (taxation management theory). 
Another line of research studies drivers of credit losses in a macroeconomic context. These 
researchers are often associated with authorities in charge of regulation and supervision of the 
financial system, respectively responsible for its overall stability. While the behavioural factors 
above are used as control parameters, this literature mainly investigates aggregate macro factors 
such as GDP growth, rate of unemployment, indebtedness of households and firms which could 
affect the credit loss experience of banks. Some studies include additional bank-specific factors 
into their modelling to control for the institution-specific characteristics (e.g. proxies for 
riskiness of the loan portfolio).  
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3 The Australasian banking system 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical review of developments and key events in the Australian 
and New Zealand banking system since 1980, i.e. the period for which credit loss and 
provisioning data as well as related information has been collected in the database. This time 
period will subsequently often be called the ‘observation period’. The information gathered in 
this chapter is based not only on explicitly referenced sources but also on a comprehensive 
collection of original bank annual reports (see detailed list in Table 3-7).  
 
These are the major parts to this chapter.  
1. The short introductory section 3.2 describes the selection methodology for including an 
institution into the sample.  
2. The second and major part presents a comprehensive history for both the Australian and New 
Zealand financial system as a whole and for the individual institutions covered in the 
database (see Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 below). There are two separate sub-sections, one for 
Australia (Section 3.3) and the other New Zealand (section 3.4).  
3. Section 3.5 then explores the standards and rules which have affected disclosure by financial 
institutions in Australasia, especially with regard to information related to their credit risk 
and loss experience. 
4. Section 3.6 summarises the chapter. Some of the longer tables and figures referenced in the 
text are all shown in section 3.7 as a chapter 3 appendix. 
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Table 3-1 Overview of banks in database (Australia) 
Bank identifier Bank full name Institution earlier name Successor Registered Data range
AU AdelaideBk Adelaide Bank Co-operative Building Society of 
South Australia
1994 to present 1988-2005
AU AdvanceBk Advance Bank NSW Building Society AU StGeorge 1985 to 1998 1986-1996
AU ANZ ANZ Banking Group 
(AUS)
whole period 1979-2005
AU BendigoBk Bendigo Bank 1995 to present 1991-2005
AU BkMelbourne Bank of Melbourne RESI Statewide Building Society AU Westpac 1989-1998 1998-1996
AU BkWest Bank West / HBOS 
Australia
Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia
HBOS Australia whole period 1983-2005
AU BoQ Bank of Queensland whole period 1980-2005
AU CBC Sydney Commercial Banking 
Company of Sydney 
Limited
AU NAB to 1982 1979-1981
AU ChallengeBk Challenge Bank Hotham Permanent Building 
Society (Vic)/ Perth Building
AU Westpac 1987 to 1996 1987-1995
AU Colonial Colonial / Colonial State 
Bank
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society
AU CoWthBk 1996 to 2001 1996-1999
AU CommBk Commercial Bank of 
Australia
AU Westpac to 1982 1979-1981
AU CoWthBk Commonwealth Bank whole period 1979-2005
AU EldersRural Elders Rural Bank Limited 2000 to present 1999-2005
AU NAB National Australia Bank National Bank of Australasia whole period 1979-2005




1987 to 2003 1979-1993
AU SBNSW State Bank of New South 
Wales
Rural Bank of New South Wales AU Colonial to 1995 1980-1995
AU SBSA State Bank of South 
Australia
The State Bank of South Australia AU Advance Bk to 1994 1980-1994
AU SBVictoria State Bank of Victoria AU CoWthBk to 1991 1979-1990
AU StGeorge St.George Bank St.George Building Society 1993 to present 1989-2005
AU SuncorpMet Suncorp-Metway, 
Suncorp after 2002
Metway Bank renamed Suncorp 
in 2002
1988 to present 1991-2005
AU TasmaniaBk Tasmania Bank Statewide Bank (Launceston Bank 
for Savings), The Tasmanian 
Permanent Building Society 
AU Trustbk TAS to 1991 1984-1990
AU Trustbk TAS Trust Bank Tasmania SBT Bank (The Savings Bank of 
Tasmania), Hobart Savings Bank
AU CoWthBk to 1999 1983-1999
AU Westpac Westpac (AUS) Bank of New South Wales whole period 1979-2005  
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Table 3-2 Overview of banks in database (New Zealand) 
Bank identifier Bank full name Institution earlier name Successor Registered Data range
NZ ANZ ANZ National Bank ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) 
until 2004
whole period 1980-2005
NZ ASB ASB Ltd. Auckland Savings Bank 1989 to present 1983-2005
NZ BNZ Bank of New Zealand whole period 1979-2005
NZ Countrywide Countrywide Bank Countrywide Building Society NZ NBNZ 1987 to 1998 1983-1998
NZ NBNZ National Bank of New 
Zealand
NZ ANZ to 2004 1979-2003
NZ Rural Bank Rural Bank Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation of New Zealand
NZ NBNZ 1990 to 1994 1984-1992
NZ Trust Bank Trust Bank NZ Trustee Bank Group NZ Westpac 1989 to 1996 1988-1996
NZ TSB Bank TSB Bank Taranaki Savings Bank 1989 to present 1987-2005
NZ UnitedBK United Bank United Building Society NZ Countrywide 1990 to 1994 1983-1992
NZ Westpac Westpac Banking Corp. 
(NZ)
Bank of New South Wales whole period 1987-2005
 
3.2 Sample selection 
Credit risk, which is defined as the risk that a counterparty to a financial transaction will 
fail to fulfil its obligation, is omnipresent in the financial system. If we set out to assess the 
extent of losses which have been caused by credit risk, we would thus ideally have to measure 
the cumulative loss experience of all participants in the financial markets or, in an even wider 
perspective, the economy in general. This thesis is less ambitious in that it merely aims at 
studying the credit loss experience of banks as a particular group of financial intermediaries. 
This sector nonetheless plays a key role in virtually all economies and, being one of the most 
regulated industries, it is a special focus of the prudential supervisor of the financial system. This 
special attention is based on the fact that credit losses or, more generally, asset quality problems 
have ultimately triggered the overwhelming proportion of bank failures
14
. 
                                                 
14
 See Graham & Horner (1988) for research into causes of US bank failures of the 1980s (as 
shown in Congressional Budget Office, 1994, p. 20, table 2). International evidence on causes that have 
led to such asset quality problems is shown in Caprio & Klingebiel (1996, figure 3, p. 13). 
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The starting point for the selection of the data sample is all institutions that have been 
registered as a bank in Australia and/or New Zealand during the observation period (see Table 
3-6 in the chapter appendix). The full list of registered Australian banks has been assembled 
based on data in RBA (1991, p. 21-24, appendix 2) for information on banks registered pre-1991 
and from RBA and APRA banking systems statistics after this time (APRA, 2002, , 2006; RBA, 
1998). For New Zealand, the full list was sourced from RBNZ (2006a). 
After applying the selection criteria below, data series for a total of 23 Australian
15
 and 10 
New Zealand banks were collected (as shown in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 above). 
3.2.1 Criteria for inclusion 
As shown in Table 3-6, the selection firstly contains all the systemically important banks 
operating at a national level. Secondly, it includes banks where retail banking, generally both in 
terms of deposit-taking or lending, constitutes a substantial portion of the business. Banks taking 
retail deposits are potentially vulnerable to runs and are thus of interest to the prudential 
supervisor in view of contagion effects. Within this category we also include three specialty rural 
lenders (Rural Bank of New Zealand, Primary Industry Bank of Australia (PIBA), Elders Rural 
Bank). Finally, we consider banks with a strong regional market position in order to capture 
possible regional effects in our analysis. All these criteria are in fact overlapping in the sense that 
strong exposure to the retail business is usually associated with either systemic or regional 
importance. 
3.2.2 Criteria for exclusion 
In line with the above criteria, the database excludes institutions with the primary 
characteristic of being a wholesale and/or merchant bank. This class of institutions is dominated 
                                                 
15
 State Bank of NSW and Colonial were counted as separate banks. 
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by overseas based banks which started entering the Australasian market with the deregulation of 
the mid 1980s. Their exclusion is also forced by the fact that many of them have not consistently 
published financials for their local operations throughout the observation period. The exclusion 
of merchant and trading banks means that domestic institutions like NZI Bank
16
, DFC New 
Zealand
17
, a government-owned merchant bank, and Australian Bank
18
, all of which experienced 
substantial credit losses during the observation period have been omitted. 
A further reason for excluding a bank relates to size. Four very small institutions were 
eliminated owing to this criterion: Arab Bank Australia, Kookmin Bank (NZ), National Mutual 
Royal Bank and Town & Country Bank. Note that the latter two had been operating for just a 
few years before they were absorbed into ANZ Bank. 
Many of the larger banking groups had more than one of their entities registered as a bank. 
While being a subsidiary of a larger entity was no cause for being excluded
19
, financial data for 
many of them were either difficult to obtain or their results were reported within their parents’ 
financial disclosure. Under this category, we most notably excluded the large number of savings 
banks which had been set up by the trading banks earlier in the observation period in order to 
offer certain restricted products and services. Similarly, we dropped the numerous regional trust 
banks in New Zealand that were part of the Trust Bank Group. 
                                                 
16
 NZI Bank was born out of a wholesale finance subsidiary of insurance group NZI Corporation 
(NZI) in 1987. It experienced substantial losses arising from the October 1987 share market collapse and 
the 1988/89 fall in property market which led to its closure in early 1992. These losses forced NZI 
Corporation into the arms of General Accident, a UK insurer which took full control of NZI in September 
1989. 
17
 Development Finance Corporation (DFC) New Zealand, originally a development bank for 
industry, was converted to a limited liability company in March 1987. The government sold it to pension 
fund manager National Provident Fund (80%) and Salomon Brothers (20%) in November 1988. After 
substantial losses, it was placed under statutory management in October 1989. 
18
 Australian Bank was formed in 1981 as a merchant bank and experienced large lending losses in 
1985 and 1986. After a partial recovery, it was absorbed into State Bank of Victoria in 1989. 
19
 Hypothetically this would have meant that we would have had to exclude all Australian owned 
banks in New Zealand, i.e. the leading players of the industry. 
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Finally, there is the exclusion category titled ‘data availability issues’, i.e. when (1) it was 
not feasible to retrieve the relevant financial reports or (2) the short data series did not warrant 
inclusion. Only very few institutions had to be omitted purely due to this category. The largest 
three under (1) are again overseas-owned institutions, rural specialist lender Rabobank as well as 
ING Bank and HSBC Bank, both with a sizeable retail loan book and deposits. Also left out was 
AMP Bank, a subsidiary of insurance and asset management conglomerate AMP. The banks 
excluded due to short time series under (2) are the New Zealand banks Elderbank, National 
Mutual Bank New Zealand, NAB (NZ), Kiwibank and Superbank, as well as Bank of Adelaide 
in Australia. 
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3.3 The Australian banking system 
The following review of the Australian banking system firstly presents its overall 
development over the observation period, starting with the regime prior to the onset of 
deregulation and the effects of the deregulation initiated by the Campbell commission of inquiry. 
This is followed by a description of the major elements of the 1998 financial sector reform which 
drastically changed the regulatory framework. Lastly, it provides a general review of Australian 
banks’ performance through the whole observation period with a particular focus on their credit 
loss and provisioning experience. 
The second half of this section (section 3.3.2) is taken up by brief narratives for each bank 
covered in this database. The narratives present the historical background for each institution and 
the key events that have affected them during the observation period. The narratives are grouped 
by the five largest banking institutions in the present market (ANZ, Commonwealth Bank, NAB, 
Westpac and St. George), i.e. each subsection portrays the major bank with all its predecessors 
that have been absorbed by them through time. There is a final subsection that covers banks 
which have not become part of the above groups.  
As a visual summary, Figure 3-11 to Figure 3-14 (on pages 100 to 103) depict genealogies 
of Australian banks which show major merger and acquisition events in the industry since 1980. 
 
3.3.1 Development of the overall system 
3.3.1.1 Pre-deregulation state of the world 
The development of the financial system in Australia over the past 25 years coincides with 
a period of great change, both with regard to the rapid evolution of globalized financial markets 
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and concurrent changes in the regulatory environment
20
. The fundamental act regulating the 
banking system throughout this period has been the Banking Act 1959 but this piece of 
legislation has undergone major changes over the past 25 years. At the outset up until 1981, 
Australian banks’ operations were strictly controlled, which coincided with the general 
enthusiasm for Keynesian macroeconomic management at the time. As one example, controls 
over the volume of lending were used to offset cyclical changes in the level of economic activity. 
Despite such a tight corset for the banks, Thomson & Abbott (2000, p. 81) note that the post-war 
era was nevertheless ‘characterised by vigorous enterprise in the financial sector’. This was 
reflected in an increasing contribution of this sector to GDP with the emergence of a sector of 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) which, subject to less regulation in the decades following 
WWII, grew more rapidly than banks as a consequence (Thomson & Abbott, 2000, p. 77).
21
 See 
Table 3-3 below for an overview of growth of assets in the Australian financial system after 
1955. 
                                                 
20
 For reference, Wallis Inquiry (1997, table 14,1, p. 570-574) provides a time line of selected 
events in the evolution of the Australian financial system from 1937 through to 1997. 
21
 To engage into restricted areas of business such as hire-purchase and instalment lending, trading 
banks would thus buy into NBFIs. Examples were ANZ’s ESANDA and Westpac’s AGC finance 
company subsidiaries. 
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Table 3-3 Historical nominal growth of assets of Australian financial institutions 








1955  5.7  0.9  2.0  
1960  7.2 26.5% 2.2 138.7% 3.3 64.1%
1965  10.6 48.0% 2.8 25.9% 5.4 65.4%
1970  15.9 50.1% 7.0 152.8% 9.0 66.0%
1975  32.5 104.0% 19.2 173.2% 15.1 66.7%
1980  58.3 79.5% 41.6 117.4% 27.4 81.6%
1985  123.0 111.0% 83.8 101.2% 71.2 159.9%
1990  325.8 164.9% 145.2 73.3% 213.6 200.1%
1995  437.9 34.4% 130.9 -9.8% 313.0 46.5%
2000  731.0 66.9% 168.8 28.9% 739.7 136.4%
2005  1245.0 70.3% 215.8 27.9% 1203.6 62.7%
 
Source: RBA (1997) for data to 1995; RBA (2006) for data 2000 and 2005  
NBFI include permanent building societies, credit co-operatives, money market corporations, finance 
companies and general financiers 
Others includes life offices and superannuation funds, other managed funds, securitisation vehicles, 
general insurance offices 
 
3.3.1.2 Effects of the deregulation initiated by Campbell inquiry 
By the late 1970s, pressure for regulatory reform was mounting through a combination of 
inflation, exogenous shocks (e.g. 1973 oil price shock) and the declining effectiveness of 
monetary policy which relied on the control of banks’ balance sheets (Wallis Inquiry, 1997, p. 
567). This ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Campbell Committee in 1979. The 
1981 recommendations of this inquiry brought about a raft of deregulation measures. The 
researchers of the later Wallis Inquiry (1997, Table 14.3-5, p. 588-591) grouped these 
recommendation into four broad categories. Firstly, changes affecting the mechanisms of 
macroeconomic management, including foreign exchange controls and the implementation of 
monetary policy; secondly, the abolition of direct controls on interest rates and portfolio 
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composition; thirdly, a strengthening of regulations aimed at preserving system stability and, 
finally, a removal of barriers to entry by granting banking licenses to overseas institutions. 
Most of these recommendations were subsequently implemented, although some not until 
the late 1980s or 1990s
22
. Recommendations relating to macroeconomic management, direct 
interest rate controls and the easing of bank entry restrictions were adopted first, foreign 
exchange controls, the remaining quantitative lending controls and restrictions on access for 
foreign institutions were removed by the late 1980s (Wallis Inquiry, 1997, p. 587). 
Another important development in the Australian banking scene after 1981 was the gradual 
withdrawal of governments at both state and federal levels from direct ownership of financial 
institutions. This was consistent with the Campbell Committee’s recommendation even though 
the actual trigger lay in the economic crisis that started after the global share crash of October 
1987. Many of the state owned banks had lent aggressively into more liberalized markets and 
had diversified into unfamiliar types of business activities during the 1980s. Due to heavy losses, 
many of them subsequently required direct or indirect capital injections of public funds, a 
sobering experience for their owners and motivation to abolish government deposit guarantees 
and initiate privatisation. The process started in 1991 with the partial float of Commonwealth 
Bank (CBA) and the sale of the State Bank of Victoria to CBA. This was followed by the sale of 
State Bank of New South Wales and Trust Bank Tasmania to Colonial, itself absorbed into CBA 
in 2000. The sale of the State Bank of South Australia to Advance Bank and the full float of 
Bank of Western Australia occurred in 1995 and, lastly, CBA was fully privatised in 1997. The 
particular transactions are described in more detail in the following narratives for each of the 
(formerly) state owned entities in the sample. 
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 RBA (1991, Appendix 1, p. 15-20) provides a chronological overview of changes to banking 
regulations for the time period 1968 to 1990. 
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The 1972 Banks (Shareholdings) Act
23
, whose key provision were later embodied in the 
Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998, is another piece of legislation that has affected the 
shape of the Australian banking industry up to the current day. It limits the holdings by any one 
shareholder in a bank to 15% (up until 1998 10%) unless an exemption is obtained. It was the 
basis for the government’s so-called 'Six Pillars' policy which stated that mergers would not be 
permitted among any of the four major banks or two major life insurance institutions. This policy 
was later revised to the 'Four Pillars' policy in 1998, banning mergers among the four major 
banking groups even though researchers like Harper (2000, p. 71) have raised doubt whether 
mergers among major Australian banks should be handled any differently to mergers elsewhere 
in the economy.  
3.3.1.3 Financial sector reforms of 1998 
A final chapter in the development of the Australian financial system started with the 
financial sector reforms of 1998. These reform proposals were in essence instigated by the 
Financial System Inquiry (called Wallis Inquiry) which had been “charged with providing a 
stocktake of the results arising from the financial deregulation of the Australian financial system 
since the early 1980s” (Wallis Inquiry, 1997, p. vii). One of the stated goals of the Wallis Inquiry 
was to bring about ‘competitive neutrality’, an issue the earlier Campbell Committee in 1981 had 
been struggling with as well. For one thing, the distinction between banks and non-bank financial 
institutions had become even more blurred through time. In 1981, however, the time for a 
uniform regulatory framework was not ready yet and, similarly, the later Martin inquiry in 1991 
just suggested better coordination among regulators (Martin Inquiry, 1991, p. 21). The financial 
sector reforms of 1998 were more radical, however. As one of its key recommendations, it 
                                                 
23
 The Banks (Shareholdings) Act 1972 placed a general limit on shareholdings in banks of 10 per 
cent of voting shares. Exemptions required the approval of the treasurer and these were typically provided 
for foreign banks to establish wholly owned wholesale subsidiaries. When repealed in 1998, the act’s key 
provisions were included in the Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998.  
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postulated a single Commonwealth agency for the prudential regulation of the financial system. 
This entity, established in 1998 and named the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA), was assigned to supervise and regulate banks, NBFIs and insurance companies alike, 
all of which had previously been subject to the supervision of the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) and other regulatory bodies. As shown in Figure 3-1, the 1998 reform also reorganized 
the responsibilities for consumer protection in the financial industry by expanding the 
responsibilities of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
In the time since adoption of the revised regulatory regime, its prudential aspects have been 
tested in 2001 with the collapse of HIH Insurance. It is fair to say, however, that APRA at the 
time was still in start-up mode and further changes to the insurance legislation have provided it 
with additional powers. In the favourable economic environment of the recent past the potential 
effects of the separation of prudential supervision (APRA) and maintenance of system stability 
(RBA) has not been ‘stress tested’ as yet. Here researchers like Valentine (1997, p. 308) have 
expressed concerns about the RBA losing direct contact with those institutions whose failure 
would prejudice systemic stability.  
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Figure 3-1 Restructuring of regulatory framework with the 1998 financial sector reform 
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Source: adaptation of table provided by Goldsworthy, Lewis, & Shuetrim (2000, table 2, p. 5). 
3.3.1.4 Performance and credit loss experience of Australian banks 
The performance of Australian banks as measured by return on assets has been fluctuating 
in a range of 0.5 – 1.2% over the observation period except for the economic crisis of the early 
1990s when Westpac and ANZ (of the major banks) suffered substantial losses (discussed later 
in this chapter). This is illustrated in Figure 3-2. One notices that the favourable economic 
climate since the mid 1990s has kept ROA at around 1%, while NZ banks have achieved higher 
returns more recently.  
Compared to the New Zealand banking system, the crisis in Australia occurred about 1-2 
years later even though the first signs of stress could be detected in Australia’s banks’ financial 
statements through increased provisioning as early 1990. Major losses were reported for the 1992 
year only, however. 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
AUSTRALIA major banks NEW ZEALAND major banks  
Australian major banks comprise ANZ, CBA, NAB, Westpac 
New Zealand major banks comprise ANZ, ASB, BNZ, NBNZ (to 2003), Westpac 
Source: from original financial statements 
A similar pattern as for the ROA emerges in the analysis of loan write-offs as measured as 
a percentage of loans. This is illustrated in Figure 3-3 for the major banks and in Figure 3-4 and 
Figure 3-5 for the universe of (former) state banks. A smaller 1991 peak in write-offs was 
followed by substantial asset write-downs in 1993 for the major banks. As to the state banks, the 
write-downs at State Bank of Victoria precipitated its merger with Commonwealth Bank in 1990 
and the massive asset write-down at State Bank of South Australia occurred in 1993 (both banks 
are discussed in more detail in the following narratives). Similarly, former Rural & Industries 
Bank of Western Australia, now named Bank West, wrote off more loans than any of the major 
banks in the country (cumulative 1991 to 1993). Such a loss experience explains a motivation of 
state governments to seek privatization of these institutions. 
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Figure 3-3 Write-offs as % of average loans of major Australian banks 
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Source: from original financial statements 
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Figure 3-4 Write-offs as % of average loans of (former) Australian state banks 
AU BkWest, 1991, 
5.0%
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Figure 3-5 Write-offs as % of average loans of (former) Australian state banks (State Bank of 
Victoria and South Australia omitted for ease of presentation) 
AU BkWest, 1991, 
5.0%














(on average loans, annualized)
 
Source: data from original financial statements 
 47
3.3.2 Narratives on Australian banks in data base 
As shown in section 3.2, the database compiled in this thesis covers the leading Australian 
banking institutions that have been operating over the 25 year observation period. For ease of 
presentation, the following banking profiles are grouped around the five leading multi-line banks 
(includes St. George Bank) together with all their major predecessors which have been absorbed 
through time. Some regional players have remained independent from these national banking 
groups. They are covered in a final subsection of these narratives. 
In accordance with the sample selection criteria, no data have been collected on banks 
specializing in wholesale banking or specialty financial services (mostly overseas based 
institutions) and merchant banks (e.g. Macquarie Bank). Likewise, very small banks (e.g. Arab 
Bank Australia) and non-bank financial institutions (e.g. building societies, credit unions) have 
been omitted. Many of these institutions will nevertheless be mentioned in the following 
narratives because they had some association or at least some interaction with banks in the 
sample. 
3.3.2.1 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ)  
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ) is one of the longest standing 
major banking institutions, operating in Australia since well back into the 19th century. Its two 
predecessor banks, the Bank of Australasia (founded 1835) and the Union Bank of Australia 
(founded 1837) merged in 1951 to form ANZ Bank. In 1970, in what was then the largest merger 
in Australian banking history, ANZ merged with the English, Scottish and Australian Bank 
Limited, a bank established in 1852 (ANZ Bank, 2005). 
In 1977 it transferred its headquarters from the UK to Melbourne and formally 
incorporated in Australia. In the time since then, it grew its own business with smaller 
acquisitions of minor players (e.g. local banks, building societies). Three notable exceptions 
were firstly ANZ Banking Group’s 1979 takeover of troubled Bank of Adelaide, after problems 
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with Bank of Adelaide’s finance company subsidiary (Wallis Inquiry, 1997, p. 571). The 
banking business of the Bank of Adelaide group was transferred to ANZ in October 1, 1980. 
Secondly, in 1984 ANZ purchased the merchant bank Grindlays (for the most part disposed of in 
2000) and thirdly, it acquired in 2003 The National Bank of New Zealand (NBNZ) from Lloyds 
TSB. The NBNZ transaction virtually doubled ANZ’s total overseas exposure. 
The foray into merchant banking combined with heavy business and property lending in 
the 1980s had its consequences when it booked a loss in 1992 and had to write-off roughly 5% of 
its loan portfolio over the first half of the 90s
24
. Through its Grindlays subsidiary, ANZ was also 
involved in a major Indian banking scandal which was only settled in 2001 (ANZ Bank, 2001). It 
also faced losses at its specialty financier Esanda. In line with a more benign economic climate 
in Australia and New Zealand, ANZ’s performance has been steady since that time. 
3.3.2.2 Commonwealth Bank (CBA) 
Commonwealth Bank (CBA) was established in 1911 though Act of Parliament as a 
federal government owned institution to carry out ‘general and savings bank business’ (Thomson 
& Abbott, 2000, p. 79). In 1924 the bank was also given the authority of a central bank, 
including the exclusive right of note issue. In 1960, after this dual role of the CBA had become a 
growing concern among private trading banks, it was finally divided into the new 
Commonwealth Banking Corporation (a commercial bank) and the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) in charge of undertaking central banking functions (Commonwealth Banks Act 1959). 
With an amendment to is founding act it changed its name to the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia in 1988. 
Major changes were initiated with the adoption of the Commonwealth Banks Restructuring 
Act 1990 which converted CBA from a statutory authority to a public company with 
                                                 
24
 ANZ wrote off its high bad debt provisions caused by the 1990 recession over a longer period of 
time than did most of its peers. 
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conventional share capital in 1991 and allowed the issue of up to 30% of these shares to the 
public. 1991 also constitutes a marked improvement in CBA’s disclosure quality as earlier 
accounts did not contain consolidated financials with CBA’s savings and development banks 
reporting as separate entities before 1989.
25
  The long-term historical financial comparatives in 
the 1991 share issue prospectus allowed an extraction of some non-reported data as far back 
as1981. 
An important chapter in CBA’s history ended in July 1997 when the federal government, 
which had been reducing it shareholdings since 1991, at last sold off its 50.1% majority stake to 
the public (Commonwealth Bank Sale Act 1995). At the same time, this sale initiated the phase-
out of government guarantees for CBA’s liabilities and CBA thus became an institution purely 
governed by the applicable banking and corporations law. 
The following subsections present the major institutions absorbed into CBA during the 
observation period. The acquisition of New Zealand based ASB Bank will be discussed in the 
New Zealand part of these narratives. 
3.3.2.2.1 State Bank of Victoria (CBA succeeded to its assets per 1 January 1991) 
One major trigger for CBA’s 1991 conversion was the need to bail-out troubled State Bank 
of Victoria (SB Victoria). This institution founded in 1841 strongly expanded its asset base and 
scope of activities during the deregulation of the 1980s. Its eventual downfall was caused 
through soaring credit losses and especially the collapse of its merchant banking arm 
Tricontinental taken over in 1985. First signs of stress in Tricontinental’s portfolio were reported 
in the 1989 annual report. In 1990, the Victoria state government agreed to compensate SB 
Victoria for loan write-offs of up AUD 2.1 billion. Finally, per 1 January 1991, CBA became 
‘successor in law’ of SB Victoria. 
                                                 
25
 So-called ‘combined’ P&L and balance sheets were provided back to 1984 but detailed 
disclosure was disaggregated by unit. 
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3.3.2.2.2 Colonial State Bank / State Bank of New South Wales (acquired per 3 June 2000) 
The insurance and banking conglomerate Colonial Ltd acquired by CBA in 2000 included 
the assets of former State Bank of New South Wales (SB NSW) which had been operating under 
the name of Colonial State Bank since having been corporatized and finally sold off by the NSW 
government per 31 December 1994. 
SB NSW traced its origins back to one of Australia’s first savings banks founded in 1819 
and later merged with Government Savings Bank of New South Wales. When this bank’s 
savings bank activities were assumed by CBA in 1931, it adopted the name “Rural Bank of New 
South Wales” until it changed its name to State Bank of New South Wales in 1982. SB NSW 
found itself in an awkward position of competing in the newly deregulated market of the 1980s 
without being able to offer savings bank products until 1987, when a historical 1931 
amalgamation agreement with CBA was finally terminated.
26
 
Like other banks, SB NSW was hit by the ensuing economic crisis of the late 1980s. It 
reported levels of bad debt provisions in excess of 4% of loans but unlike its counterparts in 
Victoria and South Australia it did not require government support. As the financial performance 
of SB NSW remained unsatisfactory, the NSW state government decided to offer it for sale in 
late 1993. With the four major trading banks excluded from tendering, Colonial Mutual Life was 
chosen as the purchaser. Finally, as mentioned above, Colonial Mutual Life, which demutualized 
in 1996 to become Colonial Ltd., operated the bank under the name of Colonial State Bank until 
Colonial itself was absorbed by CBA in 2000. 
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 Early in 1931, the Government Savings Bank of New South Wales closed its doors and froze the 
savings of depositors (Davidson & Salisbury, 2005). Later in December 1931, the failed bank was 
amalgamated into CBA. CBA was conferred an exclusive right of a state savings bank in NSW while 
passing on half its profits on these activities to state government owned Rural Bank of NSW. When Rural 
Bank of NSW changed it name to SB NSW in 1982, a dispute with CBA over the transfer of these profits 
arose which was only settled in 1987. 
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3.3.2.2.3 Trust Bank Tasmania (acquired 2000 as part of Colonial transaction) 
A final minor addition to Commonwealth Bank’s asset base also related to the takeover of 
Colonial Ltd. A few months before this transaction, Colonial had agreed to acquire Tasmania 
based Trust Bank in November 1999, the last remaining state bank. This institution had been 
struggling with investments in modern infrastructure, namely computer systems and had been 
formed at the peak of the financial crisis in 1991 by a combination of The Saving Bank of 
Tasmania (The Hobart Savings Bank) and ailing Tasmania Bank. Tasmania Bank itself had only 
been established as a state bank by Act of Parliament four years earlier in September 1987 
through the merger of Launceston Bank for Savings and a local building society. Both 
Launceston Bank for Savings, in later years operating as Statewide Bank, and Hobart Savings 
Bank, later operating as Savings Bank of Tasmania – SBT Bank, trace their roots back to the 
early colonization of Tasmania and were founded in 1835 and 1845 respectively.  
3.3.2.3 National Australia Bank 
National Australia Bank (NAB) was formed by the merger of National Bank of Australasia 
and the Commercial Banking Corporation of Sydney (CBC) in 1981 when CBC became a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of NAB on 1 October 1981. Both these institutions had a long history 
as trading banks and had been founded in 1858 and 1834 respectively. Officially they started 
operating as a merged entity as of 1 January 1983 once the necessary approvals had been 
obtained (including a change of the banking act). The initial, rather lengthy name of National 
Commercial Banking Corporation of Australia was soon changed to National Australia Bank 
effective 1 October 1984. 
During the eighties, unlike its peers ANZ and Westpac, NAB refrained from large scale 
property lending and diversification into merchant banking which saved it from large scale write-
offs. Instead it sought expansion of its retail business overseas. Notable are the acquisition of 
several UK and Irish based banks per 30 October 1987. These included Clydesdale Bank (UK) 
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and Northern Bank (Northern Ireland, Ireland); the latter one renamed National Irish Bank. In 
1990, it added Yorkshire Bank (UK) to its overseas assets. As result, NAB has long been the 
Australian bank with the most overseas banking exposure
27
. 
NAB continued its overseas expansion with the acquisition of BNZ from the New Zealand 
government in late 1992, the takeover of Michigan National Bank effective November 1995 and, 
finally, the purchase of HomeSide, Inc., a US originator and servicer of mortgage loans in 
February 1998. The US acquisitions did not prove a good decision as NAB saw itself forced to 
sell its major US subsidiaries at a loss in excess of AUD 2 billion in 2001 and 2002. This came 
on top of various scandals in NAB’s domestic trading area which depressed financial 
performance at the beginning of the millennium. For illustration, NAB reported the lowest return 
on assets of any major Australian bank in all but one year from 2000 to 2005. 
3.3.2.4 Westpac Banking Corporation 
Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) is a successor of Australia's first bank. It was 
established as Bank of New South Wales in 1817 even before New South Wales was formally 
proclaimed a crown colony in 1824 and up until 2002 it operated under the statute of a special 
state act (the Bank of New South Wales Act of 1850) when it finally changed its status to a 
corporations law company. Note that the present Westpac name was adopted on occasion of the 
merger with the Commercial Bank of Australia in 1981, a bank of about a third the size of Bank 
of New South Wales (assets of AUD 7.1 billion vs. 18.4 billion). This merger also had an impact 
on the New Zealand banking scene since both Commercial Bank and Bank of NSW had been 
operating as trading banks in New Zealand prior to 1981. 
The most dramatic episode in the history of the bank was Westpac’s near failure in the 
early 1990s. An account of these events is provided in Carew (1997) and more recently Davidson 
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 This means that for purely domestic credit loss studies, data series for NAB have to be adjusted 
for the impact of these foreign loans. 
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& Salisbury (2005) who discuss Westpac’s forays into commercial property lending and also 
international wholesale banking of the eighties. It was not Westpac’s international business, 
however, which ultimately required the bulk of write-offs of a cumulative AUD 5.6 billion for 
the 1990 to 1993 period
28
. The major losses came from involvement in high profile commercial 
real estate projects in Australia, mainly through its subsidiary AGC, and exposure to some larger 
corporate defaults (e.g. Lintner, Adsteam, Northern Star). 
The chart in Figure 3-6 highlights the consequential loss of Westpac’s market leadership. 
Through the merger with Commercial Bank of Australia in 1983 it held more than a quarter of 
Australian banks’ assets and was clearly the largest among the major banks. After its lending 
losses of 1990 to 1993 it fell back behind NAB and Commonwealth Bank in terms of assets and 
is now comparable to ANZ’s size.  
The following accounts describe Challenge Bank and Bank of Melbourne which were 
acquired by Westpac in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Trust Bank New Zealand, taken over in 
1996, is covered in the NZ narratives of section 3.4.3.3 on page 77. 
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 This compares to Westpac’s AUD 65 billion in loans in 1990 and, more importantly, to its AUD 
6.5 billion in equity. 
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3.3.2.4.1 Challenge Bank (acquired per 1 January 1996) 
Western Australia based Challenge Bank had its roots in Perth Building Society which in 
1982 acquired control of Victorian Hotham Permanent Building Society. Legislative barriers 
initially prevented a full integration of operations until the two units formally merged and 
registered under the Challenge Bank name in 1987. Challenge Bank, while still mainly a retail 
bank, expanded in the 1980s into corporate and commercial property lending. When the 
recession of the 90s hit the economy, it required major value adjustments in its loan portfolio. It 
wrote off about 3% of its loans in the three years from 1990 to 1992. In 1996, it was acquired by 
Westpac in a friendly takeover valuing it at AUD 689 million, i.e. about fourteen times earnings 
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(Carew, 1997, p. 436 and 1995 annual report Challenge Bank). Up until 2004, Westpac operated 
Challenge Bank under its original name under but then moved to a single national brand 
throughout Australia. 
3.3.2.4.2 Bank of Melbourne (acquired per 3 May 1998) 
According to Davidson & Salisbury (2005, p. 347), Westpac’s footprint in Victoria had 
always been weak and even its 1982 merger with Melbourne based Commercial Bank of 
Australia did not pay off in this respect. Another opportunity to expand in Victoria arose in 1997 
when Westpac completed the purchase of Bank of Melbourne. This bank had been formed in 
1986 through the merger of RESI Building Society and Statewide Building Society. Until 1989, 
this entity operated under the name of RESI-Statewide Building Society when it registered as 
Bank of Melbourne. Despite low credit losses during the economic gloom of the early 1990s, the 
bank was subject to a short term deposit run after Pyramid Building Society folded in 1990 (K. 
Davis, 2004, p.12; Gizycki & Lowe, 2000, p. 184). At about the same time, Bank of Melbourne 
had to settle a costly lawsuit related to the embezzlement of statutory funds at Occidental Life 
and Regal Life (K. Davis, 2004, p. 244).  
3.3.2.5 St. George Bank 
St. George Bank is generally not considered as one of Australia’s major banks
29
 even 
though as the 5th largest bank it holds about 5% of the banking system’s assets. It was originally 
founded in 1937 as St. George’s Cooperative Building Society in a Sydney suburb. It grew 
through amalgamation with neighbouring building societies and by 1979 it had become the 
largest building society in the country with 130 branches and 800 staff (St. George Bank, 2006). 
Expansion continued through the merger with Statewide Building Society effective in 1988 and 
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 For instance, it has not been included in either the ‘six pillars’ or ‘four pillars’ policy. 
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acquisition of Victorian Savings and Loan Society in 1990. In 1992, it achieved its full banking 
status and changed its name to St. George Bank. To diversify its traditional retail loan portfolio, 
it acquired Barclays Bank’s Australia commercial loan portfolio in 1994. After its unsuccessful 
attempt to acquire Queensland-based Metway bank in 1996,
30
  its 1997 merger with Advance 
Bank, also a former Sydney building society, doubled its asset base in one single transaction. 
The integration of Advance Bank initially cost St. George some momentum but in the past 
few years it has diversified its asset base even though its lending portfolio still comprises 72% 
residential mortgage loans (S&P, 2006). St. George was a relatively new entrant into the New 
Zealand market. Its Superbank subsidiary was launched in February 2003, a joint venture 
between supermarket chain Foodstuffs and St.George Bank Ltd. of Australia. Unsuccessful in 
growing its asset base in line with its targets, Superbank deregistered as a bank in 2006 after 
selling its loan portfolio and redeeming all customer deposits. 
3.3.2.5.1 Advance Bank (acquired per 29 January 1997) 
Advance Bank mentioned above was formed as a result of the conversion of NSW 
Building Society (founded 1940) to Advance Bank Australia in June 1985. In a submission to the 
Wallis inquiry, the bank claimed that it was ‘the first building society in the world to 
demutualize, convert to bank status and list on the stock exchange’ (Advance Bank, 1996, p. 1). 
In its first decade, growth of Advance Bank was steady and organic without major acquisitions. 
The major transaction for the bank was the July 1995 purchase of the core retail banking assets 
of troubled State Bank of South Australia. These assets provided Advance Bank and 
subsequently St. George Bank with a strong presence in South Australia. To this day, St. George 
operates under the brand name Bank of South Australia or ‘BankSA’ in this state. 
                                                 
30
 Metway subsequently joined with Suncorp and Queensland Industry Development Corp in a 
merger arranged by the Queensland state government. 
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3.3.2.5.2 State Bank of South Australia (acquired by Advance Bank in July 1995) 
The State Bank of South Australia (SBSA) had been formed on 1 July 1984 by the 
amalgamation of two banks owned by the State Government of South Australia - the Savings 
Bank of South Australia, and the former State Bank of South Australia (MacPherson, 1993, 
SBSA Report of Investigation, chapter 3).
31
 Set up as an entity with both commercial and non-
commercial statutory objectives and with its profile as a regional retail bank, SBSA sought to 
compete against the newly deregulated private banks, embarking on an ambitious path of 
expansion outside its home state. As a consequence, the bank saw a remarkable enlargement of 
its asset base. Its more than 400% asset growth rate clearly exceeded that of other banks, both 
government owned, and private (MacPherson, 1993, Table 3.3). This turned it into a diversified 
financial services group with very significant Australia-wide and international operations. 
Acquisitions during this time included merchant banking subsidiaries, real estate companies as 
well as United Bank in New Zealand. 
As documented in McCarthy (2002), SBSA saw itself faced with mounting loan losses for 
the 1991 financial year as the bullish economic conditions of the 80s came to an end. Only 
indemnity funds in excess of AUD 3 billion provided by the state government prevented SBSA’s 
collapse. The state government subsequently resolved to remove the impaired assets from the 
core bank by setting up an entity named GAMD to assume these assets. This separation prepared 
the way for the corporatization (1994) and subsequent sale of SBSA’s core banking assets to 
Advance Bank in July 1995. Impaired and non-banking assets remained with state-owned South 
Australian Asset Management Corporation.  
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 McCarthy (2002) provides a detailed history of these two predecessor banks and describes the 
events leading up to their merger, in particular the shift in culture that occurred within these banks from 
‘the old thrift philosophy’ to ‘the desire to be a major financial player’ (p. 142-143). 
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3.3.2.6 Australian banks not absorbed into any of the major national banking groups 
3.3.2.6.1 Bank West (formerly Rural and Industry Bank of Western Australia)  
Bank West has its origins in the Agricultural Bank of Western Australia which was 
established to ‘promote rural enterprise in the colony’ (R&I Bank Annual Report 1986, p. 3). In 
1944, the original charter was widened and Rural and Industry Bank of Western Australia (R&I 
Bank) opened in 1945, operating as a full trading bank including a government agency 
department. In 1956 it added a savings bank division.  
Notable events earlier in the observation period are the 1987 full acquisition of the Primary 
Industry Bank of Australia (PIBA), an agricultural development bank reviewed in the next 
section. 1987 was also the year when, on behalf of the WA state government, R&I Bank had to 
acquire ailing Western Australian (WA) Teachers’ Credit Society. According to Davis (2004, p. 
243), this institution had grown rapidly in the first half of the 1980s partly based on commercial 
lending but then had to seek government assistance after several years of difficulty.  
To improve commercial flexibility of the institution in a deregulated financial system, the 
state parliament passed legislation in 1988 which initiated corporatization of the bank. This 
process concluded with its incorporation as R&I Bank of Western Australia Ltd. in 1991. Like 
other state banks it had the difficult dual objective of ‘operating profitably and also to the 
greatest advantage of the people of Western Australia and promoting the balanced development 
of Western Australia’ (R&I Bank Annual Report 1989, p. 4).  
In 1990, major asset quality problems became apparent in the bank’s portfolio and the bank 
was the subject of a brief run in January 1992. The run ended when the RBA governor issued a 
statement pointing out that deposits with the R&I Bank were guaranteed by the state government 
of Western Australia (K. Davis, 2004, p. 242). Over a period of three years R&I Bank wrote off 
approximately 13% of its loans. It could only replenish its dwindling equity by means of 
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injections of capital by R&I Holdings, the formal owner of R&I Bank on behalf of the state 
government. R&I Holdings itself had to borrow these funds. 
The 1994 name change from R&I Bank to Bank of Western Australia (Bank West) led the 
way to the full scale privatisation of the bank. In December 1995, Bank of Scotland acquired a 
51% cornerstone stake in Bank West with the balance floated to the public in February 1996. In 
the subsequent years Bank West’s Scottish owner steadily increased its holding. Finally, Bank of 
Scotland’s successor HBOS, which itself had been formed in 2001 as a result of the merger 
between Bank of Scotland and the Halifax, moved to full control in August 2003. Accordingly, 
Bank West no longer publishes detailed financial accounts. Some key figures of P&L and 
balance sheet as well as the levels of provision are, however, disclosed as part of HBOS’s annual 
segment reporting. 
3.3.2.6.2 Primary Industry Bank of Australia 
Primary Industry Bank of Australia (PIBA) was created under the Primary Industry Bank 
Act 1977 jointly by the Commonwealth government, the four major trading banks and the state 
banks as part of an electoral promise to the rural sector to have its own bank (Metcalfe, 1984). 
PIBA was operating purely as a refinance institution during the first decade of its existence, i.e. 
the shareholding banks were lending on its behalf but could then refinance these rural loans at 
special terms with PIBA
32
. The characteristics of PIBA’s pre-1987 business means that its 
lending was not effectively subject to credit risks associated with the ultimate borrower before 
1987 and no meaningful loss and provisioning data could thus be gathered for this period.  
When the government indicated its desire to dispose of its PIBA stake in 1987, R&I Bank 
of Western Australia expressed an interest and the other shareholder agreed to sell their stakes as 
well. R&I Bank, later operating under the Bank West name, retained PIBA as a separate entity. 
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 PIBA itself was provided financial assistance by the Commonwealth by means of low-interest 
deposits with the bank. 
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PIBA was granted full banking authority in June 1987 and initiated direct lending, diversifying 
into corporate and commercial loan segments. Its credit losses remained at moderate levels 
throughout the crisis of the early 1990s. 
In the context of the privatisation of its owner Bank West (renamed from R&I Bank), 
PIBA was then sold to Dutch Rabobank Group (Rabo) in October 1994. Rabo continued to 
operate the business under the PIBA brand name for the subsequent nine years to 2003 when 
PIBA's name was changed to Rabobank Australia Limited (Rabobank, 2006). Unfortunately, 
PIBA ceased publishing full standalone financials once it became part of Rabo.  
As to PIBA’s operations in New Zealand, these were initiated in 1989 with the granting of 
a banking license. By the time Rabobank became PIBA’s owner, it had grown the NZ loan book 
to NZD 150 million which it managed from Sydney. Its New Zealand presence provided Rabo an 
entry into the NZ rural finance sector. 
3.3.2.6.3 Suncorp (formerly Suncorp Metway, Metway Bank) 
Queensland-based Metway Bank started business on 1 July, 1988 following conversion 
from Metropolitan Permanent Building Society which had been founded 33 years earlier 
(Metway Bank Annual Report, 1992). In 1990, Metway Bank acquired Prudential Finance 
Limited and, in 1992, the Household Building Society (Suncorp, 2006). In 1996, the Queensland 
Government-owned insurance company Suncorp and Queensland Industry Development Corp 
(QIDC) entities were merged into the publicly listed Metway Bank to create the new banking 
and insurance group Suncorp Metway. The Queensland state government was initially the largest 
shareholder of the new group with a 68 percent holding but by 2000 it had sold its stake in a 
series of instalment note placements. 
In the meantime, Suncorp has simplified its name by dropping ‘Metway’ from its logo in 
2002 and currently claims to be the sixth largest banking group in Australia (Suncorp annual 
report 2005). Both its insurance and banking operations contribute about equally to its bottom 
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line. This dual structure increases the difficulty of extracting bank specific data for this entity 
even though segment disclosure has greatly improved over the past few years. 
3.3.2.6.4 Bank of Queensland (BOQ) 
BOQ was established in 1874 as The Brisbane Permanent Benefit Building and Investment 
Society, the first permanent building society formed in Queensland but soon thereafter, in 1887, 
converted to a bank and then in 1942, following mergers with other Queensland-based financial 
institutions, to a trading bank. The name Bank of Queensland was adopted in 1970, one year 
before it listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (BOQ, 2006).  
In 1996, Bank of Queensland stayed independent and did not to join the merger of Suncorp 
and Metway Bank arranged by the Queensland government. This was despite the fact that, at the 
time, the Queensland government held 44% of the bank
33
. However resistance by the bank’s 
management, who saw Metway bank as a rival, as well as the possible need to buy out the 
remaining shareholders prevented the transaction (Bowen, Daley, & Huber Jr., 1982). As part of 
the merger arrangements, the Queensland government committed itself with the federal 
authorities to disposing of its BOQ shareholding. This was completed through a public offering 
in December 1999 (Queensland Audit Office, 2000, p. 95). 
BOQ’s retail banking activities have always been its core focus despite some small scale 
diversification of its earning stream. Most of its branches, whose number has doubled over the 
past five years, are still in Queensland. Much of this recent growth has been achieved through a 
franchising scheme called ’Owner-Managed Branches (OMB)’, mainly set up to originate 
mortgage loans, including in other states of the East coast. 
                                                 
33
 The Queensland government held slightly less than 50% of BOQ throughout the 1980s and up to 
this transaction (from BOQ annual reports) 
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3.3.2.6.5 Bendigo Bank / Elders Rural Bank 
Bendigo Bank (Bendigo) is a regional bank operating predominantly in Victoria which has 
its roots in the Bendigo goldfields. It was founded there as the ‘Bendigo Permanent Land and 
Building Society’ in 1858 (Bendigo Bank, 2005). Since the early 1980s it has expanded through 
a number of acquisitions, mainly of other building societies. By the time it converted to a bank in 
1995, it had grown into Victoria's biggest building society. Unlike other building societies in its 
home state, e.g. the Pyramid group of building societies which had to rescued by the state 
government in 1990
34
, Bendigo came out of the recession relatively unscathed. This is reflected 
by the support it received from the Victorian government which helped it acquire two other 
building societies at the time (Bendigo Bank, 1996, p. 5). 
A special innovation of Bendigo have been the so-called community banks where since 
1998 smaller local communities, many of whom had lost their local bank branch through closure, 
are able to form a company to operate it as a franchised Bendigo Bank branch. Bendigo provides 
banking support and revenue is shared with the locally owned company. By August 2005, 159 of 
these branches were operating, i.e. more than half of the total 310 Bendigo branches at the time 
(Bendigo Bank, 2005). 
Finally, Bendigo is associated with Elders Rural Bank which it owns in a 50/50 joint 
venture together with Futuris Corp., the holding company of Elders group
35
. Elders Rural Bank, 
a specialist rural financial service provider and lender, was incorporated in January 1999 and the 
banking licence granted in 2000. Bendigo provides it with the banking systems and Elders with a 
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 During the mid-1980s, competing with banks and offering attractive interest rates, the Pyramid 
Building Society’s problem was that it branched out from its traditional lending area - namely, a building 
society lending for home loans - and lent money to developers of projects such as hotels, motels, guest 
houses, office buildings, caravan parks and other resorts around Australia (K. Davis, 2004, p. 242, 243). 
The building society was then not able to sustain the crash on the commercial market as many of its 
borrowers had gone broke in the recession. 
35
 Bendigo Bank accounts for Elders Rural Bank under the equity method, i.e. without full 
consolidation. 
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network of more than 400 branches in all Australian states (status March 2006). Elders Rural 
Bank had AUD 2.6 billion in assets in June 2005 compared to AUD 13.3 billion in assets for 
Bendigo. 
3.3.2.6.6 Adelaide Bank 
Adelaide Bank is a South Australian based institution born out of the building societies 
movement
36
. Incorporated as the Co-operative Building Society of South Australia in 1900, it 
had a relatively conservative risk profile going into the economic crisis of the early 1990s. At 
this time, it merged with, or rather de facto acquired two other South Australian building 
societies, the larger Hindmarsh Adelaide Building Society and the small REI Building Society
37
, 
both of them struggling with the impact of the recession. This transaction almost doubled the co-
operative’s size and provided the basis for its listing on the ASX and then conversion to become 
Adelaide Bank at the beginning of 1994 (Adelaide Bank, 2006). 
Most of Adelaide Bank’s exposure is still to the housing market, although with only 25 
branches it originates most of its loans through third party mortgage brokers. This means it is 
largely a wholesale mortgage lender. Currently, it has lending exposure to all Australian states 
and just a quarter of the lending is to South Australian borrowers. A substantial part of its 
lending is of non-prime nature by way of more risky so-called ‘low-doc’ mortgage loans
38
. 
The institution has two other special features. Firstly, it is involved in margin lending 
which started in 2000 with its acquisition of Leveraged Equity Ltd., the margin lending business 
                                                 
36
 It is completely separate from Bank of Adelaide which had to be rescued by ANZ in 1979.  
37
 The SA Government directed the Co-operative to take over REI after accounting irregularities 
had been uncovered that overstated REI's profits and an audit had determined that more than half of REI’s 
assets had evaporated within a year.(Baker, 2000, p. 66; Darvall, 1991). 
38
 Low-doc or low documentation loans are loans to borrowers like self-employed people who do 
not have the documentation required to get traditional home loans.  
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of stock broking firm Ord Minnett. Secondly, starting in 1996, Adelaide Bank has become 
increasingly reliant on funding through securitization of loan assets. By mid 2005, Adelaide 
Bank serviced off-balance sheet securitized assets of AUD8 billion, corresponding to just below 
60% of its total assets. Under new international financial accounting standards (IFRS) these off-
balance assets will be recognized on the balance sheet with the annual accounts of 2006. 
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3.4 The New Zealand banking system 
This section reviews the development of the New Zealand banking system during the 1980 
to 2005 observation period. It commences with a summary of key developments and events that 
have been shaping the current banking landscape (section 3.4.1). The following two subsections 
review the specific stories of two classes of institutions for which data have been collected in this 
thesis. In the first group are banks that had been operating as trading banks before the onset of 
deregulation of the financial system in the mid-1980s (section 3.4.2). The second group consists 
of banks that have only been formed as a result of the 1986 framework for bank registration and 
supervision (section 3.4.3). Most of the banks in the latter group had their roots in mutually 
owned financial institutions such as building societies and trustee savings banks. Some were 
special purpose government institutions like the Post Office Savings Bank or the Rural Bank of 
New Zealand. 
As a visual summary, Figure 3-10 provides a condensed time line of merger and 
acquisition events in the New Zealand banking industry since 1980. 
3.4.1 Key developments and events in New Zealand financial sector during observation 
period 
The period since 1980 coincides with some major structural changes for the New Zealand 
financial sector. In essence, one can break this time into three separate phases: 
• The pre-1984 era,  
• the uncertainties mixed with some great optimism following the deregulation of the 
Financial Policy Reform, and, finally, 
• the recovery and consolidation after the economic crisis in the early 1990s. 
 
Prior to the reforms of the mid-1980s, New Zealand’s financial system along with the 
economy in general was characterized by pervasive government regulations and other 
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interventions (Grimes, 1998, p. 294). Grimes notes that these interventions had not only 
macroeconomic efficiency problems, but also microeconomic distortionary effects as a result of 
treating different sub-sectors in very different ways. As to institutions operating in the pre-1984 
era, Grimes (1998) suggested a break-down into three groups: trading banks, savings banks, and 
other non-bank financial institutions.  
The five, respectively after 1982 four, trading banks included government-owned market 
leader Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) together with the National Bank of NZ, ANZ and Westpac 
(Bank of New South Wales merged with Commercial Bank of Australia in 1982 to form 
Westpac). 
The universe of savings banks included the so-called ‘Trustee Savings Banks’ (i.e. 
community based banks), and the Post Office Savings Bank, all with a deposit guarantee by the 
New Zealand government (Grimes, 1998, p. 295). These institutions made mortgage, and to a 
minor extent also personal, loans. Typically as much as half their assets were invested in local 
and central government securities.
39
  One could argue that this balance sheet structure made it 
harder for them to adapt in the subsequent deregulation as they lacked expertise to originate 
assets in a risky market. Note that in order to attract low-cost deposits and make certain classes 
of loans, the trading banks had also established their own savings bank subsidiaries at the time.  
As to non-bank financial institutions during this period, cooperative building societies and 
credit unions were those which offered the most ‘bank like’ services to their members. 
It had not escaped regulators’ attention, however, that, while each of the above groups of 
financial institutions was subject to carefully delineated sets of legislation, a substantial blurring 
between their activities had been occurring both in New Zealand and overseas (Doughty, 1986, 
p. 115). Substantial changes were thus initiated following the change of government in July 1984 
when all interest rate regulation, ratio requirements, credit ceilings, and numerous other 
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 Banks were subject to a maze of ratio requirements, with savings banks generally required to 
hold more low-risk government stock and other liquid assets (Deane, 1986, p. 17). 
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interventions were abolished (Deane, 1986, p. 11). The Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(Amendment) Act 1986 legislated the structural reforms of the banking industry. It allowed the 
entry of new banks and specified that there would be only one type of ‘bank’ in New Zealand, 
the registered bank (Sun, Tong, & Tong, 2002).
40
  Under the act, any registered bank was now 
able to engage in retail banking, wholesale banking or full service banking. No longer were there 
artificial limits on the number of banks, nor was there discrimination between domestic and 




With the deregulation, the number of banks increased significantly as new foreign banks 
entered and domestic savings institutions and building societies converted to banks. One could 
describe the mood immediately after the 1986 deregulation as a time of uncertainty for some but 
great optimism, even euphoria for others. It was the time when some like United Bank and 
particularly Bank of New Zealand diversified into new areas of business whose unfamiliar risks 
subsequently caused major lending losses at the beginning of 1990.  
As in Australia, state-owned institutions were among those which coped the least well in 
the rough climate of deteriorating markets. Most notable were extreme credit losses at Bank of 
New Zealand which lost its equity twice within a period of merely two years (see section 
3.4.2.3). Debt write-offs for BNZ in Figure 3-8 were so large that they had to been shown in a 
chart separate from other NZ banks. Likewise, Rural Bank of New Zealand faced large loan 
losses. Development Finance Corporation New Zealand (DFC), a merchant bank which the 
government had just partially privatized in 1987, was strongly exposed to the falls of listed and 
non-listed companies after the 1987 share market crash and left with large bad debts. It collapsed 
                                                 
40
 Note that under previous regulation the formation of a trading bank had required a special act of 
parliament (Grimes, 1998, p. 294) 
41
 Details of prudential regulation in New Zealand, in particular the elements of the bank disclosure 
regime, are presented in section 3.5.1.2. 
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in 1989 and was placed under statutory management by the Reserve Bank. The failure of DFC 
had a negative impact on New Zealand’s international credit standing as many international 
lenders to DFC had been banking on an implicit guarantee by the government which still held 
75% of DFC’s shares. Finally, outside the sector of state-owned institutions, problems surfaced 
at NZI Bank which was created out of a wholesale finance subsidiary of insurance group NZI 
Corporation in 1987. It experienced substantial losses arising from the October 1987 share 
market collapse and the 1988/89 fall in the property market which led to its closure in February 
1992. 
The period since the 1989/1990 crisis can be characterized by consolidation among banks, 
good financial performance with declining and then stabilizing levels of loan losses (as 
illustrated in Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8). Many New Zealand-owned institutions were sold to 
foreign owned institutions after 1990. 
As of 2006, and after the 2003 merger of NBNZ into ANZ, there remain 4 large multi-
purpose banks in the market. As shown in Figure 3-9, ANZ, ASB, BNZ and Westpac hold 65% 
of total financial sector assets which corresponds to more than 80% of assets held by deposit 
taking institutions (RBNZ, 2005). Of the other 16 banks registered, there are four that could be 
characterized as retail banks. Locally owned TSB Bank (formerly Taranaki Savings Bank) is one 
savings bank that has operated over the full observation period and for which data has been 
collected. There are some recent entries into retail banking by government-owned Kiwibank and 
St. George Bank’s New Zealand subsidiary Superbank which, in the meantime, has exited the 
market again. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, both have been omitted from the database due 
to the brevity of their existence. The same applies to the very small Auckland based Kookmin 
bank, a branch of a leading Korean retail bank, which mainly serves the Korean expatriate 
community. 
A special feature of the New Zealand financial system is the comparably less regulated 
sector of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Quite large pre-1984 according to Grimes 
(1998, p. 295), it later lost some significance but has again been growing strongly since 1998 
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(Thorp, 2003, p. 18). It accounts for approximately 10% of total domestically sourced credit 
provision, provides half of consumer credit and over 15% of commercial property lending, with 
the share of development lending significantly higher (RBNZ, 2005, p. 22). As shown in Hess & 
Feng (2007), some NBFIs like Southland Building Society (SBS) and the cooperative PSIS 
(formerly Public Service Investment Society) have expanded into full scale retail banking 
activities without registering as banks with RBNZ. NBFIs have not been reporting under the 
bank disclosure regime but under the less stringent provisions of the Securities Act 1978. In line 
with the sample selection criteria, they have not been considered in this data collection. 
Figure 3-7 Write-offs as % of average loans through observation period (New Zealand banks 
excluding BNZ and Rural Bank for ease of presentation) 
NZ ANZ, 1993, 1.2%
NZ ANZ, 1990, 1.5%















(on average loans, annualized)
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Figure 3-9 New Zealand break-down of financial system assets (2004) 
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Source: RBNZ Financial Stability Report May 2005 (RBNZ, 2005) 
 
3.4.2 Financial institutions with roots as trading banks 
3.4.2.1 ANZ and National Bank of New Zealand (NBNZ)  
The most complete set of data could be retrieved from National Bank of New Zealand 
(NBNZ) and ANZ, two trading banks with a long history in the New Zealand market which were 
joined in 2003 to form ‘ANZ National Bank Ltd Group’. 
NBNZ had always been a stand-alone entity in New Zealand. In 1919, UK-based Lloyds 
Bank took up its first shares in NBNZ and moved to become sole shareholder in 1966 (Holmes, 
1999, p. 22, 79-82). When NBNZ moved its head office from London to Wellington in 1979, it 
also switched from GBP to NZD based financial reporting (p. 133-154). Before being sold to 
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ANZ, NBNZ had grown through a series of acquisitions including Rural Bank of New Zealand 
in 1992 and Countrywide Bank in 1999 (see genealogy of New Zealand banks in Figure 3-10). 
ANZ, on the other hand, is part of an Australia based international banking conglomerate 
(more details in the Australian section of this review). Its NZ operations had 25% public 
minority shareholders after its local incorporation in 1979. The Australian parent bought them 
out in 1986 after local ownership rules had been relaxed during the deregulation. 
The acquisition of government-owned Post Office Bank was a major addition to ANZ’s 
depositor base in 1989. As it formed part of New Zealand Post, there was no detailed segment 
reporting of its banking activities except for some prospectuses in the very brief period between 
incorporation (24 February 1987) and its sale to ANZ as per 28 February 1989. 
As a final note, both ANZ and NBNZ experienced quite high levels of loan write-offs in 
the early 1990s, with a higher 2% peak for NBNZ but in cumulative terms greater losses for 
ANZ (see Figure 3-7). 
3.4.2.2 Westpac Banking Corporation, New Zealand Division 
Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) is another of the commercial banks with a very 
long history in New Zealand. It was founded 1817 in Australia as Bank of New South Wales and 
later expanded its operations to New Zealand. The name Westpac was devised in 1982 when 
Bank of New South Wales merged with Commercial Bank of Australia, another Australian 
institution with strong representation in the New Zealand market. Westpac has operated in New 
Zealand merely as a branch of its Australian parent. This has made it difficult to obtain a full 
range of financial data on its New Zealand operations before it became subject to the bank 
disclosure regime in 1996. Fortunately, some pro-forma consolidated information on the New 
Zealand division was contained in prospectuses published under the securities regulations as far 
back as 1988. Accordingly, pre-1996 data are comparably ‘thin’ in the database. In a recent 
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development, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has required Westpac to incorporate its local 
New Zealand retail operations.
42
 
3.4.2.3 Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) 
Bank of New Zealand (BNZ), founded in 1861, also has its roots as a trading bank but as 
early as 1895 (Bank of New Zealand Banking Act 1895), the New Zealand government injected 
preferential share capital to cover large bad debts. 
43
  BNZ was fully taken over by the Crown in 
1945 and there were even concerns the whole of the banking system would be nationalized by 
the government of the day (Holmes, 1999, p. 33). The legislation regarding BNZ was revised 
with The Bank of New Zealand Act 1979 which reconfirmed the 100% government ownership 
but clearly stated that the Crown would not be liable for BNZ’s debts (unlike the trustee bank 
legislation discussed later in this chapter). The subsequent 1986 amendment to the 1979 Act 
allowed the placement of up to one-third of equity with other investors. In 1988, finally, the 
special statutes related to BNZ were repealed and the bank converted to a limited liability 
company incorporated under the Companies Act. 
With the deregulation of the mid 1980s, an ambitious team of directors had assumed 
management responsibility with the obvious aim to turn BNZ into a global player. The 1987 
share prospectus, for illustration, featured a picture of Wellington’s BNZ Centre as “the 
headquarters for the Bank’s worldwide activities” (p. 13).  
Soon after an initial 25% of BNZ shares had been placed to the public, huge bad debts and 
property losses in both Australia and New Zealand became apparent. It forced BNZ’s two main 
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 The local incorporation per 2007 has led to minor additional disclosure. As a branch bank, 
Westpac (NZ) did not publish tier 1 and 2 capital which became available as a locally incorporated bank. 
43
 See Colgate et al. (1990, Appendix VI, p. 12, minutes of BNZ shareholder meeting of March 
1895). 
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shareholders, the government and Fay Richwhite & Co
44
, to bail out the BNZ twice. In total, they 
had to inject over NZD 1.1 billion into the bank in 1990 and 1991
45
. As part of the restructuring, 
the troubled portion of BNZ’ loan portfolio was transferred to a special entity (ADBRO 
Investments Ltd) to speed up the recovery of the main banking operations. Finally in 1993, BNZ 
was sold to National Australia Bank (NAB), one of the major Australian banking groups, which 
has operated BNZ as a stand-alone subsidiary ever since. 
To a certain extent, BNZ’s changes in ownership are also reflected in its financial 
disclosure. In the early 1980s, at the beginning of the observation period, BNZ reported like a 
public sector entity, emphasizing its role for the good of the New Zealand economy. Disclosure 
became more in line with privately owned banks, which are accountable to their shareholders, 
only when it was partially floated in 1987. 
Prior to acquiring BNZ, NAB had already been actively building a presence in the New 
Zealand market. In 1987, it had registered as a bank which by 1992 had grown into a network of 
35 branches with assets in excess of NZD 2 billion, i.e. 11% of BNZ’s asset at the time of its 
purchase by NAB. 
3.4.3 New Zealand banks with roots as special statutes institutions 
ASB Bank (ASB) and TSB Bank (TSB) as well as former Trustbank, Countywide Bank 
and United Bank are institutions that have their roots in the previously very fragmented trustee 
banking and building society sectors which were regulated by a myriad of statutes. Furthermore, 
before the onset of financial deregulation, the activities of Post Office Savings Bank, mentioned 
earlier in the context of ANZ, as well as Rural Bank of New Zealand were subject to special 
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 Fay Richwhite & Co through its 62% controlled subsidiary Capital Markets Equities became 
30% BNZ shareholder with the first recapitalization in June 1989 only. 
45
 Including capitalization of ADBRO, capital of NZD 495 and 635 million was injected in 1990 
and 1991 respectively. 
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statutes. All these institutions corporatized and sought bank registration in the late 1980s/early 
1990s which meant a change of their ownership relationships and legal structure. As limited 
liability companies they now had easier access to external capital and, after the statutory 
protection of their original business activity had vanished, they competed head on with the 
established banks. Moreover, as limited liability companies, they could now be sold to or merge 
with other players in the industry. 
This section firstly gives a brief overview on these statutes which is then followed by the 
profiles of the particular institutions. 
3.4.3.1 Special statutes overview 
The discussion in this subsection is based on Table 3-5 which lists the special statute 
legislation that has been in force during the observation period. 
Building Societies have been and still are subject to the Building Societies Act 1965 which 
has, however, undergone some substantial revisions mainly with the Building Societies 
Amendment Act 1987 which defined building societies more along the lines of other financial 
institutions. The amendment removed powers of the registrar, formerly the supervisor for this 
industry, and eliminated cross-support clauses among building societies. It also allowed the 
conversion of the institutions to a company registered under the regular companies legislation, 
i.e. issuing shares to its members. Later, the building societies also became subject to the 
provisions of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 which requires them to report with generally 
accepted accounting standards. Some building societies like SBS (Southland Building Society) 
have opted not to convert to a bank and still operate as a non-bank financial institution 
incorporated as a building society. 
The sector of regional trustee banks was subject to the Trustee Banks Act 1948, 
subsequently repealed by the Trustee Banks Act 1983. Under both acts, the government 
effectively guaranteed their deposits. The trustee bank legislation was repealed in 1988 by the 
Trustee Banks Restructuring Act which phased out government guarantees and set the 
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framework for corporatization. Community trusts were created to assume ownership of the 
newly formed banking entities. 
The group of private savings banks had their own statute (Private Savings Banks Act 1964, 
repealed by Private Savings Banks Act 1983). This statute applied to savings bank set up as 
subsidiaries of the main trading banks which enabled them to offer savings products to their 
clients. This legislation was repealed with the Private Savings Banks (Transfer of Undertakings) 
Act 1992 which enabled trading banks to amalgamate their savings subsidiaries. 
Post Office Savings Bank, Rural Bank and Bank of New Zealand were subject to their own 
statutes (see Table 3-5 and also the earlier discussion on BNZ for details). All three lost their 
privileges in 1987 when the system for uniform bank registration was put into place (with the 
enactment of The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Amendment) Act 1986, subsequently replaced 
by The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989). 
3.4.3.2 ASB (formerly Auckland Savings Bank) 
ASB, established in 1847 as Auckland Savings Bank, had been a community savings bank 
in the Auckland area. Incorporated as a Trustee Savings bank with government deposit 
guarantee, it expressed its intention to become a member of the group of Trustee banks 
(subsequently called Trust Bank NZ) in 1986 but not much later opted to pursue its independent 
path. It had started extending its reach to other parts of the country when it corporatized and 
registered as a bank in 1989. Ownership was first transferred to the charitable ASB Bank 
Community Trust but in the same year Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) acquired a 
controlling 75% stake in the institution. CBA finally bought out the community trust in late 2000 
to become sole shareholder. To develop into one of the five leading banks in New Zealand, ASB 
has mostly relied on internal growth as opposed to taking over other banks; the 1990 acquisition 
of the small Nelson based Westland Bank, like ASB a former trustee savings bank, being the 
only notable exception. Given ASB’s history, meaningful disclosure of selected credit loss 
related information only became available in 1987.  
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3.4.3.3 Trust Bank Group 
Trustbank was an institution that had directly been formed as a result of financial sector 
reform when eight regional trust banks joined forces in 1988 to form Trust Bank Group 
(Trustbank). While an increasing number of services were centralized into this new entity, 
Trustbank formally remained a cooperative arrangement with its members remaining 
independently owned legal entities. New members joined later but others like small Taranaki 
Savings Bank (TSB) and more notably ASB left the group to follow their independent path. In 
April 1995 the member banks formally amalgamated into one unit but this was just one year 
before Trustbank was sold to and merged into Westpac (May 1996). In line with its policy to 
keep regional brand names,
46
  Westpac adopted ’WestpacTrust’ as its official bank name in New 
Zealand until it reverted back to the original Westpac brand in 2002. 
3.4.3.4 TSB Bank (formerly Taranaki Savings Bank) 
Taranaki based TSB booked its first deposit in 1850. With the loosening of regulations on 
banking by financial policy reform of the mid 1980, TSB decided to seek an independent path 
and to stand aside from the amalgamation of the country's Trustee banks mentioned above. Its 
ownership was transferred to a community trust and in 1989 it registered as a bank, changing its 
name to TSB Bank. It adapted its infrastructure to cope with lending activities of a retail bank 
because, like other trust banks, it had previously held much of its assets in government stock and 
other liquid investments with trading banks. Its growth has been smooth and steady, purely 
financed by internally generated funds. It has not ventured into activities unrelated to retail 
banking to any substantial degree with 90% of its gross loan portfolio classified as residential 
mortgages (data per 30 March 2005). Full service branches are predominantly located in the 
Taranaki core region but for the origination of home loans the bank has established service 
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 Westpac initially also retained names of other banks acquired in Australia in the late 1990s like 
Challenge Bank and Bank of Melbourne. 
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centres in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. Accordingly, by 2005 more than two thirds of 
credit exposures are now outside Taranaki. To serve these customers and also to expand its 
depositor base, TSB started offering phone and later Internet banking services at a national level 
in 1996. 
3.4.3.5 Countrywide Bank 
Cooperative Countrywide Building Society became a registered bank in 1988 when it 
changed its name to Countrywide Bank (Countrywide). At the same time, the bank was publicly 
listed with members of the former building society allocated 40% of the shares while UK based 
Royal Bank of Scotland (40%) and General Accident Insurance Company (20%) became the 
dominant shareholders. Royal Bank of Scotland eventually bought out General Accident 
Insurance Company and when Countrywide acquired United Bank, the UK bank took its stake to 
100% in 1992. In 1998, finally, the bank was sold to and integrated into NBNZ. 
3.4.3.6 United Bank 
United Bank had its origin as a building society, too. It had been formed as United 
Building Society by the union of Northern United Building Society and the Canterbury Building 
Society in October 1982. It became the target of a run on its deposits in August 1988 
(MacPherson, 1993, 18.2.2). In 1990, it became a wholly owned subsidiary of State Bank of 
South Australia (SBSA) when it converted to a bank and SBSA subscribed to NZD 150 million 
for 100% of its capital. SBSA’s own problems soon became apparent and, only two years later in 
1992, Royal Bank of Scotland merged United Bank into Countrywide. 
This disturbed history and its short existence as a registered bank had effects on the data 
retrieved from United Bank’s accounts. The only extended time series were the static stocks of 
bad debt provisions reported from 1987 onwards. No substantial bad debt appeared in United’s 
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published accounts even though they must have existed according to the losses at United Bank 
shown in MacPherson’s report into the failure of SBSA (MacPherson, chapter 3.1.2).
47
 
3.4.3.7 Rural Bank of New Zealand 
The Rural Bank of New Zealand had originally been established as part of the State 
Advances Corporation after WWII. Legislation in 1974 constituted it as a rural development 
bank for the purpose of ‘making loans and providing other assistance for farming purposes and 
for other purposes in relation to primary industries’ ("Rural Banking and Finance Corporation 
Act 1974"s 19). When the new Labour government of 1984 gave it the direction to become a 
stand-alone bank, it registered as a bank under the new regime. Given that its customer base was 
comparably narrow and much of its loan portfolio had been lent at subsidized rates, its short 
existence in a liberalized market does not surprise. In 1990 the government sold it to the Fletcher 
Challenge Group and just two years later it was integrated into NBNZ. This is one of the reasons 
why NBNZ (since 2003 part of ANZ Group) still has a strong position as a lender to the rural 
sector in New Zealand. 
 
                                                 
47
 As noted in the report on the collapse of SBSA, SBSA had paid NZD 150 million for the 
estimated NZD 40.2 million net book value of United Bank. In fact, this book value was later estimated at 
a negative NZD 17 million (MacPherson, 1993, volume 8, chapter 18.1). It would be too speculative to 
derive more realistic estimates of loan losses at United Bank with the rough data provided in MacPherson. 
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3.5 Review of disclosure rules in Australasian banking 
This section firstly examines the detailed rules and standards with regard to information 
disclosure by New Zealand financial intermediaries that have been in force over the observation 
period. It focuses in particular on those standards that have impacted the disclosure of credit 
losses, provisions and related credit risk information.  
In a more global fashion, a second and shorter sub-section then reviews the Australian 
disclosure rules, highlighting its distinct differences to the New Zealand model. These 
differences relate in particular to the lack of a disclosure regime specific for registered banks. It 
also examines the impact of listing rules in Australia where all main banking groups have been 
exchange traded on the ASX over much of the observation period. 
 
3.5.1 Disclosure rules for financial intermediaries in New Zealand 
There are essentially three sets of standards or rules which have affected financial reporting 
by New Zealand financial intermediaries since the early 1980s. 
 
1. Rules founded in general company legislation (Companies Act) with associated accounting 
standards issued by professional accounting bodies. 
2. Rules prescribed by the prudential regulator, namely the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
3. Rules mandated by the provisions of the securities law. 
 
The following review is supported by a chronological history of acts, regulations and 
standards in tabular form which summarize their impact in Table 3-4. 
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3.5.1.1 Company legislation and accounting standards 
From the start of the observation period up until the mid 1990s, companies reported under 
the Companies Act 1955. As a fundamental principle, the act required that every balance sheet 
and profit and loss account of a company should give a “true and fair view” of the state of affairs 
(s 153(1)). Rules regarding the form of accounts were laid out in Schedule 8 to this act and were 
very general in form. Disclosure requirements that touched on the reporting of credit losses were 
the obligation to show the impairment of assets but specifically just for fixed assets ("Companies 
Act 1955" Eight Schedule, cl 11(1)) and the need to show provisions and reversals in a broad 
sense if they were material (cl 13.1 (g)). 
At the time, there were accounting standards in force –  then named ‘Statements of 
Standard Accounting Practice’ (SSAP) and issued by the Council of the New Zealand Society of 
Accountants (NZSA) –  on the basis that members of the society were required to comply with 
them or to disclose departures, in accordance with specified criteria.
48
 None of the SSAPs related 
however to the specifics of the reporting by financial institutions in general, or loan loss 
provisions in particular. Some of these standards helped push banks towards greater disclosure of 
credit provisions as for example SSAP-9, issued in 1978 (cl 4.1 (c)), which bans material items 
from being included with or offset against other items without separate identification. Pre-1980, 
loan loss provisions, though material in most cases, had been offset against loans while 
provisions expense had typically been netted against gross revenues by the banks.  
A major reshuffle of company legislation in the New Zealand occurred with the enactment 
of the Companies Act 1993 which is still in force today.
49
 Unlike the Companies Act 1955, the 
                                                 
48
 See Zeff (1979) for a more historical perspective of how accounting principles have evolved in 
New Zealand. 
49
 Mortlock (2003, p. 16-19) provides a concise summary of the philosophy and workings of New 
Zealand’s current financial and accounting system which includes the financial reporting and auditing 
framework. 
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1993 Act no longer contains any requirements relating to the contents of financial statements but 
these issues were addressed in the Financial Reporting Act 1993. Not all banks started reporting 
immediately under the new act as there was a 3-year transitional period to the mid of 1997 
during which both acts were in force. 
The Financial Reporting Act 1993 represented a new approach to legislating the way 
companies have to disclose information in that the act does not define reporting rules per se but 
requires reporting to comply with generally accepted accounting practice set by the Accounting 
Standards Review Board (ASRB), which itself is established through this act (III, ss 22-35). The 
process is that the NZSA, later renamed Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand 
(ICANZ) submits these standards to the ASRB for approval which thereby makes them legally 
binding. 
The number of financial reporting standards (FRSs) has grown through the years, at the 
same time replacing the previous SSAP standards.50  Standards relating to the reporting on credit 
provisions and losses may be found in  
• FRS-9 - Information to be Disclosed in Financial Statements (ICANZ, 1995), 
•  FRS-31 - Disclosure of Information About Financial Instruments (NZSA, 1982), 
•  FRS-33 - Disclosure of Information by Financial Institutions (ICANZ, 2000). 
 
As a final note, a major reshaping of accounting standards is on its way at the time of 
writing. This relates to the introduction of the New Zealand equivalents to International Financial 
Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS) which are currently being phased in.
51
  A new set of rules will 
replace above the FRSs, in particular, 
                                                 
50
 While standards were renamed from SSAP to FRS, they kept the number of the older SSAP 
standard for a particular subject field. For example, both SSAP-9 and FRS-9 deal with standards for 
disclosure in financial statements. 
51
 Entities are permitted to use NZ IFRS in the preparation of financial statements for periods 
commencing on or after 1 January 2005. These standards will become mandatory for reporting periods 
commencing on or after 1 January 2007 (ICANZ, 2005a, s 13, p. 7). 
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• FRS-9 by NZ IAS 1 (ICANZ, 2006), 
• FRS-31 by NZ IAS 32 (ICANZ, 2005b) and , finally, 
• FRS-33 by NZ IAS 30 (ICANZ, 2004). 
 
Rules regarding ‘impairment and uncollectibility of financial assets’ will no longer be 
covered in FRS-33, however, but in NZ IFRS 39 - Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement (ICANZ, 2005c). Under the new provisioning rules, the concepts of specific and 
general provisions are discontinued and replaced by the new categories of individual and 
collective impairment (KPMG, 2005, p. 22).
52
  These changes will, however, have no effect on 
the historical provisioning data which have been reported under earlier rules and standards. 
 
3.5.1.2 Prudential regulation of New Zealand banks 
Given the public interest to safeguard the financial system, banks operating in New 
Zealand have always been subject to particular regulation and supervision beyond the general 
company legislation. Before the financial deregulation starting in the mid 1980s, legislation 
dealing with banks, e.g. as laid out in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964 ("Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand Act 1964"Part V: Regulation of Banking and Credit) was less concerned 
with prudential supervision of the banks per se but contained direct prescriptive authority of the 
RBNZ over the operations of financial institutions, i.e. very much in the spirit of the time with 
pervasive regulations in almost every sector of the economy. Prudential aspects were indirectly 
addressed by RBNZ’s right to impose so-called reserve ratios, i.e. a requirement to hold a certain 
                                                 
52
 In future, there will be less discretion in the provisioning of unidentified losses and financial 
assets may be regarded as impaired only if there is objective evidence to this effect as a result of past 
events. There is uncertainty as to the interpretation of these new rules as shown, for instance, in 
Westpac’s NZ disclosure statement per September 2005 (p. 26), which expects reduced provisions but 
states that ‘the extent of this reduction in provisioning has not yet been determined as a result of unsettled 
interpretation issues’. In general, the market expects banks’ earnings volatility to increase. 
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percentage of borrowings as deposits with the RBNZ or government stock. The main purpose of 
these ratios lay in monetary policy implementation. Grimes (1998, p. 298) points out that such 
rules had the opposite effect of prudential requirements in 1984 when it left some savings 
institutions technically insolvent when a sharp rise in interest rates caused the market value of 
their long-term government securities to fall markedly. 
A formal prudential framework came into force only with the 1986 Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Amendment Act, subsequently replaced by the 1989 Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 
1989 (still in force today). For the first time, it defined the role of the RBNZ as a prudential 
regulator and supervisor of the banking system. Accordingly, these acts introduced a new 
registration process for banks and defined prudential regulation and supervision as a specific role 
for the RBNZ. Powers of the RBNZ under these acts are still extensive but the 1986 Amendment 
Act had no provisions of forcing relevant information disclosure to the banks’ depositors. The 
1989 Act ("Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989"s 81) then provided RBNZ with the explicit 
mandate of prescribing information to be disclosed by means of ‘disclosure statements’. 
The 1989 Act had no immediate effect, however, as the required regulation defining the 
content of these disclosure statements was issued only in 1995 (RBNZ, 1995 Registered Bank 
Disclosure Statement Order). The issuance of the 1995 order, whose implications are 
summarized in Mortlock (1999), coincided with a change in RBNZ application of its powers 
under the 1989 Act and a shift to a comparably light-handed disclosure based regime of banking 
supervision. This included a shift in focus to ensuring proper disclosure to the market away from 
obtaining direct information from banks or even interfering with a bank’s affairs. More recently, 
the RBNZ has become slightly more intrusive. Since 2003 essentially all the country’s main 
banks have been owned by the four leading Australian banking groups and this has given rise to 
concerns regarding potential effects of financial contagion spreading from Australia (see for 
example research by Hull, 1999). RBNZ has thus acted by imposing limits on outsourcing 
essential core bank functions to their parents for systemically important institutions (RBNZ, 
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2006b). It has also forced Westpac, which had been operating as a branch bank in New Zealand 
since 1861, to seek local incorporation, at least for its retail activities. 
Both the 1995 Order mentioned above and its 1998 revision (RBNZ, 1998 Order in 
Council) have nevertheless brought uniformity into the banks’ information disclosure and New 
Zealand’s market discipline based approach to regulation is often cited as a model in 
international publications (e.g. in Gup, 2000, p. 189-190; e.g. in Mayes, 2000). The orders lay 
down the form, content and frequency of bank disclosure statements in great detail. Specific 
disclosure requirements relate to asset quality (various types of impaired assets, specific and 
general provisions, asset write-offs), risk concentrations (credit, funding, individual, connected 
counterparties), and general credit information (guarantee and ownership, credit ratings, relevant 
accounting policies). There are also rules on how to present information on the bank’s capital 
ratios in the Basel capital adequacy framework (BCBS, 1988). The 1998 order also added 
requirements regarding disclosure of exposures to market risk, in particular interest rates, equity 
and foreign exchange exposures. 
3.5.1.3 Securities law 
Securities law is a third area of legislation that has affected financial reporting of banks. 
The Securities Act 1978 was drafted as consumer protection legislation in response to some high 
profile investment scandals such as the 1976 failure of Securitibank, a private merchant bank 
(Hunt, 2001, p. 69). The banks are affected by this legislation because the term “security” as 
defined in the act ("Securities Act 1978"s 2D) also encompasses deposit products such as term 
investments. The act introduced the rules for offers of securities to the public, which includes the 
obligation to produce a prospectus and investment statement ("Securities Act 1978" Part II, s 33, 
37). The specific requirements as to what has to appear in these offering documents, in particular 
also in respect of financial statements, are set out in the 1983 Securities Regulations ("Securities 
Regulation 1983"Schedule 1,2).  
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Collecting the financial data from annual reports and prospectuses in earlier years, one 
could observe that reporting requirements under the securities legislation did not always match 
the accounting standards used in the preparation of regular annual accounts at the time. This 
forced the banks to produce two sets of financial statements even though differences between the 
two methods were minute. Two examples of differences were alternative methods of accounting 
for the value of certain subsidiaries and the classification of debt instruments.  
With the introduction of the bank disclosure statement requirement orders in 1996, 
registered banks became exempt from the requirement to produce prospectuses under securities 
legislation but up to this point in time, prospectuses were the only available source of financial 
information for some of the banks (e.g. Westpac NZ operating as a branch of its Australian 
parent). 
While banks are no longer required to produce a prospectus – unless they were to list their 
equity on the NZX – the securities legislation remains the main foundation of reporting for non-
bank financial institutions in New Zealand. As these rules are less specific than the bank 
disclosure regime, concerns regarding the disclosure quality of NBFI prospectuses has been 
expressed repeatedly (Securities Commission New Zealand, 2005; Van Schaardenburg, 2002) 
and might thus change in future. 
3.5.2 Disclosure in Australia 
This review of rules that has affected the financial reporting of Australian banks since 1980 
will be somewhat less detailed than the previous section reviewing this topic for New Zealand. 
This can be justified with a parallel development of accounting standards in both countries with 
New Zealand standards generally well coordinated with those of Australia even though a formal 
Trans-Tasman Accounting Standards Advisory Group (TTASAG) was set up only in 2004. In its 
initial meeting, the group noted that “while there were some differences in standards in Australia 
and New Zealand, generally both countries are modifying the standards in similar ways and 
therefore differences were limited” (TTASAG, 2004). 
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Unlike New Zealand, Australia does not explicitly rely on a disclosure based regulatory 
regime to enforce market discipline in the banking sector, i.e. APRA as the prudential regulator 
does not prescribe supplementary disclosure rules in addition to those of the general companies 
law or securities legislation. Gray (1996, Attachment 1) analyzed the information disclosure of 
Australian banks in the light of the New Zealand bank disclosure rules that had just been issued. 
He noted that while Australian banks did not strictly fulfil all elements of the NZ rules in detail, 
they nevertheless “appear to meet most of the requirements”. In the case of Bank West, however, 
the lack of a universal bank disclosure regime in Australia led to missing data since 2003 for this 
quite sizeable institution. After HBOS took full control (see section 3.3.2.6.1), this bank has no 
longer published separate annual reports for its Australian operations. There are similar data 
availability issues with other overseas-owned institutions such as PIBA (Rabobank) and ING 
Bank. 
There is one explanation why good disclosure by Australia’s banks appears to be achieved 
even without specific rules issued by the prudential regulator. With the exception of the former 
state bank sector and non-bank financial institutions later converted to banks, all of the leading 
Australian banks have been listed on the stock exchange through the observation period. This 
compares to New Zealand where the government or overseas-owned banking sector at times had 
issued some minority shares with limited float. In general – and this comment applies to both 
New Zealand and Australia – one can observe that a listing on the stock exchange had a 
beneficial impact on the disclosure quality as shareholders keenly scrutinize the activities of 
firms and push for openness in reporting.
53
  Depositors, on the other hand, tend to take less 
interest in the affairs, or more importantly risks, of their banks. Such a mindset and limited 
                                                 
53
 In some case missing data series could be extended backward thanks to detailed historical 
information provided in new share issue prospectuses. Examples include CBA (Prospectus -
Commonwealth Bank Public Share Offer 1991) and BNZ (Prospectus for an Issue of Ordinary Shares 
1987). 
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knowledge about their banks have repeatedly been confirmed in surveys like the one conducted 
by Wood (2000) for the New Zealand market.  
Similar to New Zealand, disclosure earlier in the observation period was strongly 
influenced by special statutes of which there were a great many in Australia with its federal 
structure. The Campbell committee had found that financial intermediaries were subject to a 
range of disclosure requirements but that these lacked consistency as they were being imposed 
by different jurisdictions (State and Commonwealth) and administered by different authorities 
(Campbell Inquiry, 1981, 21.39, p. 370). For example, the various state acts regulating credit 
unions and building societies imposed disclosure requirements that differed from each other and 
from those of the Companies Act. Such statutes had much the same effect as in New Zealand, 
namely that disclosure of these special statutes entities was either deficient or simply non-
existent (e.g. credit provisioning information for former building societies). 
In summary, the data collection process confirmed that the information disclosure quality 
of Australian and New Zealand Banks, many of the latter owned by Australian parents, moved 
very much in tandem through the observation period. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has provided an overview on the development of the Australasian banking 
system through the observation period. In both Australia and New Zealand, this period has seen 
considerable change in structure and regulatory framework of the financial industry. 
The post-war phase of banking regulation and regulation in general was characterized by a 
very Keynesian view of the world. The financial institutions regulations were thus primarily 
designed to control the amount of business done by the banking sector, the money supply and 
hence the level of economic activity. 
Changes were initiated based on the recommendations by the 1981 Campbell commission 
in Australia and three years later with the change of government in New Zealand with the 
financial sector policy reform. Both economies were subsequently hit by a crisis which had an 
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impact on the credit loss experience of financial institutions. The peak of problems cumulated in 
1989 and 1990 in New Zealand and included the NZD 1.1 billion bailout of BNZ, the collapse of 
DFC, large loan losses at government owned Rural Bank and the demise of NZI Bank. Similarly, 
one to two years later in Australia, the state banking sector – in particular State Bank of Victoria 
and South Australia – as well as Westpac, were most affected. 
In the time since then, the economic climate has been more benign in both countries. 
Performance of banks recovered and credit losses stabilized on comparably low levels. In both 
systems local and central governments abandoned their direct ownership of financial institutions. 
This led to a consolidation around four major banking groups in Australia (ANZ, CBA, NAB, 
Westpac) which now each own one of the four leading banks in New Zealand. Concentration 
was slightly less pronounced in Australia where players like St. George Bank, Bank West and 
Suncorp have established a sizeable national presence. In New Zealand, however, the four main 
banks have become very dominant, controlling 80% of assets subject to financial intermediation 
in the country. 
Notable was Australia’s financial sector reform of 1998 which reorganized regulation and 
supervision of the financial sector by creating APRA as the agency in charge of prudential 
supervision of most financial institutions including insurance and banks. 
Pre-1980 bank annual accounts were not rich on information with typical P&Ls often 
showing just three items: (1) total income including all interest and non-interest expense but net 
of bad debt provision or write-off expense for the period, (2) total of all interest and operating 
expenses and, finally (3) the taxation expense. Likewise, loan assets in the balance sheet were 
shown as a net number without details on bad debt provisions. 
With the onset of deregulation, disclosure quality of banks in Australasia improved 
steadily. The best financial information has been available from privately owned banks subject to 
the scrutiny of the share markets whereas state banks and mutuals subject to special statutes (e.g. 
building societies) provided limited or no detailed information until they converted to banks 
under the new registration regimes. 
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In 1995, New Zealand created a specific bank disclosure regime under the auspices of the 
RBNZ as the prudential regulator. This supervisory regime based on market discipline has found 
some international attention. In Australia, on the other hand, disclosure is driven primarily by the 
companies and securities regulation. Its quality is not inferior, however, as the leading banks are 
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Table 3-4 Chronological list of statutes/standards that have shaped the financial reporting of banks in New Zealand 
Rule / Standard Description Rules affecting financial disclosure generally and credit 





Sets the rules as to the form of the balance 
sheet and the profit and loss account. Embodies 
s153(1) of Act requiring accounts to give a true 
and fair view of the state of affairs and profit or 
loss of the company.
No specific rules. Defined the need to show provisions and reversals 
in a broad sense if they are material [cl 13.1 (g)]. Requirement to 






Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Act 
1964
"Constitution" of reserve Bank replacing a 
corresponding 1933 Act. Defines the role of the 
Reserve Bank in the "sovereign control of 
currency and credit"
Authorizes the RBNZ regulate and control (on behalf of the 
government) the financial system including far reaching 
presecriptive powers over the banking system (e.g. investment 
requirements, setting of rates of interests and foreign exchange 
rates). Specifies reporting requirements to the RBNZ but no rules on 
reporting to the public.
1965 to 1989 Legally binding
Securities Act 
1978
This Act regulates the offer of securities to the 
public for subscription by requiring disclosure of 
information to potential investors but is not 
concerned with secondary markets. Sets up the 
Securities Commission.
Introduced the requirement to publish information on new offerings 
in general (Part II, ss 33, 37) which were then laid out in the 
Securities Regulations 1983. Deposit and other investment products 
typically offered to the public by banks fall under the definition debt 







SSAP-9 Sets the accounting standards regarding the 
information to be disclosed in company balance 
sheets and profit & loss statements. At the time, 
SSAP-9 was modeled on IAS 5 (Information to 
be Disclosed in Financial Statements) and was 
meant to supplement the provisions of the 
Eighth Schedule of the Companies Act 1955.
Similar requirements as the Eighth Schedule of 1955 Companies 
Act, i.e. no specific standards on credit loss/risk disclosure. Some 
general principles spelled out in SSAP-9 like 4.1 (c) on materiality 
formulates a need for disclosure of material items without offsetting 
them against other items. Loan loss provisions which would be 
material in most cases had historically been offset against loans, 
respectively been included in gross revenues. SSAP-9 also requires 








Released by Securities Commission it 
prescribes the details of the information that 
must appear in the offering documentation 
(investment statement, registered prospectus). 
Schedule 2 refers to the requirements in respect of financial 
statements for debt securities offerings. Clause 31 requires a 
disclosure of maturity profile of lending for financial institutions and 
arears but in its earlier form it does not contain further credit risk 
specific disclosure requirements. Later versions were adapted meet 






Table 3-4 Chronological list of statutes/standards that have shaped the financial reporting of banks in New Zealand (continued 2) 
 
Rule / Standard Description Rules affecting financial disclosure generally and credit 
loss/risk reporting in particular
Valid from/to Effect
SSAP-15 Sets standards on accounting for contingencies 
which refers to particular conditions or situations 
where the ultimate outcome is unknown.
Within the SSAP-15 framework, 5.1 implies the requirement for loan 
loss provisioning. 5.1 requires recognition of contingent losses in the 
financial statements if is expected that a future event will confirm the 
loss and reasonable estimate of the loss can be made.









Amends Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 
1964 to define the role of the RBNZ in 
registration of banks and prudential regulation 
and supervision.
Section 38L requires banking institutions to provide information for 
the purposes of prudential supervision to the RBNZ. No provisions 
for disclosure to the public. Repealed by 1989 Reserve Bank Act.
1986-1989 Legally binding
Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Act 
1989
Provides the constitution for the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand. Defines functions and powers, 
which in particular also includes registration and 
prudential supervision of the banking system 
(Part 5).  
Section 81 allows the RBNZ to prescribe the information to be 
disclosed to the public (disclosure statements). The act has no 
immediate effect as the required order defining the content of these 
disclosure statements are issued in 1995 only (Registered Bank 




FRS-31 Sets the standard for disclosure of information 
about financial instruments which by definition 
also include loan assets







The Act came into force on 1 July 1994 together 
with a package of new company legislation
Does no longer address disclosure requirements as these are now 









Requires public securities issuers to file financial 
statements that comply with generally accepted 
accounting practice and give a true and fair view 
of their affairs. Establishes the Accounting 
Standards Review Board (“ASRB”).
Unlike Companies Act 1955 this Act no longer contains specific 
accounting and disclosure rules but gives legal power to the 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) approved by the ASRB. FRS 
standards thus superseded the requirements under Schedule Eight 









Table 3-4 Chronological list of statutes/standards that have shaped the financial reporting of banks in New Zealand (continued 3) 
Rule / Standard Description Rules affecting financial disclosure generally and credit 
loss/risk reporting in particular
Valid from/to Effect
FRS-9 Information to be Disclosed in Financial 
Statements - replaced SSAP-9
FRS-9 6.13 (d) (i) and (ii) require disclosure of bad and doubtful 
debts, distinguishing between













Issued under the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Act 1989. Defines the public disclosure regime 
for registered banks replacing the prospectus 
requirements under the Securities Act 1978
Comprehensive set of guidellines on type, shape, content and 
frequency of bank disclosure statements. Banks must disclose 
specific items relating to credit losses/risks and asset quality. The 
major items listed in the First Schedule are:
> Asset quality (various types of impaired assets, specific and 
general provisions, asset write-offs)
> Risk concentrations (credit, funding, individual, connected 
counterparties)
> General credit information (guarantee and ownership, credit 
ratings, relevant accounting policies)
1995 to 1998 Legally binding








Replaces Registered Bank Disclosure 
Statement (Order 1995)
Similar provisions as in 1995 order but adds rules on how to 
disclose exposures to market risk (Eighth Schedule). Also aligns it 






Table 3-5 Selected special statutes applicable to financial institutions in New Zealand (past & present) 
Description History / Background Valid from/to
Building Societies
Building Societies Act 1965, 
No 22
Sets the rules of registration and operations for 
building societies.
Substantial revisions mainly in the Building Societies Amendment Act 
1987 No 175 which defines building societies more along the lines of 
other financial institutions. The 1987 amendment also removes powers of 
registrar and cross-support clauses among building societies. Allows 
conversion of society into company under Companies Act.
Stricter requirements regarding reporting enacted with the Financial 
Reporting Act 1993.
still in force with 
amendments
Credit Unions
Friendly Societies and 
Credit Unions Act 1982, No 
118
Consolidates law relating to friendly and certain 
other societies, makes provisions for the 
formation and administration of credit unions.
The common bond provision restricts membership to a group of people, 
for example, employees of a company or people in a particular area. 
There are also restrictions on raising capital from members. Recent 
amendments have focused on providing more operational flexibility to the 
credit unions, e.g. the deposit cap for individual members was raised. 
still in force with 
amendments
Post Office Bank
Post Office Act 1959 (Part 
VII), No 30
Part VII of this act [ss 113-130] contained  the 
legal basis for the post office to set up and 
operate a post bank.
Repealed in 1987. Legislation related to the operation of a post bank 
(Part VII of the Post Office Act 1959) was subsequently contained in Post 
Office Bank Act 1987.
to 1987
Post Office Bank Act 1987, 
No 114
Provisions preparing the sale of the post office 
bank.
Private Savings Banks
Private Savings Banks Act 
1964, No 9
Regulates the operation of savings banks 
operated by trading banks
Savings banks were set up by trading banks in a bid to offer long-term 
savings products mortgage lending products. Trading banks per se faced 
regulatory restrictions on these types of activities and this act allowed 
them to start competing in an area which had been the turf of trustee 
savings banks and the post office bank.
to 1983
Private Savings Banks Act 
1983, No 117
Regulates the operation of savings banks 
operated by trading banks
Repealed by Private Savings Banks (Transfer of Undertakings) Act 1992 
which allowed trading banks to amalgamate their stand-alone savings 
banks.  
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Table 3-5 Selected special statutes applicable to financial institutions in New Zealand (past & present)-(continued 2) 
Description History / Background Valid from/to
Rural Banking and Finance Corporation
Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation Act 1974, No 3
Establishes Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation as a rural development bank. This is 
the predecessor of what was later known as 
Rural Bank.
Repealed by Rural Banking and Finance Corporation Act 1989 to 1989
Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation Act 1989, No 
81
Allows corporization of Rural Banking and 
Finance Corporation under the Companies Act 
1955.
This Act was repealed, as from 1 July 1994, by s 15(1) National Bank of 
New Zealand Limited Act 1994
to 1994
National Bank of New 
Zealand Limited Act 1994, 
No 3 (Private)
Provides for the transfer to Rural Bank to 
National Bank and dissolution of Rural Bank. 
Trustee Savings Banks
Trustee Savings Banks Act 
1948, No 62
Sets foundation of trust bank sector whose 
deposits are government guaranteed.
Repealed by Trustee Banks Act 1983 to 1983
Trustee Banks Act 1983, No 
116
Brings regulation of trustee banks in line with 
legislation for other players in the financial sector 
but government guarantee is maintained.
Repealed by Trustee Banks Restructuring Act 1988, No 90 to 1988
Trustee Banks 
Restructuring Act 1988, No 
90
Phases out government deposit guarantees for 
trustee banks and sets framework for 
corporization. Community trusts were created to 
initially take over the share capital of the newly 
formed trust banks.
Sets the stage for the consolidation of 9 out the 12 the regional trust 
banks under the  umbrella of Trust Bank New Zealand Ltd which acquired 
the share capital of the regional Trust Banks. The regional community 
trusts in turn became shareholders of Trust Bank New Zealand Ltd.
ASB, Westland Savings Bank (later amalgamated into ASB) and 
Taranaki Savings Bank (TSB) remain outside this Trust Bank Group.
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Table 3-5 Selected special statutes applicable to financial institutions in New Zealand (past & present)-(continued 3) 
Description History / Background Valid from/to
Bank of New Zealand
The bank of New Zealand 
Act 1861, No 1 (private)
Original act of incorporation for Bank of New 
Zealand
repealed by Bank of New Zealand Act 1979 to 1979
Bank of New Zealand Act 
1945, No 18
Nationalization of Bank of New Zealand as "State 
trading bank"
repealed by Bank of New Zealand Act 1979 to 1979
Bank of New Zealand Act 
1979, No 34
Consolidates legislation relating to bank of New 
Zealand, including a new incorporation by 
repealing The New Zealand Bank Act 1861
Confirms full Crown ownership of bank but this was amended with the 
Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act 1986 that lowered minimum 
Crown ownership to two-thirds of capital. According to s 9, the Crown 
does not guarantee the deposits however. Repealed by Bank of New 
Zealand Act 1988.
to 1988
Bank of New Zealand Act 
1988, No 172
Conversion of bank to an entity registered under 





Figure 3-10 Genealogy of New Zealand banks 
Auckland 

















1979 NZ Subsidiary formed state-owned 1979
1980 25% of shares placed since 1945 1980
1981 with investors 1981




1986 repurchased by parent 1986 1986
1987 Govt sells 25% of shares 1987
1988 registered Registration and Trust Bk Group formed 1988
1989 acquires Post Bank name change 1989
1990 acquires Westland Bk sold to 1990
1991 Fletcher Group 1991
1992 acq. Rural Bank Rural acquires United Bank 1992
1993 Bank RBSC full control bought by NAB 1993
1994 amalgamates Post Bank amalgamation 1994
1995 of members 1995
1996 acquires Trust Bank Trust Bank 1996
1997 1997
1998 acquires Countrywide Countrwide Bank 1998
1999 1999
2000 CBA takes full control 2000
2001 2001
2002 NBNZ 2002
2003 acquires NBNZ 2003




RBSC: Royal Bank of Scotland 
CBA: Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
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State Bank of 
Victoria
State Bank of 
New South 
Wales












1979 acq. of failing Adelaide Bk 1979
1980 1980
1981 name change 1981
1982 1982
1983 1983
1984 acq. Grindlays Bank 1984
1985 acq. 100% of Tricontinental 1985
1986 Merger with TSM PBS i) 1986
1987 name change to forms Tasmania Bank 1987
1988 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 1988
1989 acq. PostBank (NZ) recapitalization 1989
1990 acq. Town & Country BS and corporization & share offering by state govt corporization acquisition forms 1990
1991 National Mutual Royal Bk (1990) takeover State Bk Victoria 1991
1992 1992
1993 1993
1994 acq. by Colonial Mutual Life 1994
1995 Government operating as Colonial State Bk 1995
1996 sells remaining shares demutualization of Colonial 1996
1997 1997
1998 1998
1999 acq. Trust Bk Tasmania 1999
2000 disp. of Grindlays Bk acq. Colonial Ltd. 2000
2001 2001
2002 2002
2003 acq. National Bk NZ 2003
2004 ANZ Commonwealth Bank 2004
Trust Bank Tasmania
 
i) TSM PBS: the Tasmanian Permanent Building Society 
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1981 1982 merger forms 1981
1982 Nat'l Comm'l Banking Corp of Australia 1982
1983 name change to 1983
1984 National Australia Bank 1984
1985 1985
1986 RESI-Statewide BS 1986
1987 acq. several banks in UK, Ireland 1987
1988 1988
1989 Bank of Melbourne 1989
1990 1990
1991 Major loan losses on property 1991
1992 and in corporate sector 1992
1993 1993
1994 1994
1995 acq. Michigan National Bank (US) 1995
1996 acq. Trust Bank (NZ) / Challenge Bk 1996
1997 1997
1998 acq. HomeSide Inc. (US) 1998
1999 1999
2000 2000
2001 sold US subsidiaries at a 2001
2002 loss in 2001/2002 disp. of Australian Guarantee Corp. (AGC) 2002
2003 2003
2004 National Australia Bank 2004Westpac
1982 merger forms
Westpac Corp.
acq. Bank of NZ








Figure 3-13 Genealogy of major Australian banks (St. George Bank, Bank West) 


















1982 sells stake in Town&Country Perm BS 1982
1983 1983
1984 conversion to merger 1984
1985 Advance Bank 1985
1986 1986
1987 merger with takes full control of PIBA i) 1987
1988 State Building Society governing act revised, bail-out of TCS ii) 1988
1989 1989
1990 major credit losses 1990
1991 conversion to Bailout by SA govt incorporation as limited liability company 1991
1992 St.George Bank bad asset 1992
1993 transferred to GAMD 1993
1994 name change to Bank West, sale of PIBA 1994
1995 acq. St Bk SA Bank of Scotland takes 51% stake 1995
1996 full privatisation, share listing 1996
1997 acq. Advance Bank 1997
1998 1998
1999 non-core bank assets 1999
2000 2000
2001 Bank of Scotland/Halifax merge to HBOS 2001
2002 2002
2003 South Australian HBOS takes full control 2003
2004 St.George Bank Asset Management Corp. Bank West (HBOS) 2004  
i) PIBA: Primary Industry Bank of Australia; ii) TCS: W.A. Teachers' Credit Society 
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1986 renamed Suncorp 1986
1987 Conversion to 1987
1988 Metway Bank (1988) 1988
1989 1989
1990 acq. Prudential Finance 1990
1991 1991













simplifying name ot Suncorp
to form Suncorp Metway
Metway, Suncorp merge with QIDC
 
QIDC: Queensland Industry Development Corp 
Household BS: Household Building Society 
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 



































































































































































































ABN AMRO Bank N.V. 1997 2005 O O
ABN AMRO Finance (Aust.) 1999 1999 O O
Adelaide Bank Limited 1994 2005 conversion from building society 1994 X
Advance Bank Australia 1985 1998 formed through conversion from building society. Merged with St. George Bank in 1997 X X
AMP Bank Limited 1998 2005 O
ANZ Banking Group Limited 2005 ANZ Banking Group X X
ANZ Grindlays Bank 1995 2000 acquired by Standard Chartered and subsequently trading as Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank O O
ANZ Savings Bank 1992 O
Arab Bank Australia Limited 1994 2005 owned by Arab Bank plc, incorporated in Amman, Jordan O
Australian Bank 1981 1992 acquired by SB Victoria in 1989, then part of Commonwealth Bank O O
Australian Resources Development Bank 1993 acquired by NAB in 1989 O O O
Asahi Bank 1995 2002 O
Bank of Adelaide 1980 merged with ANZ Banking Group. O O
Bank of Adelaide Savings Bank 1980 merged with ANZ Banking Group. O O
Bank of America, National Association 1994 2005 O O
Bank of America Australia 1986 1995 O O
Bank of China 1985 2005 O O
Bank of China (Australia) Limited 2002 2005 O O
Bank of Cyprus Australia Pty Limited 2000 2005 O O
Bank of Melbourne 1989 1998 transformed from BS in 1989, acquired by Westpac 1998 X X
Bank of New South Wales 1982 becomes part of Westpac X X  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (2 of 9) 


































































































































































































Bank of New South Wales Savings Bank 1982 O
Bank of New Zealand 1996 acquired by NAB in 1993 O O O
Bank of New Zealand Savings Bank 1993 O O
Bank of Queensland Limited 2005 X X
Bank of Queensland Savings Bank 1983 1994 O O
Bank of Singapore (Australia) 1986 1996 becomes part of Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation in 1996 O O
Bank of South Australia 1994 1997 X X
Bank of Tokyo Australia 1985 1995 succeeded by the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi O O
Bank of Western Australia Limited 1994 2005 BankWest, succeeds R&I Bank X X
Bank One, National Association 1999 2003 until 1999 First National Bank of Chicago (merged into Bank One) O O
Bankers Trust Australia 1986 2000 acquired 1998 and then sold by Deutsche Bank in 1999. Later partially absorbed into Westpac (2002) O O
Banque Nationale de Paris 1998 succeeded by BNP Paribas                                O O
Barclays Bank Plc 1990 2005 Barclays Capital O O
Bendigo Bank Limited 1995 2005 conversion from building society 1995 X
BNP Paribas 1998 2005 until 1998 Banque Nationale de Paris                                O O
Canberra Advance Bank 1990 1992 renamed from Civic Advance Bank O
CBC Savings Bank 1982 savings bank subsidiary of Commercial Banking Company of Sydney O
Challenge Bank 1987 1996 converted from BS in 1987, acquired by Westpac 1996 X X
Chase Manhattan Bank 1985 2001 name change to JPMorgan Chase Bank related to merger of J.P. Morgan and Manhattan Chase. O O
Chase Manhattan Bank Australia 1994 1995 O O
Citibank N.A. 1995 2005 O O
Citigroup Pty Limited 1985 2005 O O
Citibank Savings 1985 1995 O O  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (3 of 9) 


































































































































































































Civic Advance Bank 1986 1990 converted from BS in 1986, renamed to Canberra Advance Bank in 1990. O O
Colonial State Bank 1996 2001 acquired by CBA in 2000. X X O
Commercial Bank of Australia 1982 becomes part of Westpac X X
Commercial Savings Bank of Australia 1982 O
Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney 1982 becomes part of NAB X X
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 2005 until 1984 Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia X X
Commonwealth Savings Bank 1993 O
Commonwealth Development Bank of 
Australia Limited 2005 Commonwealth Development Bank O O
Co-operative Central Raiffeisen-
Boernenleenbank 2003 2005 trading as Rabobank O
Co-operative Central Raiffeisen-
Boernenleenbank B.A.        1995 1996 trading as Rabobank O
Credit Suisse 1994 2005 Credit Suisse First Boston between 1997-2004 O O
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank 1995 2003 succeeded by Mizuho Corporate Bank O O
Deutsche Bank AG 1986 2005 O O
Dresdner Bank AG 1998 2003 O O
Elders Rural Bank Limited 2000 2005
Elders Rural Bank is a joint venture between Bendigo 
Bank Limited and Futuris Corporation Limited, the 
parent company of Elders Limited.
X
First National Bank of Chicago 1994 1999 O
HBOS Treasury Services plc 2005 2005 O
HongkongBank of Australia 1986 1999 renamed HSBC Bank Australia Limited in 1999 O
Hobart Savings Bank 1991 trading as The Savings Bank of Tasmania, predecessor of Trust Bank Tasmania. X X  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (4 of 9) 


































































































































































































HSBC Bank Australia Limited 1999 2005 until 1999 HongkongBank of Australia O O
HSBC Bank Plc 1996 2005 until 1999 Midland Bank PLC O O
IBJ Australia Bank 1985 2003 succeeded by Mizuho Corporate Bank O O
ING Bank (Australia) Limited 1994 2005 until 1999 ING Mercantile Mutual Bank O
ING Bank NV 1997 2005 O
Investec Bank (Australia) Limited 2003 2005 O
International Commercial Bank of China 1995 2003 O
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 
Association 2001 2005 name change from Chase Manhattan Bank O
Laiki Bank (Australia) Limited 2001 2005 X X
Launceston Bank for Savings 1987 becomes Tasmania Bank in 1987.
Lloyds Bank NZA                                     1985 1996 O
Macquarie Bank Limited (1985) 1985 2005 before 1985 Macquarie Associates Limited O
Members Equity Bank Pty Limited 2001 2005 O
Metway Bank                                            1988 1996 conversion from BS in 1988, merger with QIDC and Suncorp in 1996 X X
Midland Bank PLC                                   1995 1996 succeeded by HSBC Bank Plc O
Mitsubishi Bank of Australia 1986 1995 Merged with Bank of Tokyo 1995 O
Mizuho Corporate Bank, Ltd 2002 2005 successor of Dai-Ichi Kangyo Australia Limited and IBJ Australia Bank Limited O
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of 
New York 1993 2001
Part of JP Morgan. Merger of to merger of J.P. Morgan 
and Manhattan Chase in 2001. O
NatWest Markets Australia/NatWest 
Australia Bank                                  1986 1998
Royal Bank of Scotland acquired National Westminster 
Bank in 2000, In earlier years trading as NatWest 
Australia Bank.
O
National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) 1982 2005 formed through merger of National Bank of Australasia and Commercial Banking Company of Sydney. X X
National Australia Savings Bank 1982 1992 O
National Bank of Australasia 1982 succeeded by NAB X X  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (5 of 9) 


































































































































































































National Bank Savings Bank 1982 succeeded by NAB Savings Bank O
National Mutual Royal Bank 1986 1990 acquired by ANZ in 1990 O O
National Mutual Royal Savings Bank 1986 1987 O O
NBD Bank 1994 1995 merged with First National Bank of Chicago O O
NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) 
Limited 1998 2005 O O
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
Limited 1995 2005 successor of Bank of Singapore (Australia) O O
Overseas Union Bank 1993 2002 O O
Primary Industry Bank of Australia 
(PIBA) 1987 2003
since 1994 part of Rabo Bank. 1987 to 1994 part of R&I 
Bank (BankWest). X
QIDC (Queensland Industry 
Development Corporation) 1995 1998 merged with Metway Bank and Suncorp 1996 O O O
R&I Bank of Western Australia 1994 earlier trading under full name "The Rural and Industries Bank of Western Australia" X X
Rabobank Australia Limited 1996 2005
until 1998 registered under Co-operative Central 
Raiffeisen-Boernenleenbank B.A. Purchased PIBA 
1994.
O
Royal Bank of Canada 1996 2005 O O
Rural Bank of New South Wales 1981 renamed to State Bank of NSW in 1981. X X
Savings Bank of South Australia 1984 merged with State Bank SA O O
Societe Generale 2003 2005 O O
St George Bank Limited 1993 2005 X X
St. George Partnership Banking 1994 1996 part of St. George Bank O O O
Standard Chartered Bank 1986 2005 O O
Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank 2000 2003 until 2000 ANZ Grindlays Bank O O
State Bank of India 2003 2005 O O  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (6 of 9) 


































































































































































































State Bank of NSW 1981 1995 predecessor renamed from Rural bank of NSW. Succeeded by Colonial State Bank X X
State Bank of SA 1994 succeeded by Bank of South Australia (acquired by Advance Bank) X X
State Bank of Victoria 1991 before 1981 operating as State Savings Bank of Victoria. Taken over by Commonwealth Bank X X
State Street Bank and Trust Company 1994 2005 O O
Suncorp-Metway Limited 1996 2005 Preceded by Metway Bank. Since 2003 trading as Suncorp. X X
Taiwan Business Bank 2001 2005 O O
Tasmania Bank 1987 1991 becomes part of Trust Bank Tasmania X X
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd 1995 2005 Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi (Australia) O O
The International Commercial Bank of 
China 2003 2005 O O
The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 2003 2005 O O
The Toronto-Dominion Bank 1998 2005 O O
Town & Country Bank 1992 1995 Regional WA bank converted from BS; acquired by ANZ in 1990 O O short
Trust Bank Tasmania 1991 1999 formed through merger of Hobart Savings Bank and Tasmania Bank in 1991 X X
UBS AG 2003 2005 O O
United Overseas Bank Limited 1993 2005 O O
WestLB AG 1995 2005 before 1997 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale       O O
Westpac Banking Corporation 1982 2005 formed through merger of Bank of New South Wales and Commercial Bank of Australia. X X
Westpac Savings Bank 1982 1993 O  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (7 of 9) 



































































































































































































ABN AMRO Bank NV 1998 2005 O O
AMP Bank Limited 1988 2004 O
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) 
Limited 2004 X X
ANZ National Bank Limited 2004 2005 successor of ANZ Banking Group after merger of ANZ and National Bank X X
ASB Bank Limited 1989 X X
Westland Bank Limited 1990 1994 acquired by ASB in 1990 O O
Bank of New Zealand 2005 acquired by NAB in 1993 X X
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Australia) 
Limited 1996 2004 O O
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. 2004 2005 successor of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Australia) Limited O O
Indosuez New Zealand Limited 1987 1987 O O
Banque Indosuez New Zealand Limited 1987 1991 successor of Indosuez New Zealand Limited O O
Banque Indosuez 1991 1997 O O
Crédit Agricole Indosuez 1997 1998 successor of Banque Indosuez O O
Banque Nationale de Paris 1997 2000 O O
BNP Paribas 2000 2001 successor of Banque Nationale de Paris O O
Barclays New Zealand Limited 1987 O O
Barclays Bank New Zealand Limited 1987 1989 successor of Barclays New Zealand Limited O O
Barclays Bank PLC 1988 1998 O O
BT New Zealand (Holdings) Limited 1988 1988 O O
Bankers Trust New Zealand Limited 1988 1999 O O
BNZ Finance Limited 1991 2001 O
CIBC New Zealand Limited 1987 1989 O O
Citibank N A 1987 2005 O O  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (8 of 9) 


































































































































































































Commonwealth Bank of Australia 2000 2005 O O
Deutsche Bank A G 1996 O O
Countrywide Banking Corporation 
Limited 1987 1998 acquired by National Bank in 1998 X X
Elders Merchant Finance Limited 1989 1989 O O
Elderbank Limited 1989 1990 successor of Elders Merchant Finance O
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation 1987 2005 O O
Kiwibank Limited 2001 2005 short
Kookmin Bank 1997 2005 O O
Macquarie Bank Limited 1987 1991 O
National Mutual Corporation New 
Zealand Limited 1989 1989 O
National Mutual Bank New Zealand 
Limited 1989 1990 successor of National Mutual Corporation NZ short
NZI Financial Corporation Limited 1987 1987 O
NZI Bank Limited 1987 1992 successor of NZI Financial Corporation Limited O O
The National Bank of New Zealand 
Limited 2004 X X
Broadbank Corporation Limited 1987 1987 predecessor of National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited O O
National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited 1987 1993 short
Post Office Bank Limited 1989 1994 acquired by ANZ in 1989 O O
Primary Industry Bank of Australia 
Limited 1989 1999 acquired by Rabobank in 1994 O O
Rabobank Nederland 1996 2005 O
Rabo Wrightson Finance Limited 1999 1999 O
Rabobank New Zealand Limited 1999 2005 successor of Rabo Wrightson Finance Limited O  
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Table 3-6 Registered banks in Australia and New Zealand 1980 to 2005 (9 of 9) 


































































































































































































Rural Banking and Finance Corporation 
of New Zealand Limited 1990 1990 X
The Rural Bank Limited 1990 1994 Successor of the Rural Banking and Finance Corporation of New Zealand Limited X
St George Bank New Zealand Limited 2003 2005 trading as Superbank short
Taranaki Savings Bank Limited 1989 1989 X X
TSB Bank Limited 1989 2005 successor of Taranaki Savings Bank Limited X X
Trust Bank New Zealand Limited (and 
its subsidiaries) 1989 1996 sold to Westpac in 1997 X X
Trust Bank Auckland Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank Bay of Plenty Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank Canterbury Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank Central Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank Otago Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank South Canterbury Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank Southland Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank Waikato Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Trust Bank Wellington Limited 1989 1995 part of Trust Bank New Zealand Group O O
Security Pacific New Zealand Limited 1987 1988 O
Security Pacific Bank New Zealand 
Limited 1988 1988 successor of Security Pacific New Zealand Limited O O
State Bank of South Australia 1988 1994 acquired United Bank in 1990 O O
United Banking Group Limited 1990 1990 succeeded by United Bank Limited X O
United Bank Limited 1990 1994 merged into Countrywide Bank in 1992 X O
Westpac Banking Corporation 2005 X X O  
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Table 3-7 Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project 
Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (1 of 35) 
AU AdelaideBk 2005 to AU AdvanceBk 1990
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU AdelaideBk 2005 June 12 Annual Report 2005 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 2004 June 12 Annual Report 2004 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 2003 June 12 Annual Report 2003 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 2002 June 12 Annual Report 2002 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 2001 June 12 Annual Report 2001 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 2000 June 12 Annual Report 2000 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 1999 June 12 Annual Report 1999 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 1998 June 12 Annual Report 1998 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 1997 June 12 Annual Report 1997 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 1996 June 12 Annual Report 1996 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 1995 June 12 Annual Report 1995 Adelaide Bank Limited Y
AU AdelaideBk 1994 June 12 Annual Report 1994 Adelaide Bank Limited Incorporated on January 1, 1994 Y
AU AdelaideBk 1993 June 12 Annual Report 1993 The Cooperative Building Society of South 
Australia Y
AU AdelaideBk 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 The Cooperative Building Society of South 
Australia Y
AU AdelaideBk 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 The Cooperative Building Society of South 
Australia N
AU AdelaideBk 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 The Cooperative Building Society of South 
Australia N
AU AdelaideBk 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 The Cooperative Building Society of South 
Australia N
AU AdvanceBk 1996 May 12 Annual Report 1996 Advance Bank Australia Limited Acquired by St George Bank January 29, 
1997. Y
AU AdvanceBk 1995 May 12 Annual Report 1995 Advance Bank Australia Limited Acquisition of Bank of South Australia 
Limited (former State Bank of South 
Australia) from SA Government July 1995. Y
AU AdvanceBk 1994 May 12 Annual Report 1994 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y
AU AdvanceBk 1993 May 12 Annual Report 1993 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y
AU AdvanceBk 1992 May 12 Annual Report 1992 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y
AU AdvanceBk 1991 May 12 Annual Report 1991 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y
AU AdvanceBk 1990 May 12 Annual Report 1990 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (2 of 35) 
AU AdvanceBk 1989 to AU ANZ 1994
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU AdvanceBk 1989 May 12 Annual Report 1989 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y
AU AdvanceBk 1988 May 12 Annual Report 1988 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y
AU AdvanceBk 1987 May 12 Annual Report 1987 Advance Bank Australia Limited Y
AU AdvanceBk 1986 May 12 Annual Report 1986 Advance Bank Australia Limited Conversion from Building Society (NSW 
Building Society) into Savings Bank effective 
1 June 1995. Previous name: NSW Building 
Society. Y
AU ANZ 2005 September 12 2005 Annual Report / Financial 
Report 2005
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 2004 September 12 2004 Annual Report / Financial 
Report 2004
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Acquisition of NZ NBNZ effective 1 
December 2003. Financial statements as 
separate publication Y
AU ANZ 2003 September 12 2003 Annual Report / Financial 
Report 2003
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Financial statements as separate publication
Y
AU ANZ 2002 September 12 2002 Annual Report / Financial 
Report 2002
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Financial statements as separate publication
Y
AU ANZ 2001 September 12 2001 Annual Report / Financial 
Report 2001
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Financial statements as separate publication
Y
AU ANZ 2000 September 12 2000 Annual Report / Financial 
Report 2000
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Financial statements as separate publication
Y
AU ANZ 1999 September 12 1999 Annual Report / 1999 Financial 
Statements
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Financial statements as separate publication
Y
AU ANZ 1998 September 12 1998 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1997 September 12 1997 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1996 September 12 1996 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1995 September 12 1995 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1994 September 12 Report to Shareholders 1994 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (3 of 35) 
AU ANZ 1993 to AU ANZ 1978
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU ANZ 1993 September 12 Report to Shareholders 1993 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1992 September 12 Report to Shareholders 1992 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1991 September 12 Report to Shareholders 1991 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1990 September 12 Report to Shareholders 1990 
/Financial Statements 1990
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Financial statements in separate booklet
Y
AU ANZ 1989 September 12 Annual Report 1989 /Financial 
Statements 1989
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited
Financial statements in separate booklet
Y
AU ANZ 1988 September 12 1988 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1987 September 12 1987 Audited Accounts Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1986 September 12 1986 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1985 September 12 1985 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1984 September 12 1984 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y




AU ANZ 1982 September 12 1982 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1981 September 12 1981 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1980 September 12 1980 Annual Report Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1979 September 12 1979 Report and Accounts Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited Y
AU ANZ 1978 September 12 1978 Report and Accounts Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited N  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (4 of 35) 
AU ANZ 1977 to AU BankWest 1999
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU ANZ 1977 September 12 1977 Annual Report and Notice of 
Annual General Meeting
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited N
AU ANZ 1976 September 12 1976 Annual Report and Notice of 
Annual General Meeting
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited N
AU ANZ 1975 September 12 1975 Report and Accounts Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited N
AU ArabBk 2005 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 2004 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 2003 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 2002 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 2001 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 2000 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 1999 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 1998 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 1997 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 1996 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 1995 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited N
AU ArabBk 1994 December 12 Annual Report Arab Bank Australia Limited Banking licence granted 
AU BankWest 2005 December 12 HBOS Annual Report 2005 HBOS Plc. Data derived from sector reporting on 
Australian operations. Y
AU BankWest 2004 December 12 HBOS Annual Report 2004 HBOS Plc. Data derived from sector reporting on 
Australian operations. Y
AU BankWest 2003 December 12 HBOS Annual Report 2003 HBOS Plc. Data derived from sector reporting on 
Australian operations. Y
AU BankWest 2003 n/a n/a HBOS Proposal – Scheme Booklet Bank of Western Australia Limited HBOS buys out minority shareholders. 
Scheme becomes effective 26 August 2003.
N
AU BankWest 2002 December 12 Annual Report 2002 Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 2001 December 10 Annual Report 2001 Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 2001 February 12 Annual Report 2001 Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 2000 February 12 Annual Report 2000 Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 1999 February 12 Annual Report 1999 Bank of Western Australia Limited Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (5 of 35) 
AU BankWest 1998 to AU BendigoBk 2004
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU BankWest 1998 February 12 Annual Report 1998 Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 1997 February 12 Annual Report 1997 Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 1996 February 5 Interim Five-Month Report, to 29 
February 1996
Bank of Western Australia Limited
Y
AU BankWest 1996 n/a n/a Prospectus - BankWest Public Share 
Offer
Bank of Western Australia Limited Bank of Scotland offers 49% of shares to 
public. Y
AU BankWest 1995 September 12 Annual Report 1995 Bank of Western Australia Limited Privatisation  on December 1, 1995 Y
AU BankWest 1994 September 12 Annual Report 1994 Bank of Western Australia Limited Name change 26 April 1994 Y
AU BankWest 1993 September 12 Annual Report 1993 R&I Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 1992 September 12 Annual Report 1992 R&I Bank of Western Australia Limited Y
AU BankWest 1991 September 9 Report for the nine months ended 30 
September 1991
R&I Bank of Western Australia Limited Incorporated as limited liability company on 1 
January 1991. Y
AU BankWest 1990 December 9 Report for the nine months ended 31 
December 1990
The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia
Not published but data disclosed in 
subsequent 9 month report Y
AU BankWest 1990 March 12 44th Annual Report 1990 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BankWest 1989 March 12 43rd Annual Report 1989 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BankWest 1988 March 12 42nd Annual Report 1988 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BankWest 1987 March 12 41st Annual Report 1987 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BankWest 1986 March 12 40th Annual Report 1986 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BankWest 1985 March 12 39th Annual Report 1985 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BankWest 1984 March 12 38th Annual Report 1984 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BankWest 1983 March 12 37th Annual Report 1983 The Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia Y
AU BendigoBk 2005 June 12 Full Financial Report 2005 Bendigo Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report Y
AU BendigoBk 2004 June 12 Full Financial Report 2004 Bendigo Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (6 of 35) 
AU BendigoBk 2003 to AU BoQ 2003
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU BendigoBk 2003 June 12 Full Financial Report 2003 Bendigo Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report Y
AU BendigoBk 2002 June 12 Full Financial Report 2002 Bendigo Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report Y
AU BendigoBk 2001 June 12 Full Financial Report 2001 Bendigo Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report Y
AU BendigoBk 2000 June 12 Full Financial Report 2000 Bendigo Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report Y
AU BendigoBk 1999 June 12 Annual Report 1999 Bendigo Bank Limited Y
AU BendigoBk 1998 June 12 Annual Report 1998 Bendigo Bank Limited Y
AU BendigoBk 1997 June 12 Annual Report 1997 Bendigo Bank Limited Y
AU BendigoBk 1996 June 12 Annual Report 1996 Bendigo Bank Limited Y
AU BendigoBk 1995 June 12 Annual Report 1995 Bendigo Bank Limited Granted bank status July 1, 1995 Y
AU BendigoBk 1994 June 12 Annual Report 1994 Bendigo Building Society Y
AU BendigoBk 1993 June 12 Annual Report 1993 Bendigo Building Society Y
AU BendigoBk 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 Bendigo Building Society Y
AU BkMelbourne 1996 June 12 Annual Report 1996 Bank of Melbourne Limited Absorbed into Westpac effective 3 May 1998
Y
AU BkMelbourne 1995 June 12 Annual Report 1995 Bank of Melbourne Limited Y
AU BkMelbourne 1994 June 12 Annual Report 1994 Bank of Melbourne Limited Y
AU BkMelbourne 1993 June 12 Annual Report 1993 Bank of Melbourne Limited Y
AU BkMelbourne 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 Bank of Melbourne Limited Y
AU BkMelbourne 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 Bank of Melbourne Limited Y
AU BkMelbourne 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 Bank of Melbourne Limited Converted from RESI-Statewide Building 
Society to Bank of Melbourne on July 1, 
1989. Y
AU BkMelbourne 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 RESI Statewide Building Society Last year of reporting as a Building Society
Y
AU BkMelbourne 1988 June 12 Annual Report 1988 RESI Statewide Building Society Data reconstructed from 1989 data Y
AU BkMelbourne 1987 June 12 Annual Report 1987 RESI Statewide Building Society Y
AU BkMelbourne 1986 June 12 Annual Report 1986 RESI Statewide Building Society RESI & Statewide building societies merge to 
form RESI-Statewide Building Society
Y
AU BoQ 2005 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 2004 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 2003 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (7 of 35) 
AU BoQ 2002 to AU CBC Sydney 1980
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU BoQ 2002 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 2001 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 2000 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1999 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1998 August 12 Annual Report / Financial Report Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1997 August 12 Annual Report 1997 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1996 August 12 Annual Report 1996 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1995 August 12 Annual Report 1995 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1994 August 12 Annual Report 1994 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1993 August 12 Annual Report 1993 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1992 August 12 Annual Report 1992 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1991 August 12 Annual Report 1991 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1990 August 12 Annual Report 1990 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1989 August 12 Annual Report 1989 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1988 August 12 Annual Report 1988 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1987 August 12 Annual Report 1987 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1986 August 12 Annual Report 1986 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1985 August 12 Annual Report 1985 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1984 August 12 Annual Report 1984 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1983 August 12 Annual Report 1983 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1982 August 12 Annual Report 1982 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1981 August 12 Annual Report 1981 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU BoQ 1980 August 12 Annual Report 1980 Bank of Queensland Limited Y
AU CBC Sydney 1981 June 12 Annual Report 1981 The Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney Ltd
Merged with National Bank of Australasia to 
form National Commercial Banking 
Corporation of Australia, later renamed 
National Australia Bank effective 1 October 
1981. Y
AU CBC Sydney 1980 June 12 Annual Report 1980 The Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney Ltd Y  
  120
Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (8 of 35) 
AU CBC Sydney 1979 to AU Colonial 1996
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU CBC Sydney 1979 June 12 Annual Report 1979 The Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney Ltd
No reporting of provisions on a consolidated 
basis, but for non-banking subsidiaries only.
Y
AU ChallengeBk 1995 September 12 Annual Financial Statements 1995 Challenge Bank Limited Acquired by Westpac effective 1 January 
1996 Y
AU ChallengeBk 1994 September 12 Annual Report 1994 Challenge Bank Limited Y
AU ChallengeBk 1993 September 12 Annual Report 1993 Challenge Bank Limited Y
AU ChallengeBk 1992 September 12 Annual Report 1992 Challenge Bank Limited Y
AU ChallengeBk 1991 September 12 Annual Report 1991 Challenge Bank Limited Y
AU ChallengeBk 1990 September 12 Annual Report 1990 Challenge Bank Limited Y
AU ChallengeBk 1989 September 12 Annual Report 1989 Challenge Bank Limited Y
AU ChallengeBk 1988 September 12 Annual Report 1988 Challenge Bank Limited Y
AU ChallengeBk 1987 September 5 Annual Report 1987 Challenge Bank Limited Formed out of conversion of Perth Building 
Society and Hotham Permanent Building 
Society 16 April 1987. Reporting covers 16 
April to 30 September only. Y
AU Colonial 1999 December 12 Annual Report 1999 Colonial Limited Acquires Trust Bank Tasmania (December 
1999). Merges with Commonwealth Bank, 13 
June 2000 Y
AU Colonial 1998 December 12 Annual Report 1998 Colonial Limited Includes segment reporting on Colonial State 
Bank. Y
AU Colonial 1997 December 12 Annual Report 1997 Colonial Limited Includes segment reporting on Colonial State 
Bank. Y
AU Colonial 1996 December 12 Annual Report 1996 Colonial Limited Incorporation of Colonial on 15 July 1996. 
This report covers just the period of 15 July 
to 31 December 1996. There are however pro-
forma results for the whole of 1996 available 
on p. 40 of the 1997 report.
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (9 of 35) 
AU Colonial 1995 to AU CoWthBk 1994
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU Colonial 1995 December 12 Annual Report 1995 The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Limited
Includes full year results of Colonial State 
Bank (formerly State Bank of NSW) acquired 
from NSW government 31 December 1994. 
Stand-alone  results for Colonial State Bank 
also published in separate report.
N
AU Colonial 1994 December 12 Annual Report 1994 The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Limited
No relevant banking activities
N
AU Colonial 1993 December 12 Annual Report 1993 The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Limited
No relevant banking activities
N
AU CommBk 1981 June 12 Annual Report 1981 The Commercial Bank of Australia Limited Merged with Bank of New South Wales to 
form Westpac Y
AU CommBk 1980 June 12 Annual Report 1980 The Commercial Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU CommBk 1979 June 12 Annual Report 1979 The Commercial Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU CoWthBk 2005 June 12 Annual Report 2005 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 2004 June 12 Annual Report 2004 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 2003 June 12 Annual Report 2003 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 2002 June 12 Annual Report 2002 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 2001 June 12 Annual Report 2001 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 2000 June 12 Annual Report 2000 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1999 June 12 Annual Report 1999 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1998 June 12 Annual Report 1998 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1997 June 12 Annual Report 1997 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Government sells remaining 50.39% 
shareholding in July 1996. Y
AU CoWthBk 1996 n/a n/a Share Buy Back Explanatory 
Memorandum and Independent 
Expert's Report
Commonwealth Bank of Australia
N
AU CoWthBk 1996 June 12 Annual Report 1996 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1995 June 12 Annual Report 1995 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1994 June 12 Annual Report 1994 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (10 of 35) 
AU CoWthBk 1993 to AU Macquarie 2005
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU CoWthBk 1993 June 12 Annual Report 1993 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Listing on stock exchange 12 September 
1991. Y
AU CoWthBk 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Takeover of State Bank of Victoria (31 
December 1990) Y
AU CoWthBk 1991 n/a n/a Prospectus -Commonwealth Bank 
Public Share Offer
Commonwealth Bank of Australia
Y
AU CoWthBk 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Y
AU CoWthBk 1988 June 12 Annual Report 1988 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Name change with 87/88 amendment of 
Commonwealth Bank Act Y
AU CoWthBk 1987 June 12 Annual Report 1987 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1986 June 12 Annual Report 1986 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1985 June 12 Annual Report 1985 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1984 June 12 Annual Report 1984 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1983 June 12 Annual Report 1983 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1982 June 12 Annual Report 1982 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1981 June 12 Annual Report 1981 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1980 June 12 Annual Report 1980 Commonwealth Banking Corporation Y
AU CoWthBk 1979 June 12 Annual Report 1979 Commonwealth Banking Corporation N
AU EldersRural 2005 June 12 Annual Report Elders Rural Bank Limited Y
AU EldersRural 2004 June 12 Annual Report Elders Rural Bank Limited Y
AU EldersRural 2003 June 12 Annual Report Elders Rural Bank Limited Y
AU EldersRural 2002 June 12 Annual Report Elders Rural Bank Limited Y
AU EldersRural 2001 June 12 Annual Report Elders Rural Bank Limited Y
AU EldersRural 2000 June 12 Annual Report Elders Rural Bank Limited Incorporated January 1999. Banking licence 
per 26 June 2000. Elders Rural Bank is a JV 
between Bendigo Bank Limited and Futuris 
Corp., the parent company of Elders Limited.
Y
AU Macquarie 2005 March 12 Annual Review 2005 / 2005 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (11 of 35) 
AU Macquarie 2004 to AU NAB 2005
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU Macquarie 2004 March 12 Annual Review 2004 / 2004 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 2003 March 12 Annual Review 2003 / 2003 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 2002 March 12 Annual Review 2002 / 2002 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 2001 March 12 Annual Review 2001 / 2001 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 2000 March 12 Annual Review 2000 / 2000 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 1999 March 12 Annual Review 1999 / 1999 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 1998 March 12 Annual Review 1998 / 1998 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 1997 March 12 Annual Review 1997 / 1997 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 1996 March 12 Annual Review 1996 / 1996 Financial 
Report
Macquarie Bank Limited Financial report published separately
Y
AU Macquarie 1995 March 12 Annual Report 1995 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1994 March 12 Annual Report 1994 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1993 March 12 Annual Report 1993 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1992 March 12 Annual Report 1992 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1991 March 12 Annual Report 1991 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1990 March 12 Annual Report 1990 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1989 March 12 Annual Report 1989 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1987 March 12 Annual Report 1987 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1986 March 12 Annual Report 1986 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU Macquarie 1985 March 12 Annual Report 1985 Macquarie Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 2005 September 12 Full Year Results / Concise Annual 
Report
National Australia Bank Limited Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (12 of 35) 
AU NAB 2004 to AU NAB 1985
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU NAB 2004 September 12 Full Year Results / Concise Annual 
Report
National Australia Bank Limited Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU NAB 2003 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Concise 
Annual Report
National Australia Bank Limited Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU NAB 2002 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Concise 
Annual Report
National Australia Bank Limited Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU NAB 2001 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Annual 
Review
National Australia Bank Limited Separate publications of full financial report 
and annual review Y
AU NAB 2000 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Annual 
Review
National Australia Bank Limited Separate publications of full financial report 
and annual review, Annual review missing
Y
AU NAB 1999 September 12 Annual Report 1999 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1999 September 12 Annual Report 1999 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1998 September 12 Annual Report 1998 National Australia Bank Limited NAB acquires HomeSide Inc. (US) Y
AU NAB 1997 September 12 Annual Report 1997 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1996 September 12 Annual Report 1996 National Australia Bank Limited NAB acquires Michigan National Bank (US) 
in November 1995. Y
AU NAB 1995 September 12 Annual Report 1995 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1994 September 12 Annual Report 1994 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1993 September 12 Annual Report 1993 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1992 September 12 Annual Report 1992 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1991 September 12 Annual Report 1991 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1990 September 12 Annual Report 1990 National Australia Bank Limited NAB acquires Yorkshire Bank (UK) Y
AU NAB 1989 September 12 Annual Report 1989 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1988 September 12 Annual Report 1988 National Australia Bank Limited NAB acquires several banks in UK, Ireland 
(October 1987) Y
AU NAB 1987 September 12 Annual Report 1987 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1986 September 12 Annual Report 1986 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1985 September 12 Annual Report 1985 National Australia Bank Limited Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (13 of 35) 
AU NAB 1984 to AU PIBA 1986
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU NAB 1984 September 12 Annual Report 1984 National Australia Bank Limited Y
AU NAB 1983 September 12 Annual Report 1983 National Commercial Banking Corporation 
of Australia Ltd
Starts operating as a merged bank 1/01/1983 
(Merger of National Bank of Australasia and 
Commercial Banking Company of Sydney)
Y
AU NAB 1982 September 12 Annual Report 1982 National Commercial Banking Corporation 
of Australia Ltd
Reports results of merged banks for both 
1982 and 1981. Name officially changed on 
31 December 1982 only. Y
AU NAB 1981 September 12 123rd Annual Report 1981 National Bank of Australasia Limited Merged with Commercial Banking Company 
of Sydney to form National Commercial 
Banking Corporation of Australia effective 1 
October 1981. Y
AU NAB 1980 September 12 122nd Annual Report 1980 National Bank of Australasia Limited Y
AU NAB 1979 September 12 121st Annual Report 1979 National Bank of Australasia Limited No reporting of provisions on a consolidated 
basis. N
AU PIBA 1993 September 12 1993 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited Acquired by Rabobank in 1994
Y
AU PIBA 1992 September 12 1992 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1991 September 18 1991 Financial Report for the 18 
months ended 30 September 1991
Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1990 March 12 1990 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1989 March 9 1989 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1988 June 12 1988 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1987 June 12 1987 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited Rural and Industry Bank of Western Australia 
takes full control. Banking license per 30 June 
1987 Y
AU PIBA 1986 June 12 1986 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (14 of 35) 
AU PIBA 1985 to AU SavBkSA 1983
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU PIBA 1985 June 12 1985 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1984 June 12 1984 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1983 June 12 1983 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1982 June 12 1982 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1981 June 12 1981 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1980 June 12 1980 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited
Y
AU PIBA 1979 June 12 1979 Annual Report Primary Industry Bank of Australia Limited Set up 1978 under Primary Industry Bank Act 
1977. Y
AU Rock BS 2005 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 2004 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 2003 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 2002 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 2001 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 2000 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 1999 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 1998 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 1997 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 1996 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 1995 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 1994 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society Limited N
AU Rock BS 1993 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society N
AU Rock BS 1992 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society N
AU Rock BS 1991 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society N
AU Rock BS 1990 June 12 Annual Report The Rock Building Society N
AU SavBkSA 1983 June 12 Annual Report 1983 The Savings Bank of South Australia Merged with State Bank of South Australia 
effective July 1, 1984 N  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (15 of 35) 
AU SavBkSA 1982 to AU SBSA 1994
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU SavBkSA 1982 June 12 Annual Report 1982 The Savings Bank of South Australia N
AU SavBkSA 1981 June 12 Annual Report 1981 The Savings Bank of South Australia N
AU SavBkSA 1980 June 12 Annual Report 1980 The Savings Bank of South Australia N
AU SBNSW 1995 December 12 Annual Report 1995 State Bank of New South Wales Ltd First report as member of Colonial Group 
which bought bank per 31 Dec 1994. Includes 
3 mos reporting per December 1994.
Y
AU SBNSW 1994 September 12 Annual Report 1994 State Bank of New South Wales Ltd Not published N
AU SBNSW 1994 March 6 Consolidated Results Six Months 
Ended 31 March 1994
State Bank of New South Wales Ltd Half year report only
N
AU SBNSW 1993 September 12 Annual Report 1990 State Bank of New South Wales Ltd Y
AU SBNSW 1992 September 12 Annual Report 1990 State Bank of New South Wales Ltd Y
AU SBNSW 1991 September 15 Annual Report 1991 State Bank of New South Wales Ltd Y
AU SBNSW 1990 September 15 Annual Report 1990 State Bank of New South Wales Ltd Corporization, 14 May 1990 Y
AU SBNSW 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 State Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1988 June 12 Annual Report 1988 State Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1987 June 12 Annual Report 1987 State Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1986 June 12 Annual Report 1986 State Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1985 June 12 Annual Report 1985 State Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1984 June 12 Annual Report 1984 State Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1983 June 12 Annual Report 1983 State Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1982 June 12 Annual Report 1982 State Bank of New South Wales Name change to State Bank of New South 
Wales effective 2 November 1981 Y
AU SBNSW 1981 June 12 Annual Report 1981 Rural Bank of New South Wales Y
AU SBNSW 1980 June 12 Annual Report 1980 Rural Bank of New South Wales N
AU SBSA 1995 June 12 Annual Report 1994-95 South Australian Asset Management 
Corporation
No financials published. Bank SA acquired 
by Advance Bank Australia July 1995.
N
AU SBSA 1994 June 12 Annual Report 1993-94 South Australian Asset Management 
Corporation
Corporatisation by transferring core banking 
operations to Bank of South Australia Ltd 
(Bank SA) effective 1 July 1994.
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (16 of 35) 
AU SBSA 1993 to AU SBVictoria 1981
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU SBSA 1993 December 6 Interim Report Six Months Ended 31st 
December 1993
State Bank of South Australia
Y
AU SBSA 1993 June 12 Annual Report 1993 State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 State Bank of South Australia Bail-out by SA State Government which 
provides an indemnity of AUD 3.1 billion. Y
AU SBSA 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1988 June 12 Annual Report 1988 State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1987 June 12 Annual Report 1987 State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1986 June 12 Annual Report 1986 State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1985 June 12 Annual Report 1985 State Bank of South Australia Merger with Savings Bank of South Australia 
effective July 1, 1984 Y
AU SBSA 1984 June 12 Annual Report 1984 State Bank of South Australia Savings Bank of Australia and State Bank of 
South Australia report as a merged entity for 
the first time. Y
AU SBSA 1983 June 12 Annual Report 1983 The State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1982 June 12 Annual Report 1982 The State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1981 June 12 Annual Report 1981 The State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBSA 1980 June 12 Annual Report 1980 The State Bank of South Australia Y
AU SBVictoria 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 State Bank of Victoria Last year of reporting. Merged with 
Commonwealth Bank effective January 1, 
1991. Y
AU SBVictoria 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1988 June 12 Annual Report 1988 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1987 June 12 Annual Report 1987 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1986 June 12 Annual Report 1986 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1985 June 12 Annual Report 1985 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1984 June 12 Annual Report 1984 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1983 June 12 Annual Report 1983 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1982 June 12 Annual Report 1982 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1981 June 12 Annual Report 1981 State Bank of Victoria Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (17 of 35) 
AU SBVictoria 1980 to AU SuncorpMet 2004
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU SBVictoria 1980 June 12 Annual Report 1980 State Bank of Victoria Y
AU SBVictoria 1979 June 12 Annual Report 1979 State Bank of Victoria N
AU StGeorge 2005 September 12 Full Financial Report /Concise Annual 
Report
St. George Bank Limited
Y
AU StGeorge 2004 September 12 Full Financial Report /Concise Annual 
Report
St. George Bank Limited
Y
AU StGeorge 2003 September 12 Full Financial Report /Concise Annual 
Report
St. George Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report
Y
AU StGeorge 2002 September 12 Full Financial Report St. George Bank Limited Full Financial Report Y
AU StGeorge 2001 September 12 Full Financial Report / Concise 
Financial Report
St. George Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report
Y
AU StGeorge 2000 September 12 Full Financial Report / Concise 
Financial Report
St. George Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report
Y
AU StGeorge 1999 September 12 Full Financial Report / Concise 
Financial Report
St. George Bank Limited Concise and full Financial Report
Y
AU StGeorge 1998 September 12 Annual Report 1998 St. George Bank Limited Y
AU StGeorge 1997 September 12 Annual Report 1997 St. George Bank Limited Acquired Advance Bank Australia effective 
January 29, 1997 Y
AU StGeorge 1996 September 12 Annual Report 1996 St. George Bank Limited Y
AU StGeorge 1995 September 12 Annual Report 1995 St. George Bank Limited Y
AU StGeorge 1994 September 12 Annual Report 1994 St. George Bank Limited Acquired Barclays Bank commercial banking 
assets per 6 April 1994 Y
AU StGeorge 1993 September 16 Annual Report 1992/1993 St. George Bank Limited Changed name to St.George Bank per 1 July 
1992 Y
AU StGeorge 1992 May 12 Annual Report 1992 St. George Building Society Limited Last year of reporting as a building society
Y
AU StGeorge 1991 May 12 Annual Report 1991 St. George Building Society Limited Y
AU StGeorge 1990 May 12 Annual Report 1990 St. George Building Society Limited Y
AU StGeorge 1989 May 12 Annual Report 1989 St. George Building Society Limited Merger with State Building Society effective 
1 October 1988 Y
AU SuncorpMet 2005 June 12 Annual Report 2005 Suncorp Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 2004 June 12 Annual Report 2004 Suncorp Limited Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (18 of 35) 
AU SuncorpMet 2003 to AU TasmaniaBk 1988
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU SuncorpMet 2003 June 12 Annual Report 2003 Suncorp Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 2002 June 12 Annual Report 2002 Suncorp-Metway Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 2001 June 12 Annual Report 2001 Suncorp-Metway Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 2000 June 12 Annual Report 2000 Suncorp-Metway Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1999 June 12 Annual Report 1999 / / Announcement 
of Consolidated Financial Results
Suncorp-Metway Limited
Y
AU SuncorpMet 1998 June 12 Annual Report 1998 / Announcement 
of Consolidated Financial Results
Suncorp-Metway Limited
Y
AU SuncorpMet 1997 June 12 Annual Report 1997 Suncorp-Metway Limited Merger December 1, 1996 (Suncorp, Metway 
Bank, QIDC) Y
AU SuncorpMet 1996 June 12 Annual Report 1996 Metway Bank Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1995 June 12 Annual Report 1995 Metway Bank Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1994 June 12 Annual Report 1994 Metway Bank Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1993 June 12 Annual Report 1993 Metway Bank Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 Metway Bank Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 Metway Bank Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 Metway Bank Limited Y
AU SuncorpMet 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 Metway Bank Limited First year of business as Metway Bank after 
converting from Metropolitan Permanent 
Building Society on 1 July 1988.
Y
AU TasmaniaBk 1990 August 12 Annual Report 1990 Tasmania Bank Acquired by SBT Bank to form Trust Bank 
Tasmania (AU Trustbk TAS) 1 September 
1991 Y
AU TasmaniaBk 1989 August 12 Annual Report 1989 Tasmania Bank Y
AU TasmaniaBk 1988 August 12 Inaugural Annual Report 1987-1988 Tasmania Bank Tasmania Bank established by Act of 
Parliament 1 Sept 1987 after merger with 
Tasmanian Permanent Building Society, no 
report published for 1987 financial year Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (19 of 35) 
AU TasmaniaBk 1987 to AU Trustbk TAS 1983
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU TasmaniaBk 1987 August 12 Annual Report 1987 Launceston Bank of Savings (LBS 
Statewide Bank)
not published, data from 1988 report
Y
AU TasmaniaBk 1986 August 12 Annual Report 1986 Launceston Bank of Savings (LBS 
Statewide Bank) Y
AU TasmaniaBk 1985 August 12 Annual Report 1985 Launceston Bank of Savings (LBS 
Statewide Bank) Y
AU TasmaniaBk 1984 August 12 Annual Report 1984 Launceston Bank of Savings (LBS 
Statewide Bank) Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1999 February n/a Half Yearly Report Trust Bank Tasmania Absorbed into Colonial Ltd as Colonial Trust 
Bank (30/11/1999) and later into 
Commonwealth Bank (13/6/2000) N
AU Trustbk TAS 1998 August 12 1998 Annual Report Trust Bank Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1997 August 12 1997 Annual Report Trust Bank Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1996 August 12 1996 Annual Report Trust Bank Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1995 August 12 1995 Annual Report Trust Bank Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1994 August 12 1994 Annual Report Trust Bank Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1993 August 12 1993 Annual Report Trust Bank Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1992 August 12 1992 Annual Report Trust Bank Tasmania Trust Bank Tasmania commenced operations 
1 Sept 1991 Y








AU Trustbk TAS 1989 August 12 1989 Annual Report The Hobart Savings Bank (trading as SBT 
Bank) Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1988 August 12 1988 Annual Report The Hobart Savings Bank (trading as SBT 
Bank) Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1987 August 12 1987 Annual Report The Savings Bank of Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1986 August 12 1986 Annual Report The Savings Bank of Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1985 August 12 1985 Annual Report The Savings Bank of Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1984 August 12 1984 Annual Report The Savings Bank of Tasmania Y
AU Trustbk TAS 1983 August 12 1983 Annual Report The Savings Bank of Tasmania Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (20 of 35) 
AU Westpac 2005 to AU Westpac 1992
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU Westpac 2005 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Concise 
Annual Report
Westpac Banking Corporation Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU Westpac 2004 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Concise 
Annual Report
Westpac Banking Corporation Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU Westpac 2003 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Concise 
Annual Report
Westpac Banking Corporation Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU Westpac 2002 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Concise 
Annual Report
Westpac Banking Corporation Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report. Reports 
the first time as a public limited company 
after registering 23 August 2002. 
Y
AU Westpac 2001 September 12 Annual Financial Report / Concise 
Annual Report
Westpac Banking Corporation Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU Westpac 2000 September 12 Annual Financial Report Westpac Banking Corporation Separate publications of full financial report 
and concise version of annual report
Y
AU Westpac 1999 September 12 Annual Financial Report Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1998 September 12 Annual Report 1998 Westpac Banking Corporation Bank of Melbourne merges into Westpac 3 
May 1998 Y
AU Westpac 1997 September 12 Annual Report 1997 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1996 September 12 Annual Report 1996 Westpac Banking Corporation Acquisition of Challenge Bank per 1 January 
1996 and Trust Bank per 1 June 1996. 
Y
AU Westpac 1995 September 12 Annual Report 1995 Westpac Banking Corporation pages to p. 22 missing Y
AU Westpac 1994 September 12 Annual Report 1994 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1993 September 12 Annual Report 1993 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1992 September 12 Annual Report 1992 Westpac Banking Corporation Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (21 of 35) 
AU Westpac 1991 to AU WideBay BS 1998
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)








AU Westpac 1989 September 12 Annual Report 1989 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1988 September 12 Annual Report 1988 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1987 September 12 Annual Report 1987 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1986 September 12 Annual Report 1986 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1985 September 12 Annual Report 1985 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1984 September 12 Annual Report 1984 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1983 September 12 Annual Report 1983 Westpac Banking Corporation Y
AU Westpac 1982 September 12 Annual Report 1982 Bank of New South Wales Merger with Commercial Bank of Australia. 
Name change to Westpac Banking 
Corporation 1 October 1982. Y
AU Westpac 1981 September 12 Annual Report 1981 Bank of New South Wales Y
AU Westpac 1980 September 12 Annual Report 1980 Bank of New South Wales Y
AU Westpac 1979 September 12 Annual Report 1979 Bank of New South Wales Y
AU WideBay BS 2005 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Australia Limited N
AU WideBay BS 2004 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Australia Limited N
AU WideBay BS 2003 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N
AU WideBay BS 2002 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N
AU WideBay BS 2001 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N
AU WideBay BS 2000 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N
AU WideBay BS 1999 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N
AU WideBay BS 1998 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (22 of 35) 
AU WideBay BS 1997 to NZ ANZ 1994
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
AU WideBay BS 1997 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N
AU WideBay BS 1996 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited N
AU WideBay BS 1995 June 12 Annual Report Wide Bay Capricorn Building Society 
Limited
Listed on ASX on Sept 1994
N
NZ ANZ 2005 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2005
ANZ National Bank Limited Group
Y
NZ ANZ 2004 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2004
ANZ National Bank Limited Group
Y
NZ ANZ 2003 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2003
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 2002 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2002
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 2001 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2001
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 2000 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2000
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1999 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1999
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1998 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1998
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1997 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1997
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1996 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1996
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1995 September 12 Review and Financial Statements 1995 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1994 September 12 Prospectus No. 14 24 November 1994 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
N
NZ ANZ 1994 September 12 Review and Financial Statements 1994 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (23 of 35) 
NZ ANZ 1993 to NZ ASB 2003
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ ANZ 1993 September 12 Prospectus No. 12 13 December 1993 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
N
NZ ANZ 1993 September 12 Prospectus No. 13 24 June 1994 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. N
NZ ANZ 1993 September 12 Review and Financial Statements 1993 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1992 September 12 Prospectus No. 10 7 December 1992 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. N
NZ ANZ 1992 September 12 Review and Financial Statements 1992 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1991 September 12 Prospectus No. 8 18 December 1991 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. N
NZ ANZ 1991 September 12 Prospectus No. 9 23 June 1992 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. N
NZ ANZ 1991 September 12 Review and Financial Statements 1991 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1990 September 12 Financial Statements 30 September 
1990
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1990 September 12 Prospectus No. 7 24 June 1991 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. N
NZ ANZ 1989 September 12 Financial Statements 30 September 
1989
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
Y
NZ ANZ 1988 September 12 Annual Report 1988 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1987 September 12 Annual Report 1987 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1986 September 12 Annual Report 1986 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1985 September 12 Annual Report 1985 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1984 September 12 Annual Report 1984 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1983 September 12 Annual Report 1983 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1982 September 12 Annual Report 1982 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1981 September 12 Annual Report 1981 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y
NZ ANZ 1980 September 12 Annual Report 1980 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. Y













Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (24 of 35) 
NZ ASB 2002 to NZ BNZ 2002
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ ASB 2002 June 12 Annual Report 2002 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 2001 June 12 Annual Report 2001 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 2000 June 12 Annual Report 2000 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1999 June 12 Annual Report 1999 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1998 June 12 Annual Report 1998 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1997 June 12 Annual Report 1997 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1996 June 12 Annual Report 1996 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1995 June 12 Annual Report 1995 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1994 June 12 Annual Report 1994 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1993 June 12 Annual Report 1993 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 ASB Bank Ltd. Y
NZ ASB 1988 March 15 Annual Report 1988 ASB Bank Y
NZ ASB 1987 March 12 Annual Report 1987 ASB Bank Y
NZ ASB 1986 March 12 Annual Report 1986 ASB Trustee Bank Y
NZ ASB 1985 March 12 Annual Report 1985 Auckland Savings Bank Y
NZ ASB 1984 March 12 Annual Report 1984 Auckland Savings Bank Y
NZ ASB 1983 March 12 Annual Report 1983 Auckland Savings Bank Y
NZ ASB 1982 March 12 Annual Report 1982 Auckland Savings Bank Y
NZ ASB 1981 March 12 Annual Report 1981 Auckland Savings Bank Y
NZ ASB 1980 March 12 Annual Report 1980 Auckland Savings Bank Y
NZ BNZ 2005 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2005
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 2004 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2004
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 2003 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2003
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 2002 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2002
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (25 of 35) 
NZ BNZ 2001 to NZ BNZ 1981
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ BNZ 2001 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2001
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 2000 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 2000
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1999 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1999
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1998 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1998
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1997 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1997
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1996 September 12 General Disclosure Statement 
September 1996
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1995 September 12 Prospectus Number 16 December 
1995
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1994 September 12 Prospectus Number 14 December 
1994
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1993 September 18 Prospectus Number 12 December 
1993
Bank of New Zealand Ltd.
Y
NZ BNZ 1992 March 12 Annual Report 1992 Bank of New Zealand Ltd. Y
NZ BNZ 1991 March 12 Annual Report 1991 Bank of New Zealand Ltd. Y
NZ BNZ 1990 March 12 Annual Report 1990 Bank of New Zealand Ltd. Y
NZ BNZ 1989 March 12 Annual Report 1989 Bank of New Zealand Ltd. Y
NZ BNZ 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 Bank of New Zealand Y
NZ BNZ 1987 March 12 Annual Report 1987 Bank of New Zealand Y
NZ BNZ 1987 n/a n/a Prospectus for an Issue of Ordinary 
Shares 12 February 1987
Bank of New Zealand
Y
NZ BNZ 1986 March 12 125th Annual Report 1986 Bank of New Zealand Y
NZ BNZ 1985 March 12 124th Annual Report 1985 Bank of New Zealand Y
NZ BNZ 1984 March 12 123rd Annual Report 1984 Bank of New Zealand Y
NZ BNZ 1983 March 12 122nd Annual Report 1983 Bank of New Zealand Y
NZ BNZ 1982 March 12 121st Annual Report 1982 Bank of New Zealand Y
NZ BNZ 1981 March 12 120th Annual Report 1981 Bank of New Zealand Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (26 of 35) 
NZ BNZ 1980 to NZ Countrywide 1994
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ BNZ 1980 March 12 118th Annual Report 1979 Bank of New Zealand incorporated under 1979 Bank of New 
Zealand Act Y
NZ BNZ 1980 March 12 119th Annual Report 1980 Bank of New Zealand incorporated under Bank of New Zealand Act 
1945, No 18 Y
NZ BNZ 1979 March 12 118th Annual Report 1979 Bank of New Zealand N
NZ BNZ 1978 March 12 117th Annual Report 1979 Bank of New Zealand N
NZ BNZ Fin 1995 September 12 Annual Report 1995 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1994 September 12 Annual Report 1994 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1993 September 18 Annual Report 1993 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1992 March 12 Annual Report 1992 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1991 March 12 Annual Report 1991 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1990 March 12 Annual Report 1990 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1989 March 12 Annual Report 1989 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1987 March 12 Annual Report 1987 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1986 March 12 Annual Report 1986 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1985 March 12 Annual Report 1985 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1984 March 12 Annual Report 1984 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1983 March 12 Annual Report 1983 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1982 March 12 Annual Report 1982 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1981 March 12 Annual Report 1981 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ BNZ Fin 1980 March 12 Annual Report 1980 BNZ Finance Limited Y
NZ Countrywide 1998 February 12 Registered bank General Disclosure 
Statement 1998
Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1997 February 12 Registered bank General Disclosure 
Statement 1997
Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1996 February 12 Registered bank General Disclosure 
Statement 1996
Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1995 February 14 Annual Report 1995 Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1994 n/a n/a No annual report for 1994 due to end 
of reporting year change
Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (27 of 35) 
NZ Countrywide 1993 to NZ NAB 1992
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ Countrywide 1993 December 12 Annual Report 1993 Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1992 December 18 Annual Report 1992 Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1992 June 12 Interim Report to Shareholders for 12 
month interim period ended 30 June 
1992
Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited Issued due to change to 31 December 
reporting date after takeover by Bank of 
Scotland Y
NZ Countrywide 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1990 June 12 Annual Report 1990 Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1989 June 12 Annual Report 1989 Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1988 June 12 Annual Report 1988 Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited
Y
NZ Countrywide 1987 June 12 Annual Report 1987 Countrywide Building Society Y
NZ Countrywide 1986 June 12 Annual Report 1986 Countrywide Building Society Y
NZ Countrywide 1985 June 12 Annual Report 1985 Countrywide Building Society Y
NZ Countrywide 1984 June 12 Annual Report 1984 Countrywide Building Society Y
NZ Countrywide 1983 June 12 86th Annual Report 1983 Countrywide Building Society Y
















NZ NAB 1993 September 12 Financial Statements in BNZ 
Prospectus No. 12
National Australia (NZ) Limited Merged with BNZ October 1, 1993. Name 
change to National Australia (NZ) Ltd. Y
NZ NAB 1992 September 12 Prospectus No 20 National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (28 of 35) 
NZ NAB 1991 to NZ NBNZ 1996
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ NAB 1991 September 12 Prospectus No 19 Dated 5 June 1992 National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited
Y
NZ NAB 1990 September 12 Prospectus No 16 National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited Y
NZ NAB 1989 September 12 Prospectus No 15 Dated 5 June 1990 National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited
Y
NZ NAB 1989 12 Prospectus No ? National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited Y
NZ NAB 1988 September 12 Prospectus No ? National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited Y
NZ NAB 1988 12 Prospectus No ? National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited Y
NZ NAB 1987 September 12 Prospectus No ? National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited Name change from Broadbank Ltd. to 
National Australia Bank (NZ) Ltd 1/10/1987
Y
NZ NAB 1987 12 Prospectus No ? National Australia Bank (NZ) Limited Y
NZ NAB 1986 September 12 Prospectus No ? Broadbank Corporation Limited Registered as bank 22 July 1987 Y
NZ NBNZ 2003 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 2003
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The) Acquired by AU ANZ effective December 1, 
2003. Amalgamated with ANZ Banking 
Group (New Zealand) Limited to create
ANZ National Bank Limited on 26 June 
2004. Y
NZ NBNZ 2002 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 2002
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 2001 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 2001
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 2000 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 2000
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1999 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 1999
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1998 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 1998
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1997 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 1997
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1996 December 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement 1996
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y  
  141
Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (29 of 35) 
NZ NBNZ 1995 to NZ NBNZ 1980
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ NBNZ 1995 December 12 Annual Report 1995 National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1994 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1994
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1993 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1993
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1992 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1992
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1991 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1991
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1990 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1990
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1989 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1989
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1988 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1988
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1987 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1987
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1986 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1986
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1985 December 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1985
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1984 December 14 The National Bank Annual Report 
1984
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1983 October 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1983
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1982 October 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1982
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1981 October 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1981
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1980 October 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1980
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (30 of 35) 
NZ NBNZ 1979 to NZ Rural Bank 1987
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ NBNZ 1979 October 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1979
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
Y
NZ NBNZ 1978 October 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1978
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
N
NZ NBNZ 1977 October 12 The National Bank Annual Report 
1977
National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. (The)
N
NZ NZIBank 1987 March Annual Report 1987 NZI Bank Limited Some data from 1987 and 1988 reconstructed 
from Australian Ratings report
Y
NZ NZIBank 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 NZI Bank Limited Y
NZ NZIBank 1989 March 12 Report and Accounts for year ended 
31 March 1989
NZI Bank Limited
NZ NZIBank 1989 December Annual Report NZI Bank Limited Data retrieved from 1990 report. Y
NZ NZIBank 1990 December 12 Annual Report 1990 NZI Bank Limited Y
NZ NZIBank 1991 December Annual Report NZI Bank Limited Relinquished banking license in February 
1992.
Y
NZ PostBank 1991 September 12 Prospectus No. 8 dated 18  December 
1991
Post Office Bank Limited
N
NZ PostBank 1990 September Prospectus No. 6 September 1992 Post Office Bank Limited N
NZ PostBank 1989 February 11 Annual Report 1989 Post Office Bank Limited Y
NZ PostBank 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 Post Office Bank Limited Y
NZ PostBank 1988 March 12 Prospectus No.1 dated 30th June 1988 Post Office Bank Limited Incorporated 24/2/1987, bank registration per 
11/8/1989 N
NZ Rural Bank 1992 June 12 Annual Report 1992 The Rural Bank Limited Y
NZ Rural Bank 1991 June 12 Annual Report 1991 The Rural Bank Limited Y
NZ Rural Bank 1990 June 15 Annual Report 1990 The Rural Bank Limited Y
NZ Rural Bank 1989 March 12 Annual Report 1989 Rural Banking and Finance Corporation Y
NZ Rural Bank 1988 September 12 Half Year Report Rural Banking and Finance Corporation N
NZ Rural Bank 1988 March 12 Report of the Rural Banking and 
Finance Corporation of New Zealand
Rural Banking and Finance Corporation
Y
NZ Rural Bank 1987 March 12 Annual Report 1987 Rural Banking and Finance Corporation Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (31 of 35) 
NZ Rural Bank 1986 to NZ Trust Bank 1988
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ Rural Bank 1986 March 12 Annual Report 1986 The Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation of New Zealand Y
NZ Rural Bank 1985 March 12 Annual Report 1985 The Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation of New Zealand Y
NZ Rural Bank 1984 March 12 Report of the Rural Banking and 
Finance Corporation of New Zealand
The Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation of New Zealand
Y
NZ Superbank 2005 September 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement
St.George Bank New Zealand Limited
Y
NZ Superbank 2004 September 12 Annual Report and General Disclosure 
Statement
St.George Bank New Zealand Limited
Y
NZ Superbank 2003 September 14 General Disclosure Statement for the 
six months ended 31 March 2004
St.George Bank New Zealand Limited Shows data to 30 September 2003 for first 14 
months of operations.
Y
NZ Trust Bank 1996 March 12 Annual Report 1996 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries
Acquired by Westpac Banking Corp. effective 
1 June 1996. Y
NZ Trust Bank 1995 March 12 Annual Report 1995 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y
NZ Trust Bank 1994 March 12 Annual Report 1994 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y
NZ Trust Bank 1993 March 12 Annual Report 1993 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y
NZ Trust Bank 1992 March 12 Annual Report 1992 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y
NZ Trust Bank 1991 March 12 Annual Report 1991 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y
NZ Trust Bank 1990 March 12 Annual Report 1990 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y
NZ Trust Bank 1989 March 12 Annual Report 1989 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y
NZ Trust Bank 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 Trust Bank New Zealand Limited and its 
Subsidiaries Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (32 of 35) 
NZ TSB Bank 2006 to NZ UnitedBk 1990
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ TSB Bank 2006 March 12 Annual Report 2005 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 2005 March 12 Annual Report 2005 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 2004 March 12 Annual Report 2004 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 2003 March 12 Annual Report 2003 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 2002 March 12 Annual Report 2002 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 2001 March 12 Annual Report 2001 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 2000 March 12 Annual Report 2000 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1999 March 12 Annual Report 1999 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1998 March 12 Annual Report 1998 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1997 March 12 Annual Report 1997 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1996 March 12 Annual Report 1996 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1995 March 12 Annual Report 1995 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1994 March 12 Annual Report 1994 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1993 March 12 Annual Report 1993 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1992 March 12 Annual Report 1992 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1991 March 12 Annual Report 1991 TSB Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1990 March 12 Annual Report 1990 TSB Bank Limited Name change to TSB Bank Ltd in November 
1989 Y
NZ TSB Bank 1990 March 12 Prospectus No. 4 31 May 1990 TSB Bank Limited N
NZ TSB Bank 1989 March 12 Annual Report 1989 Taranaki Savings Bank Limited Y
NZ TSB Bank 1989 March 12 Prospectus No. 3 27 November 1989 Taranaki Savings Bank Limited
N
NZ TSB Bank 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 Taranaki Savings Bank Y
NZ TSB Bank 1987 March 12 Annual Report 1987 Taranaki Savings Bank Y
NZ UnitedBk 1992 June n/a Prospectus No. 6 September 1992 United Bank Limited Becomes subsidiary of Countrywide Bank 
30/4/1992 Y
NZ UnitedBk 1992 March 6 Prospectus No. 5 March 1992 United Bank Limited N
NZ UnitedBk 1991 September 12 Prospectus No. 4  September 1991 United Bank Limited Y
NZ UnitedBk 1991 September 12 Prospectus No. 3  September 1991 United Bank Limited Y
NZ UnitedBk 1990 September 12 Prospectus No. 2 September 1990 United Banking Group Limited Name change to United Bank Ltd 22 
November 1990 Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (33 of 35) 
NZ UnitedBk 1990 to NZ Westpac 2002
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ UnitedBk 1990 March 6 Prospectus No. 1, 29th June 1990 United Banking Group Limited Incorporated as limited liability 29 June 1990
Y
NZ UnitedBk 1990 n/a n/a Conversion Plan United Building Society Explanatory notice for conversion to 
registered bank and capital injection by State 
Bank of South Australia Y
NZ UnitedBk 1989 September 12 Annual Report 1989 United Building Society Y
NZ UnitedBk 1988 September 12 Annual Report 1988 United Building Society Y
NZ UnitedBk 1987 September 12 Annual Report 1987 United Building Society Y




NZ UnitedBk 1985 September 12 Annual Report 1985 United Building Society Y
NZ UnitedBk 1984 September 12 Annual Report 1984 United Building Society Y
NZ UnitedBk 1983 September 12 Annual Report 1983 United Building Society Formed by the union of Northern United 
Building Society and the Canterbury Building 
Society effective October 1, 1982. Y
NZ Westland 1990 June 15 Annual Report 1990 Westland Bank Limited Reports as a subsidiary of ASB (Westland 
became wholly owned subsidiary of ASB per 
29 September 1989) Y
NZ Westland 1989 March 12 Financial Report 1989 Westland Bank Limited Incorporated as limited liability company on 1 
September 1988 Y
NZ Westland 1988 March 12 Annual Report 1988 Westland Bank Y
NZ Westland 1987 March 12 121st Annual Report 1987 Westland Bank Y
NZ Westpac 2005 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 2004 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 2003 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 2002 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (34 of 35) 
NZ Westpac 2001 to NZ Westpac 1989
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ Westpac 2001 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 2000 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1999 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1998 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1997 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1996 September 12 General Disclosure Statement Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1995 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 15 December 
1995
Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1994 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 20 December 
1994
Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1994 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 20 June 1995 Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) N
NZ Westpac 1993 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 20 June 1994 Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch)
Dec 93 prospectus missing but this report 
provides 92/93 data Y
NZ Westpac 1992 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 18 December 
1992
Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1991 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 24 June 1992 Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch)
Dec 91 prospectus missing but this report 
provides 91/92 data Y
NZ Westpac 1990 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 21 December 
1990
Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1990 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 26 June 1991 Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) N
NZ Westpac 1989 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 22 December 
1989
Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1989 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 22 June 1990 Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) N  
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Table 3 7: Full list of bank annual reports used in this research project (35 of 35) 
NZ Westpac 1988 to NZ Westpac 1987
Institution Year Year End Months 
reported
Name of Report Reporting Entity Comments Data in sample 
(Yes/No)
NZ Westpac 1988 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 22 December 
1988
Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) Y
NZ Westpac 1988 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 22 June 1989 Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch) N
NZ Westpac 1987 September 12 New Zealand Prospectus 28 June 1988 Westpac Banking Corporation (NZ 
Division and NZ Branch)
Dec 87 prospectus missing but this report 
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4 Typology of credit loss and provisioning reporting 
4.1 Introduction 
Banks make charges against profits and reduce the value of loans recorded in their balance 
sheets when they have reason to believe that borrowers will default on those loans. Such loan-
loss provisions are typically one of the first quantitative indicators of deterioration in loan quality 
and, at the same time, a key contributor to fluctuations in bank profits and capital. Understanding 
the determinants of provisions is therefore important for assessing fundamental credit risks in a 
particular market, or more generally, the stability of a particular financial system. 
Many researchers have therefore focused on these bad debt provisioning data, mostly 
relying on data series supplied by external data providers (e.g. Bankscope database of Fitch-
IBCA used by Bikker & Metzemakers, 2003). Reliance on such data limits a researcher’s control 
of how the data have actually been transferred and adjusted from reported accounts. Moreover, 
these series in the best case range back to the early nineties only. To study the credit loss 
dynamics in a particular financial system in more detail and over a longer period of time, one 
will have to source information from the original bank financial reports, an approach, for 
example, taken by Pain (2003) for the UK and Kearns (2004) for the Irish banking system.  
Despite this use of provisioning data, there seems to be no documentation of how these 
data were actually extracted from published financial accounts in any of these studies. 
Furthermore, commercial data providers remain vague as to their methods of transferring and 
adjusting such data, limiting themselves to a generic description of data items. The motivation 
for analysing this extraction process in more detail has transpired in the course of compiling the 
database for this thesis back to 1980, i.e. the time when such information was divulged for the 
first time. One finds that there have been many variations of disclosure of loss and provisioning 
data, both through time and between institutions. Accordingly, this chapter proposes a reporting 
typology which describes (1) the stocks of provisions, (2) the method of accounting for annual 
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provision charges to P&L, (3) debt write-offs and, finally, (4) recoveries. This typology defines 
the informational content of the bank’s reporting and forms the basis of capturing credit loss and 
provisioning data into a standardized template proposed here.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. The next section provides a brief review on 
accounting for loan losses, which is followed by the explanation of the proposed reporting 
typology using two numerical examples (section 3). Section 4 then presents the standardized 
template and how the typology defines the informational content of the financial accounts. The 
chapter concludes with some sample time series extracted through this template.  
 
4.2 Accounting for loan losses 
The literature review in chapter 2 has provided a primer on loan loss provisioning. In 
preparation of the subsequent development of a reporting typology, this section gives an 
abbreviated review of the key transactions occurring. 
A provision for loan losses, or more generally, a provision for a credit loss on any of a 
bank’s claims, is an expense set aside as an allowance for ‘bad debt’ caused by customers 
actually defaulting or a related event, such as the terms of a loan having to be renegotiated 
because of a weak borrower. The amount of such expected losses recognized in the profit and 
loss statement (P&L) is deducted from the appropriate category of assets as (1) a specific 
provision for impairment if the loan concerned has been identified or (2) as a general provision 
for impairment, called ‘collective provision’ under the new IFRS terminology
54
, if assets have 
not been specifically identified.  
                                                 
54
 Revised provisioning rules under IFRS for Australia are embodied in AASB 139 (AASB, 
2004b). They impose a higher threshold for a provision to be recognized as a collective provision than the 
more loosely formulated former rules under AAS 1032, 7.2.1 (AASB, 1996) for general provisions. For 
the empirical analysis in this thesis, IFRS rules have no relevance however as the observation period ends 
in 2005. 
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The transactions above are visualized in Figure 2-1 (chapter 2) without distinguishing 
between specific and general provisions. The banks maintain a counter-asset provision account 
whose opening balance is the difference between the gross loan amount and the net loan amount, 
i.e. the portion of the loan portfolio it does not expect to collect. If it identifies potential loan 
losses during the accounting period, it will charge them to the P&L while at the same time 
crediting the loan loss provisions account.  
Write-offs, also called derecognitions, of such impaired assets then occur at a later point in 
time when the bank actually loses control of its contractual rights on the claim, for example, if 
the loan is sold or legal rights are otherwise extinguished. At that point, the corresponding 
provision is removed (debited) in an offsetting transaction. In some instances such derecognized 
bad debt might still be recovered, at which time the value recovered above the expected amount 
is debited to the loan asset (gross loans) and the corresponding provision reinstated, respectively 
directly applied to reduce the bad debt charge in the P&L by some banks. 
An alternative approach for looking at bad debt is to follow the life cycle of a loan that 
suffers a loss. This is illustrated by means of a simplified numerical example in Figure 2-2 
(chapter 2) which does not consider the complexities of accounting for interest earned on 
defaulted loans. 
When a loan is initiated, the bank will typically recognize a general provision ($50) against 
it which is maintained as a global provision for a whole portfolio of loans, i.e. not for specific 
loans. Once a potential loss has been identified and becomes reasonably probable, the bank will 
raise an additional specific provision ($350) against the loan which is in turn charged to the P&L 
statement. If the loss is confirmed, derecognition ($400) follows. Finally, some portion of the 
loan ($700) may eventually be recovered. If more than the carrying value of the loan can be 
recovered, the bank recognizes the excess collected as recovery income ($100). 
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4.3 Developing typology of reporting for loan losses and provisions 
The previous section has described accounting for loan losses in a generic way. The way 
financial institutions in Australasia have actually implemented it, or more importantly, how they 
have reported this information, has been subject to considerable variation both amongst 
institutions and also through time. This section first illustrates this heterogeneity in reporting for 
the case of New Zealand banks and then presents a general system for typifying the numerous 
methods of reporting and accounting for credit losses. A last sub-section provides an overview of 
the numerous reporting types that are observed in the sample of Australasian banking 
institutions. 
4.3.1 Reporting of credit provisions by New Zealand banks 
Provision information has both a static and a dynamic component. The first is the 
information on the balance of provisions at a particular point in time, sometimes termed ‘stock of 
provisions’ or ‘loan loss reserves’, the second comprises information on transactions in the 
provisions account that have occurred during the period. As shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2, 
banks in New Zealand started reporting static stocks of provisions before they began disclosing 
the movements in this account. 
Dynamic flow information, however, provides deeper information about the bad debt 
charges and about which portion of the claims was eventually written off. Earlier bank reports 
typically disclosed such flow information not as a P&L data item but rather in inconspicuous 
footnotes. In some instances, this flow information was incomplete as banks avoided explicit 
disclosure of bad debt expense which then had to be derived indirectly from information on 
write-offs as well as beginning and ending provision balances. Similarly, debt recoveries were 
rarely explicitly disclosed in earlier years but rather netted with write-offs. Figure 4-6 in the 
appendix to this chapter illustrates an example for Westpac’s New Zealand division on how time 
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series can be extended backwards by deriving some key data elements like net loan write-offs for 
the period from other data items reported. 
Overall (and the following comment also applies to Australian banks), extended time series 
of data are more easily obtainable for institutions with roots as privately owned commercial 
banks than for (formerly) publicly owned banks, like BNZ or state banks in Australia, which 
were more tardy in embracing detailed provision reporting. Likewise, data series are shorter for 
banks that have converted from special statutes institutions during the sample period, e.g. from 
building societies or trust banks (in New Zealand). 
Figure 4-1 NZ banks disclosure of stock of loan loss provisions 




NBNZ * > ANZ
Westpac(NZ)
Countrywide > NBNZ
Trust Bank > Westpac
Rural Bank > NBNZ
Stock of general and specific provisons disclosed > ... : absorbed by / merged into ...
Stock of specific provisons only disclosed 
Stock of general provisons only disclosed  
* Both NBNZ and Westpac had a policy of not disclosing separate general provisions over much of the 
observation period. These were held by the parent bank as part of a global provision without breaking 
out a New Zealand component. In fact, Westpac abandoned this practice in 2003 only. Previous 
general provisions had been provisions associated with the acquisition of Trust Bank (NZ) only. 
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Figure 4-2 NZ Banks disclosure of annual bad debt expense, write-offs and recoveries 







Trust Bank > Westpac
Rural Bank > NBNZ
Bad debt provision expense including details on annual debt write-offs and recoveries are reported
Bad debt provision expense including annual debt write-offs, net of recoveries are reported  
 
4.3.2 Typifying accounting and reporting of credit losses and provisions 
The general typology of loan loss and provisioning reporting proposed here was developed 
in the process of compiling the comprehensive collection of credit loss and provisioning data 
required for the empirical work of this thesis. While the full data sample described in chapter 3 
includes a total of 33 Australian and New Zealand banks, the typology presented here is 
described for a slightly smaller sub-sample of 15 Australian and 9 New Zealand banks. There is 
no impediment to classifying the reporting of other banks in the sample or in other markets using 
this methodology. 
The typology is based on four sub-categories. The first one (STK) captures the 
characteristic of static provisioning data or stock of provisions while the remaining three 
categories describe the reporting and accounting of flow data. The first flow category typifies the 
transaction shown in the provisioning accounts, the second the nature of reporting write-offs (W) 
and, finally, the third the way recoveries of claims previously written off are shown (R).  
While a full description of each sub-category including detailed sub-codes assigned for 
each type of reporting is provided in Table 4-4 in the chapter appendix, it is more meaningful to 
explain the classification process through two numerical examples. 
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Example 1 in Figure 4-3 shows one of the methods of reporting as they were observed in 
the sample by means of illustrating them in simple T-accounts. It shows the four accounts in 
which transactions related to loan loss provisioning will occur. In this Example 1, write-offs 
($40) and recoveries ($20) are reported as movements in the specific provisions account with any 
additional specific provisions required ($50) funded from the general provisions account. The net 
increase in general provisions ($80) thus becomes the bad debt charge shown in the P&L.  
Many alternative practices of reporting these same transactions shown in Figure 4-3 have 
been observed, however. Most banks fund required additions to their provisions in both specific 
and general accounts directly from the P&L. One could characterize this as a parallel 
provisioning accounting type instead of the serial accounting shown in Figure 4-3. Other 
differences relate to the accounts the write-offs and recoveries are shown in. In particular, there 
is a variety of approaches when booking recoveries which can be shown either in one of the 
provision accounts or directly as an offset to bad debt charges in the P&L. 
With regard to write-offs, there are some reporting formats which reveal additional 
information compared to Example 1 in Figure 4-3. Example 2 in Figure 4-4 depicts such a 
format where only the write-offs of loans for which the bank had already provided for ($25) are 
debited to specific provisions while unanticipated problem loans are written off directly to the 
P&L ($15). This additional information can, for instance, be useful to study the quality of a 
bank’s credit risk management system. Note also that in this second example, recoveries are 
booked directly to the P&L to offset bad debt expense there. 
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Figure 4-3 Example 1: sample structure of reporting credit provisions and write-offs 
STK-SG/G/WS/RS
P&L account
Bad debt provision expense 80
Total bad debt expense 80
General provisions account
Opening balance 200
Net increase provisions 80




Transfer from general provisions 50
Bad debts written off 40
Recoveries of debts written-off 20
Final balance 130
Opening balance 2,000
Write-offs through provisions 40
Recoveries of debts written-off 20
Net new loan origination 520
Final balance 2,500
Pure serial accounting: charge to P&L from general, write-
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Figure 4-4 Example 2: sample structure of reporting credit provisions and write-offs with 
additional information on write-offs. 
STK-SG/SG/W-SP/RP
P&L account
Bad debt provision expense 55 + 30
Write-offs direct 15
Recoveries of debts written-off 20
Total bad debt expense 80
General provisions account
Opening balance 200




Net increase provisions 55
Bad debts written off 25
Final balance 130
Opening balance 2,000
Write-offs through provisions 25
Write-offs direct 15
Recoveries of debts written-off 20
Net new loan origination 520
Final balance 2,500
Parallel accounting: write-offs to specific and direct to 
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The process of typifying the reporting formats of example 1 (Figure 4-3) and example 2 
(Figure 4-4) is shown in Table 4-1. It starts with the existence, respectively absence, of provision 
accounts in the reports. STK-SG means that both the stock of specific and general provisions is 
shown. In earlier years of reporting, banks sometimes just showed one combined provisions 
account which would then be typified as STK-C. 
The next step typifies the funding method of provisions. In the first example, the increase 
of general provisions only will be charged to the P&L (G), in the second case the sum of net 
increases in both accounts is charged (SG). The write-offs are shown in the specific provisions 
account in the first example (WS), while part of these write-offs are charged directly to the P&L 
in the second example (W-SP). Finally, the recoveries are shown with specific provisions in the 
first case (RS) and charged directly to the P&L in the second (RP). 
 
Table 4-1 Typifying the reporting formats of the two numerical examples 
 Example Figure 4-3 Example Figure 4-4 
Stock of provisions (STK) STK-SG STK-SG 
Charges to P&L from … G SG 
Write-offs shown in … WS W-SP 
Recoveries shown in  … RS RP 
Type STK-SG/G/WS/RS STK-SG/SG/W-SP/RP 
Note:  
A complete decision table for typifying the reporting is shown in Table 4-4. 
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4.3.3 Typologies observed in the sample of Australasian banks 
In summary, a total of 20 different main reporting types for Australasian banks could be 
identified over the sample period (see Table 4-2). As there are also variations within a type, 
especially with regard to reporting of recoveries, one can distinguish a total of 27 types. 
Moreover, this table does not include the types which do not report meaningful flow information 
(i.e. stocks reported only - STK-SG/O/WO/RO) or no provisioning information at all (i.e. STK-
O/O/WO/RO). For additional details, Table 4-5 for New Zealand (page 171) and Table 4-6 for 
Australia (page 172) in the appendix to this chapter show the reporting types through time for 
each of the 24 institutions considered in this typology analysis.  
Table 4-2 Reporting types observed in Australasian banking sample 
STK-SG/SG/W-SP/RP STK-SG/G/W-SG/RG STK-S/S/W-SP/RP 
 …/W-SG/RS  …/WS/RS  …/WS/RS or RO 
 …/W-SG/RP or R-SG  …/WS/RO  
 …/W-SG or W-SP/RG or RO  …/WS/RG STK-C/C/WP/RO 
 …/WS/RS   …/WC/RC 
 …/WS/RP or RG STK-SG/C/W-CP/RP  
 …/WS/RP  …/W-CP/RO  
 …/WS/RO  …/W-CP/RC or WC/RC  
 …/WP/RO   
 
4.4 Data template and informational content of reporting types 
The typology developed in the previous section serves as the basis for capturing credit loss 
and provisioning information for subsequent empirical analysis. Each type is characterized by its 
informational content which in turn determines the data items that can be extracted into a 
standard template proposed in this section. 
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4.4.1 Data template 
To capture credit loss and provisioning data, the template shown in Table 4-3 has been set 
up. The first two data items are again the static stock of specific and general provisions (1) & (2), 
the second portion of the table captures the movements in a combined general and specific 
provisions account. The usual transactions in this account are (3) write-off of debts, which 
reduces provisions, respectively (5) new provisions funded from the P&L (charge to P&L) and 
(4) debt recoveries, which both increase provisions (credit transaction). Typical examples of 
other transactions (6) are provisions added as a result of acquisitions, respectively removed as a 
consequence of disposals. For banks with international loan portfolios like some of the larger 
Australian banks, currency translation effects are also a regular component of other transactions 
(6). In earlier years, banks would sometimes fund bad debt provisions from their contingency 
reserves (a component of a bank’s equity). Such transactions were considered as funded from the 
P&L as they in fact constitute a bad debt expense booked directly against equity. 
The third and last section of Table 4-3 captures details of the charge to the P&L and thus 
also provides an insight into transactions that occurred in each of the two provisioning accounts. 
Item (7) are the specific, respectively item (8) the general, provision component of charges to 
P&L. This section also provides information on the so-called direct write-off component (9) 
which some banks will book if loans are written off for which no specific provision had been set 
aside. 
Finally, item (10) (Other) is used for special adjustments as shown by the following 
examples. In some instances, banks fundamentally changed their method of provisioning which 
distorted the actual bad debt experience for a particular year. Most banks, for instance, switched 
to statistical provisioning in the 90s which created discontinuities in general provision series. 
Another case was Westpac’s 2003 transfer of general provisions from the parent to the NZ 
division’s balance sheet. This special adjustment was then used to show bad debt charges that 
were judged to be more adequate for the year’s loan loss experience. 
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Special adjustments were, however, also included when a bank, in order to window-dress 
its accounts, resorted to reporting larger loan-asset write-downs as an extraordinary or 
exceptional item. If such additional charges were judged to have the characteristics of bad debt 
expense, they were added to the bad debt charge without corresponding transactions in the 
provisioning accounts. Especially earlier in the observation period, some banks made liberal use 
of extraordinary cost reporting in order to show more favourable “ordinary” earnings but 
accounting standards have been tightened through time. There are still issues in this regard, if a 
bank, for instance, spins off a loss making subsidiary below book value, thereby avoiding an 
explicit bad debt charge for impaired loans in these subsidiaries.
55
 
An example of a comparable adjustment was the case of the Rural Bank of New Zealand, 
where in March 1989, in preparation of the bank’s privatisation, loan provisions were booked 
directly against equity reserves that had been formed after the conversion of government-held 
borrowings. While no explicit bad debt charges were thus shown in the P&L, this write-down of 
reserves was classified as a bad debt expense. 
                                                 
55
 The 2002 disposal of NAB’s US operations at a loss is a recent example. Most of the 
approximately AUD 2 billion write-down was, however, related to a value adjustment of mortgage 
servicing rights and not to loan losses in these subsidiaries (see note NAB annual report 2001, note 5, p. 
78). 
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Table 4-3 Data items of credit loss and provisioning template 
Stock of provisions Stock of 
provisions specific (1) 
 Stock of 
provisions general (2) 
Movement in provisions / flow 
information 
Starting total provision 
- Bad debt written off  (3) 
 + Recoveries debts written off  (4) 
 + Charge/(credit) to P&L (5) 
 +/- Other transactions  (6) 
 Ending total provision (1)+(2) 
Details bad debt charge to P&L + Specific provisions additions (7) 
 + General provisions additions (8) 
 + Direct write-offs (9) 
 - Recoveries (4) 
 +/- Other (plug) (10) 
 Total charge to P&L (5) 
 
4.4.2 Informational content of reporting types 
The informational content of the credit loss and provisioning reporting is given by its type. 
The four components of the typology (STK, charge to P&L, W, R) in essence determine which 
data element can be captured into the template described in the previous sub-section. Table 4-7 
in the appendix (page174) depicts this relationship. 
As the template combines the two provisioning accounts into one, all reporting formats 
(except “O”) allow the extraction of the total bad debt charge to P&L. For data analysis that 
needs to distinguish between the specific (non-discretionary) and the general (discretionary) 
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component of this expense, reporting formats are more convenient that fund provisions in both 
accounts directly from P&L. However, even with the common format in which specific 
provisions are funded from general provisions (e.g. as in Figure 4-3), one can derive reasonable 
estimates of the components. The funding from general is then simply treated as the specific 
provision element while the balance (of total bad debt charge) is the general component. 
Distinctive differences in informational content are present in the reporting of write-offs 
and recoveries. Firstly, only net write-offs can be extracted if recoveries remain undisclosed 
(RO) as happened often earlier in the observation period. Secondly, a distinction between 
‘planned’ write-offs (for which provisions have been made) and ‘unplanned’, here called direct 
write-offs (for which no provisions have been set aside) can only be captured with the W-SP, W-
SG or W-CP reporting types. Lastly, there is a chance for extracting at least net write-offs even if 
these write-offs are not specifically reported (WO). This is the case if bad debt charges are 
disclosed and net write-offs can then be derived as an implied offsetting transaction in the 
combined provision account. 
4.5 Visualization of selected provisioning and loss data 
This section presents selected charts that have been derived using times series obtained by 
the methodology developed and described in this chapter. Some bank individual time series have 
already been shown and reviewed in chapter 3 and the following chapters 5 and 6 will analyse 
them more formally through panel data analysis. The following Figure 4-5 thus simply provides 
some initial insights into the overall credit loss dynamics for New Zealand as well as an impetus 
for the development of hypotheses to be explored in the remainder of this thesis. 
The charts in Figure 4-5 firstly illustrate that BNZ and, to a lesser extent Rural Bank, were 
faced with the bulk of loan losses in the system crises of late 1980s and early 1990s. While the 
top chart shows absolute $ amounts of provisioning, it is equally meaningful to view provisions 
in proportion to loans outstanding. This is done in the second chart of Figure 4-5 which 
distinguishes between specific and general provisions. For this purely illustrative second chart, 
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BNZ and Rural Bank have been excluded in order to follow the break-down of provisions for the 
banks which have survived the 1990 system crisis without external support. One notices that in 
the favourable economic climate of the past 10 years, specific provisions have been declining 
while the share of general provisions has grown. The 2003 bulge in additional provisioning is 
due the first time recognition of general provisions by NBNZ and Westpac in their NZ 
operations balance sheets. These provisions were previously held by their respective overseas 
parent banks (Westpac, Lloyds TSB for NBNZ). Banks have also switched to statistical 
provisioning regimes during this time which may have kept overall provisions at about constant 
levels. 
The third chart in Figure 4-5 shows the percentage of loans charged as bad debt expense to 
the P&L and written off in each year. Again, BNZ and Rural Bark are not part of this cumulative 
analysis. One notices the lagged relationship of write-offs relative to provision charges to P&L. 
It thus seems worthwhile to explore the characteristics of such alternative series measuring a 
bank’s credit loss experience (CLE) further.  
The figure also graphs real annual GDP growth for New Zealand. The prolonged low 
growth phase of the NZ economy starting with the deregulation of 1985 culminated in substantial 
loan losses culminating in 1991, i.e. about one year before the corresponding peak in Australia. 
Without employing sophisticated econometric techniques, it seems as if later dips in growth have 
not impacted credit losses in a similar way.  
The fifth and last chart of Figure 4-5 is motivated by the common observation, e.g. in 
research by Clair (1992) and Fernández de Lis et al. (2000), that fast expanding banks are often 
faced with rising credit losses in subsequent years when the true risks of their lending becomes 
apparent. Accordingly, the series showing the CPI adjusted loan growth in the universe of New 
Zealand banks is shown at the bottom of Figure 4-5. On a cumulative basis, loan growth does not 
appear to be an immediate indicator of loan losses to come. It rather seems this question will 
have to be investigated on a bank specific level since relative growth differentials between banks 
might be more important. 
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4.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
This chapter has presented a method for typifying the reporting of loan loss and 
provisioning data in bank financial accounts. This then serves as the basis to capture these data 
into a standardized template developed to capture equivalent informational content. This process, 
while quite time consuming, is nevertheless vital in order to provide the foundation for a 
consistent extraction of loan loss and provisioning information for subsequent empirical 
research. Current literature does not elaborate on this process and the methods used by financial 
data providers remain essentially undocumented. Moreover, commercial providers are typically 
unable to deliver time series back to the late 70s and early 80s so the researcher is forced to 
extract information from published annual accounts.  
The methodology presented here has been motivated by the work of compiling the 
comprehensive data base of historical financial data for Australasian banks for this thesis. It is 
found that the reporting of credit loss and provisioning varied considerably both through time 
and also between institutions. To be more specific, a total of 27 reporting types in accordance 
with above typology are detected for a time span from 1980 to 2004. 
Typology and data template developed here should be equally useful for application in 
other geographic areas. The study of credit risks requires long data series often not available 
from standard sources and this is exactly where the techniques developed in this chapter will 
provide value to a range of researchers. 
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4.7 Appendices typology of loan loss reporting chapter 4 
4.7.1 Extending data series through deduction 
In some earlier year financial accounts, banks have sometimes provides incomplete 
provision flow information in their account. The accounts of Westpac Corporation’s New 
Zealand division for 1989 are an example. The division reported beginning and ending balance 
of provisions and disclosed NZD 12.4 million write-offs from provisions (Prospectus 22 
December 1989, p. 13). A later year prospectus (Prospectus 18 Dec. 1992, p. 6) reported bad and 
doubtful debt expense of NZD 47.7 million for the 1989 year per 30/9/89. As shown in Figure 
4-6, these data allow deriving both the total of write-offs for 1989 and the amount directly 
written-off to the P&L. 
Figure 4-6 Example for deriving missing loan write-off data in Westpac’s NZ Division (1989 
accounts) 
1989 DATA
Opening balance 1/10/1988 0
Net new provisons 34.3
Direct write-offs* 13.4 DERIVED
Final balance 30/9/89 47.7 reported
Specific provision account
Opening balance 1/10/1988 16.4 reported
Net new provisions 34.3 DERIVED
Write-offs from provisions 12.4 reported in footnote
Final balance 30/9/89 38.3 reported
Opening balance 1/10/1988 3,827.8 reported
Write-offs from provisions 12.4 reported in footnote
Direct write-offs* 13.4
Net new loan origination 669.2 derived
Final balance 30/9/89 4,471.2 reported
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4.7.2 Typology decision table 
The table below presents the decision criteria to set the appropriate typology code for 
provision/loan loss reporting. This code consists of four elements. The first one describes the 
reporting of the static stock of provisions; the remaining three characterize the dynamic reporting 
of provisions, write-offs and recoveries respectively. 
Table 4-4 Typology decision table 
Stock of provisions  (STK)   
Stock of provisions 
specifically shown 
STK-O Not shown (net loans shown only) 
STK-S Specific provisions 
  STK-G General provisions 
  STK-SG Specific and general provisions 
  STK-C Combined balance shown only 
Activity in provision account(s) 
Annual provision 
charge to P&L 
shown  
O Not shown. Typically stock of provisions shown only. 
S Shows annual charge to P&L of specific provisions. 
  G Shows annual charge to P&L of general provisions. 
  SG Shows annual charge to P&L of specific and general provisions. 
  C Annual charges to P&L from an account combining general & specific provision balances  
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Table 4-4 Typology decision table (continued) 
Debt write-offs (W)    
Debt write-offs 
shown in financial 
statements 
WO Not shown, typically stock of provisions shown only. 
WS All write-offs debited to specific provisions.  
WG All write-offs debited to general provisions.  
WC Write-offs from an account combining general & specific provision balances.  
W-SP Write offs split into debits to specific provisions and direct write-offs to P&L. 
W-SG Write offs split into debits to specific provisions and debits to general provisions. 
W-CP Write-offs from an account combining general & specific provision balances and directly to P&L.
Debt recoveries (R)   
Recoveries of 
claims written off in 
earlier periods are 
specifically shown 
RO Not specifically shown. Typically R are netted with debt write-offs. 
RS R are credited to specific provisions. 
RG R are credited to general provisions. 
R-SG R are credited to general & specific provisions.* 
RP R are credited to P&L debt expense account.
RC Recoveries from an account combining general & specific provision balances.  
Note:  
* as a very rare format, State Bank of Victoria (AU SB Victoria) 1989/1990 distinguished between recoveries of 
debt they had originally provided for and recoveries on debts written off directly. 
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4.7.3 Typology tables for New Zealand and Australian banks 
Table 4-5 Typology of New Zealand banks 







STK-SG/SG/W-SG or W-SP/RG or 
RO
STK-SG/SG/WS/RS 1980-1997 1991-1999 2003, 1978 to 1988 1989-1996
STK-SG/SG/WS/RP or RG
STK-SG/SG/WS/RP








STK-SG/C/W-CP/RC or WC/RC 1990-1995 (ii) 1989-1992 (RP)
STK-S/S/W-SP/RP




(i) NZ UnitedBk reported stock of provisions only from 1987-1991 
(ii) Some data derived before 1990 from reported data 
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Table 4-6 Typology of Australian banks 










STK-SG/SG/WS/RS 1980-88, 1994 1989-1997 1989-1995 (ii)
1998-2000, 
2002-2004
STK-SG/SG/WS/RP or RG 2001-2005 (RP) 1988 (RG)
1997-1999 
(RP)
STK-SG/SG/WS/RP 1995-1997 1996-2002 2001
STK-SG/SG/WS/RO 1996, 1997 1990-1995
STK-SG/SG/WP/RO 1993 -1995
STK-SG/G/W-SG/RG 1980-1982, 1996-2004 2002-2004
STK-SG/G/WS/RS 1988, 1998-2004

















STK-C/C/WC/RC 1984-1987  
 
(i) Contingencies reserves serve as general provision before 1988 
(ii) Some funding of specific provisions from general 
(iii) Some direct write-offs in 1993 
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AdvanceBk AU SB SA
STK-SG/SG/W-SP/RP
STK-SG/SG/W-SG/RS
STK-SG/SG/W-SG/RP or R-SG 1989,1990 (R-SG) (vi)
STK-SG/SG/W-SG or W-SP/RG or 
RO





















STK-C/C/WP/RO 1986-1989 (WO) 1986-1992 (v)
STK-C/C/WC/RC  
(iv) 1987-1989 STK-C only 
(v) Shows STK-SG in 1992 
(vi) As a very rare format, AU SB Victoria 1989/1990 distinguished between recoveries of debt they had originally provided for and 
recoveries on debts written off directly. 
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4.7.4 Informational content of reporting types 
Table 4-7 Data items available for each reporting type  








































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1)+(2) (7) (8) (9) (4) (10) (5)
Stock of provisions  (STK)
STK-O Not shown (net loans shown only)
STK-S Specific provisions (S) X X X
STK-G General provisions (G) X X X
STK-SG Specific and general provisions (SG) X X X X
STK-C Combined balance shown only (C) X X
Activity in provision account(s)
O Not shown. Typically stock of provisions shown only. (iii)
S Shows annual charge to P&L of specific provisions (S) X X (ii) (X) X
G Shows annual charge to P&L of general provisions (G) X (ii) (X) X X
SG Shows annual charge to P&L of specific and general provisions (SG) X X X X
C Annual charges to P&L from an account combining general & specific provision balances X X
Debt write-offs (W) 
WO Not shown, typically stock of provisions shown only (iii)
WS All write-offs debited to specific provisions X
WG All write-offs debited to general provisions X
WC Write-offs from an account combining general & specific provision balances. X
W-SP Write offs split into debits to specific provisions and direct write-offs to P&L X X
W-SG Write offs split into debits to specific provisions and debits to general provisions X X




charge to P&L 
Stock of provisions 
specifically shown
Debt write-offs 




Footnotes shown and explained on next page. 
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Table 4-7 Data items available for each reporting type (continued) 








































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1)+(2) (7) (8) (9) (4) (10) (5)
Debt recoveries (R) 
RO Not specifically shown. Typically recoveries are netted with debt write-offs
RS R are credited to specific provisions X X
RG R are credited to general provisions X X
R-SG R are credited to general & specific provisions (i) X X
RP R are credited to P&L debt expense account X X




claims written off in 




(i) As a very rare format, AU SB Victoria 1989/1990 distinguished between recoveries of debt they had originally provided for and recoveries on 
debts written off directly. 
(ii) These data items can be derived/estimated from transfers between provision accounts. 
(iii) Can potentially be derived if either write-offs, respectively bad debt charges, are disclosed 





This chapter presents the methodology employed to explore the credit loss dynamics in 
Australasian banking. The scope of data available has an important bearing on the type of 
analyses which can be conducted. The information specifically gathered from original bank 
financial reports is comparable to the data employed by Salas & Saurina (2002), Pain (2003) and 
more recently Kearns (2004). All three articles are country specific studies for the Spanish, the 
UK, and the Irish banking markets respectively. The authors are associated with their respective 
banking system supervisors. This has the advantage that they can partially rely on confidential 
data records which have also been used by authors like Arpa, Giulini, Ittner, & Pauer (2001) and 
Quagliariello (2004). Models applied in the above studies provide the methodological starting 
point for the principal model (see section 5.2) in this thesis. 
In line with this literature, we apply a reduced form approach. As outlined in Pain (2003), a 
reduced form has its limitations as it does not explicitly link the drivers of loan losses to the loan 
loss experience itself. One will thus be able to answer the questions as to the sensitivities of loan 
losses to apparent drivers but one cannot explain the mechanism of how slower economic 
growth, for instance, translates into credit losses. The advantage of our approach is however the 
possibility of including a range of explanatory variables whose actions on the dependent variable 
are often complex and indirect. 
In theory, there are numerous data items which could serve as a potential proxy for a 
bank’s credit loss experience (CLE). These include ongoing provisions expense, stock of 
provisions (total, specific or general), level of impaired assets reported and loan write-offs. The 
existing literature does not generally elaborate on reasons for picking any particular one of them. 
Some discussion on this subject can be found in Pain (2003) which we extend in section 5.3. In 
subsection 5.3.1 we first construct and then explore a number of CLE ratio series and the 
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relationship between them. In particular, we study both contemporaneous and lead/lagged 
correlations among them (section 5.3.2.3). Moreover, it is important to define suitable reference 
levels to measure CLE against a bank’s business volume. Only such ratios allow comparisons 
among banks. A study of issues related to the denominators of CLE ratios can be found in 
section 5.3.2.2. 
Explanatory variables that drive observed CLE are discussed in section 5.4. In the first 
category are macroeconomic factors which include measures of general economic activity, the 
indebtedness of households and firms as well as the returns in the property and financial markets 
to gauge the impact of asset price shocks. The other group of explanatory variables (presented in 
section 5.4.2) are microeconomic or bank specific factors. They comprise the effects of past 
credit expansion, the bank’s risk choice as reflected in the riskiness of its loan portfolio, the 
efficiency of a bank’s credit monitoring, possible competitive effects of market power and, 
finally, other behavioural aspects including incentives for banks to engage in income smoothing 
and capital management activities. 
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5.2 The principal model 
As indicated in the introduction, this thesis sets out to estimate a reduced-form relationship 
between key explanatory variables and a bank’s credit loss experience (CLE). Accordingly, the 
principal model attempts to capture the credit loss experience of the banks as follows. 
 











− δβ  
Where  
CLEit Credit loss experience for bank i in period t 
xkit Observations of the potential explanatory variable k for bank i and period t 
uit Random error term with distribution N(0,Σ), 
Σ Variance-covariance matrix of σit error terms 
n Number of banks in sample 
T Years in observation period 
K Number of explanatory variables 
z Maximum lag of the explanatory variables of the model 
q Maximum lag of the dependent variable of the model 
 
The principal model contains a static component of explanatory variables x with a dynamic 
component added (lagged x and CLE terms). The lagged CLE variable as an explanatory term is 
in line with assertions by Kim & Santomero (1993) who explain income smoothing as a 
consequence of Bayesian models used by banks when forecasting loan losses. These models 
update projected loan losses as a function of new information obtained from the new audit and 
the historical variance of loan loss rates over the bank's previous history. Not all previous 
research analysing CLEs has included a lagged CLE term. For instance, Cavallo & Majnoni 
(2001) have used a static model only while Pain (2003) has estimated both a static and dynamic 
formulation. Note that dynamics can also be captured by including several lags of the 
explanatory x variables (distributed-lag model), a special form of modelling within the generic 
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formulation of the principal model above. The actual formulation of the estimation model will be 
conducted in the following estimation chapter 6. 
There are many potential proxies for a bank’s CLE and a number of them will be 
constructed and evaluated in the next section. The explanatory variables explored thereafter are 
usually broken down into two groups. These are firstly macroeconomic factors which for 
instance capture economic and business cycles and, secondly microeconomic or bank specific 
variables which constitute drivers of credit losses at an individual institution level. 
5.3 Proxies for credit loss experience (CLE) 
There are number of potential proxies to measure CLE that have been used by earlier 
studies (see Table 2-2 in chapter 2). Typical CLE proxies employed are ratios with a numerator 
such as impaired asset charges, the stock of provisions, level of impaired assets or loan write-offs 
(the latter is called loan charge-offs in the US terminology of Sinkey Jr. & Greenawalt, 1991). 
The denominator is mostly chosen as the total balance of loans outstanding and in some cases 
total bank assets. In general, there is no deliberation in these papers as to why a particular CLE 
ratio was chosen.
56
 An exception is Pain (2003) whose findings are discussed later in the section. 
This section applies and extends Pain’s analysis to a larger number of potential CLE ratios. It 
first proposes and then explores the characteristics of 13 CLE proxies. 
5.3.1 Construction of CLE proxies 
Numerous data items in a bank’s financial reporting provide information about its CLE 
(see Table 5-1 for an overview). Loan loss provisions, both as a period expense and as a stock, 
impaired assets (also called problem or delinquent loans by some researchers) and write-offs are 
the most obvious items for the overall loss experience. There are, however, more detailed 
                                                 
56
 The data in many studies are sourced from third party providers which possibly limits the choice 
of CLE proxies. 
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components of these main CLE data which are also disclosed. The stock of provisions can be 
split into specific and general components which provide information about the degree of 
certainty of the expected losses. Likewise, the period loan loss provisions (impaired asset 
expense) may be separated into a specific and general period expense. Some write-offs relate to 
loans for which previous provisions have been set aside in an earlier period while others, often 
labelled as ‘direct write-offs’, imply cases of more sudden credit events where loans are written 
off immediately, without first recognizing provisions.  
The level of past due loans is another relevant item. Under common accounting definitions 
past due loans exclude impaired loans, i.e. the bank does not expect to suffer credit losses on 
these loans. We include it as a CLE proxy because past due loans might provide an indication of 
stress on creditors in the financial system or they may be a leading indicator of other CLE 
measures. 
Finally, reporting of CLEs by geography and industry segment provides further insights 
into their characteristics. For illustration, Figure 5-1 below shows an example of NAB’s 
disclosure of credit losses by lending segment from 1985 to 2005. This segment reporting, 
however, lacks a standardization of categories across the sample and disclosure in Australasia 
generally started in the mid 1990s only, i.e. after the major historical peak of credit losses. 
Moreover, disclosure is non-existent for some smaller banks with limited scope of activities. In 
the following construction of potential proxies, such segment CLEs have thus not been 
considered. 
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Whatever CLE proxy is chosen, it needs to be measured against a reference level. The 
literature generally sets it against the amount of total loans and sometimes total assets in the 
bank’s balance sheet. For balance sheet CLEs such as the stock of provisions, the normal choice 
is the level of loans or assets at same balance sheet date. Conversely, period CLEs like bad debt 
expense or write-offs may be better compared against average levels of loans, respectively 
assets, observed during the whole accounting period. 
There are, however, further potential ratio denominators which can be sourced from a 
bank’s P&L statement. We could compare the CLE to the amount of interest income (either 
gross or net) or total operating income (the latter if we wish to consider credit losses stemming 
from non-balance sheet activities). In the following section (5.3.2.2), the properties of all these 
potential ratio denominators are explored.  
In theory, the combination of CLE variables and potential ratio denominators would 
generate innumerable proxy ratios. For the following investigation, we focus on ratios based on 
loans and assets but also include a measure of bad debt expense against a denominator of gross 
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and net interest income, i.e. two types of P&L data items. An overview of CLE proxy ratios 
constructed for this study is shown in Table 5-2. It includes a ratio based on recoveries of bad 
debts previously written off. Strictly speaking, this is not a CLE proxy but it has been included to 
test its properties and in particular its correlation with other CLE ratios in the subsequent 
analysis. Note that all ratios are annualized for comparability, i.e. in cases of shorter or longer 
accounting periods, CLE data items sourced from the P&L have been adjusted. 
Not all ratios constructed could be retrieved for all banks throughout the observation 
period. Figure 5-2 illustrates the percentage of banks in our database in existence at the time 
which reported the particular data item. As reporting of recoveries was patchy until the mid 
1990s, net debt write-offs as % of loans provide a much more complete date series. Likewise, 
ratios based on impaired assets, past due loans and components of bad debt expense are available 
later in the observation period only. The general picture of CLE data availability does not change 
if we create the same figure for the Australian, respectively the New Zealand, sub-sample in 
Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4. The reporting in Australia has nonetheless been more complete. 
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Table 5-1 Potential data to measure credit loss experience (CLE) 








Widest availability because provisioning level is one of the data items 
reported very early by most banks. Represents the bank’s assessment of 
the portion of the loan portfolio (or more generally assets) which will be 
lost due to credit losses. 
 




Some banks did not report general provisions as a component of total 
provisions which might affect comparability (e.g. many banks earlier in 





Total level of specific 
provisions from 
balance sheet 
Good data availability. 
Provides a measure of identified losses which will materialize with a great 
probability. Potential proxy for expected losses as opposed to unexpected 




Total level of general 
provisions from 
balance sheet 
Good data availability. 
Proxy for the discretionary portion of expected loan losses to test 
hypotheses regarding behavioural factors driving loan loss provisioning.  
Proxy for unexpected losses. General provisions partially qualify as 




Total bad debt 
expense reported in 
P&L  
alternative names are 
impaired asset 
expense / ongoing 
provisions expense. 
Generally good data availability but not as good as stock of provisions 
earlier in the observation period. 
Provides the bank’s assessment of the total credit losses which have 
occurred during the period.  
Often requires a manual adjustment in high loss situations when banks 







Bad debt expense to 
P&L can be 




Similar considerations as for specific and general component of stock of 
provisions. Like general provisions above, these two data elements could 
again be applied to study behavioural aspects when management estimates 
the discretionary component of provisions. 
The disaggregation is difficult for some reporting formats and data are 
incomplete earlier in the observation period. 
                                                 
57
 As discussed in Pain (2003, p. 14, 25) 
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Table 5-1 Potential data to measure credit loss experience (CLE) – (continued) 
CLE variable Description General considerations, data availability & issues 
Gross /net  
debt write-
offs 
Period write-offs of 
loan assets (gross) or 
after deducting 
recoveries of debts 
previously written off 
(net) 
Write-offs lag bad debt charges but are “more certain”. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests this is the measure banks consider in their internal 
performance systems. 
Earlier in observation period, recoveries of debts previously written-off 
were often netted (deducted) from this amount. Time series for net write-







accrual assets and (2) 
restructured assets. 
Widespread reporting generally started at the beginning of 1990s. 
Inconsistent reporting of this data item (if reported at all) before 1990 due 
to judgment issues as to what constitutes an impaired loan. This is 




Servicing on past-due 
loan assets is 
typically overdue for 
more than 90 days 
Past due assets consistently reported only after the mid 1990s. They do not 
necessarily imply impending credit losses as they then would be classified 
as impaired loans. 
Table 5-2 CLE ratios constructed 
Ratio acronym Full ratio name 
IAE_LN Impaired asset expense as % of average loans 
IAE_NI Impaired asset expense as % net interest income 
IAE_GI Impaired asset expense as % gross interest income 
NW_LN Net debt write-offs as % of average loans 
GW_LN Gross debt write-offs as % of average loans 
RC_LN Recoveries as % of average loans
PRV_LN Stock of provisions as % of loans 
GE_LN General provisions total as % of loans 
SP_LN Specific provisions total as % of loans
IA_A Impaired assets as % total assets 
PD_A Past due loans as % total assets 
GEE_LN General provision expense as % of average loans 
SPE_LN 
 






Figure 5-2 Percentage of banks reporting CLE proxy ratios during observation period (full sample) 
AU+NZ 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
IAE_LN 85% 79% 63% 53% 52% 64% 77% 85% 89% 93% 96% 96% 96% 96% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
IAE_NI 62% 64% 50% 42% 43% 60% 81% 89% 89% 93% 96% 96% 96% 96% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
IAE_GI 54% 57% 44% 42% 43% 60% 81% 89% 89% 93% 96% 96% 96% 96% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 88% 94% 94%
NW_LN 85% 79% 63% 53% 57% 60% 65% 74% 85% 93% 89% 93% 89% 96% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GW_LN 69% 64% 50% 47% 43% 36% 35% 37% 48% 54% 61% 63% 63% 68% 79% 79% 85% 95% 94% 84% 88% 88% 88% 82% 81% 81%
RC_LN 62% 64% 50% 47% 43% 36% 35% 37% 48% 50% 61% 59% 59% 68% 79% 79% 85% 95% 94% 84% 88% 88% 88% 82% 81% 81%
PRV_LN 92% 93% 75% 68% 71% 72% 88% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GE_LN 69% 79% 69% 58% 57% 60% 69% 81% 81% 82% 89% 85% 93% 92% 96% 92% 95% 95% 94% 89% 94% 94% 94% 100% 100% 94%
SP_LN 54% 57% 56% 53% 48% 40% 50% 67% 59% 86% 89% 93% 93% 96% 96% 92% 95% 95% 94% 89% 100% 100% 100% 94% 94% 94%
IA_A 0% 0% 6% 5% 10% 12% 12% 15% 19% 29% 46% 63% 81% 84% 88% 92% 95% 95% 94% 89% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
PD_A 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 7% 7% 11% 18% 26% 37% 52% 63% 71% 90% 95% 94% 89% 100% 100% 100% 94% 94% 94%
GEE_LN 15% 14% 19% 16% 19% 16% 23% 26% 30% 36% 46% 52% 59% 72% 79% 75% 80% 95% 94% 84% 88% 88% 94% 94% 94% 94%































XX% 0 to 25% XX% 25% to 50% XX% 50% to 75% XX% more than 75%  
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Figure 5-3 Percentage of banks reporting CLE proxy ratios during observation period (Australian sub-sample) 
Australia 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
IAE_LN 90% 82% 80% 73% 62% 80% 88% 88% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
IAE_NI 70% 73% 70% 64% 54% 80% 94% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
IAE_GI 60% 64% 60% 64% 54% 80% 94% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 91% 91% 91%
NW_LN 90% 82% 80% 73% 62% 73% 81% 88% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GW_LN 80% 73% 70% 64% 54% 47% 44% 47% 53% 56% 61% 65% 65% 71% 81% 75% 85% 100% 100% 85% 91% 91% 91% 82% 82% 82%
RC_LN 80% 73% 70% 64% 54% 47% 44% 47% 53% 50% 61% 59% 65% 71% 81% 75% 85% 100% 100% 85% 91% 91% 91% 82% 82% 82%
PRV_LN 90% 91% 80% 82% 85% 87% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GE_LN 60% 73% 80% 73% 69% 73% 75% 82% 82% 89% 94% 88% 94% 94% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 91%
SP_LN 40% 45% 50% 55% 46% 40% 50% 59% 53% 83% 89% 94% 94% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 91%
IA_A 0% 0% 10% 9% 15% 20% 19% 24% 29% 39% 56% 76% 94% 94% 94% 94% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
PD_A 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 13% 12% 12% 17% 28% 41% 59% 71% 75% 69% 85% 92% 92% 85% 100% 100% 100% 91% 91% 91%
GEE_LN 10% 9% 20% 18% 15% 13% 19% 24% 29% 33% 44% 53% 65% 76% 75% 81% 85% 100% 100% 85% 91% 91% 100% 91% 91% 91%































XX% 0 to 25% XX% 25% to 50% XX% 50% to 75% XX% more than 75%  
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Figure 5-4 Percentage of banks reporting CLE proxy ratios during observation period (New Zealand sub-sample) 
NZLD 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
IAE_LN 67% 67% 33% 25% 38% 40% 60% 80% 70% 80% 90% 90% 90% 88% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
IAE_NI 33% 33% 17% 13% 25% 30% 60% 80% 70% 80% 90% 90% 90% 88% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
IAE_GI 33% 33% 17% 13% 25% 30% 60% 80% 70% 80% 90% 90% 90% 88% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 83% 100% 100%
NW_LN 67% 67% 33% 25% 50% 40% 40% 50% 70% 90% 80% 90% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GW_LN 33% 33% 17% 25% 25% 20% 20% 20% 40% 50% 60% 60% 60% 63% 75% 88% 86% 86% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 80% 80%
RC_LN 0% 33% 17% 25% 25% 20% 20% 20% 40% 50% 60% 60% 50% 63% 75% 88% 86% 86% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 80% 80%
PRV_LN 100% 100% 67% 50% 50% 50% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GE_LN 100% 100% 50% 38% 38% 40% 60% 80% 80% 70% 80% 80% 90% 88% 88% 88% 86% 86% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 100% 100% 100%
SP_LN 100% 100% 67% 50% 50% 40% 50% 80% 70% 90% 90% 90% 90% 88% 88% 88% 86% 86% 83% 83% 100% 100% 100% 83% 80% 100%
IA_A 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 30% 40% 60% 63% 75% 88% 86% 86% 83% 83% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
PD_A 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 38% 75% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
GEE_LN 33% 33% 17% 13% 25% 20% 30% 30% 30% 40% 50% 50% 50% 63% 88% 63% 71% 86% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 100% 100% 100%































XX% 0 to 25% XX% 25% to 50% XX% 50% to 75% XX% more than 75%  
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Table 5-3 Summary statistics CLE proxies (pooled observations of all banks in data sample) 
 
 IAE_LN IAE_NI IAE_GI NW_LN GW_LN RC_LN PRV_LN GE_LN SP_LN IA_A PD_A GEE_LN SPE_LN 
Mean 0.57% 14.71% 3.61% 0.46% 0.57% 0.05% 1.37% 0.79% 0.74% 1.42% 0.35% 0.08% 0.51% 
Median 0.27% 6.40% 2.17% 0.20% 0.25% 0.03% 0.89% 0.59% 0.35% 0.63% 0.27% 0.05% 0.22% 
Maximum 16.51% 790.46% 79.24% 14.35% 14.35% 0.46% 18.75% 16.46% 11.15% 22.60% 4.32% 1.61% 16.66% 
Minimum -7.41% -59.98% -28.16% -0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% -0.26% -1.17% -7.36% 
Std. Dev. 1.38% 50.97% 7.08% 1.10% 1.26% 0.05% 1.80% 1.20% 1.21% 2.40% 0.39% 0.23% 1.31% 
Coef of Var* 2.42 3.47 1.96 2.39 2.22 1.12 1.32 1.51 1.64 1.70 1.12 2.78 2.55 
Skewness 6.47 11.19 6.30 8.31 7.35 2.55 4.82 8.54 4.44 4.59 5.49 2.14 6.40 
Kurtosis 66.84 149.45 59.78 90.57 70.19 13.98 33.44 92.02 29.92 32.13 49.41 20.85 81.08 
              
Jarque-Bera 86265.9 437177.0 66383.3 157235.7 70751.0 2166.3 21707.8 158154.4 14635.5 12202.7 23119.6 4296.2 85806.7 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
              
Observations 488 478 471 475 359 355 511 462 437 314 244 306 329 
Cross 
sections 
(banks) 32 31 31 32 26 26 32 30 30 28 25 25 26 
 




5.3.2 Properties and evaluation of CLE proxies 
This section analyses the properties of the 13 CLE proxy ratios that have been constructed. 
It is informed by Pain (2003, p. 14-18), who evaluates and explores some of these measures for 
his sample of UK commercial and mortgage banks
58
.  
5.3.2.1 Summary statistics and initial data exploration 
The summary statistics of CLE proxies are shown in Table 5-3. None of the CLE proxies 
appears normally distributed judging from skewness values and Jarque-Bera statistics. Rather 
they exhibit a truncated left tail and an extended right tail (positive skewness) as is typical for 
credit loss distributions where high loss credit events are infrequent. This distribution can be 
seen in the histogram for some important CLE’s in Figure 5-5. The large number of observations 
beyond two standard deviations above the median observation are of particular concern for the 
risk management of a bank
59
. Notable in the histogram is the fact that there are no observations 
of very low levels of net-write-offs (NW_LN), i.e. less then 0.25 standard deviations below 
median. Unlike provisions, which contain a substantial element of discretion and might be 
negative (i.e. unwound) in some years, net write-offs have always been above some minimum 
level. 
An important aspect in the evaluation of CLE proxies is how they have measured loan 
losses through time. As shown in the summary statistics in Table 5-3, CLE proxies vary greatly 
in their overall sensitivity with coefficients of variation ranging from 1.12 for past due loans 
                                                 
58
 Pain looks in particular at the interaction of provisions, write-offs and recoveries. 
59
 Note that that we have chosen the median instead of the mean in this chart mainly for 
presentation purposes because mean values of some CLEs are affected by a few extreme outliers. 
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(relative to assets) to 3.47 for impaired asset expense as % of net interest income.
60
 These 
differing levels of sensitivity can also be seen in Figure 5-6 which shows CLE standard 
deviations through the observation period against a logarithmic scale. Overall the CLE proxies 
nevertheless all seem to measure the credit loss experience through time with a similar pattern. 
For this purpose we demean and standardize the observed annual averages of CLE proxies and 
plot them in Figure 5-7. Note that standardization means that we divide the demeaned annual 
average by the standard deviation of the CLE proxy of all banks over the whole sample period, 
not by the standard deviation of the particular year. 
                                                 
60
 Recoveries with their low standard deviation are not considered as they are not an actual CLE 
proxy. 
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Figure 5-5 Histogram of selected CLE proxies 
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CLEk,i,t is the observation of CLE k (k= 1 to 9) for observation i (i=1 to n) in year t 
tk ,µ is mean of CLE proxy k of all n banks in year t 































































µµµ −= ,,~ , 
where tk ,µ is mean of all CLE k (k= 1 to 9) observations for year t; 
kµ  / kσ are mean / standard deviation of CLE k for all banks over the whole observation period.  
 
5.3.2.2 Evaluating the properties of CLE ratio denominators 
As stated earlier, most research uses either total loans or assets as a reference to measure 
credit loan loss experience. For our evaluation we have also chosen net and gross interest income 
as a denominator for two of the CLE proxies. This sub-section reviews the properties of these 
denominators and other P&L data items.  
Whenever we use a ratio as a variable to be explained, we need to understand factors 
affecting both numerator and denominator. In the case of CLE ratios, the numerator proxies the 
loss experience while the denominator provides a reference level against which this loss 
experience is measured. Ideally we wish this reference level to be a measure of the bank’s 
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business activities subject to credit risk. It should be unaffected by other factors, especially not 
by contemporaneous or lagged explanatory variables of the CLE estimation model.  
To study their general characteristics, we select 5 potential proxy denominators and 
analyse their time series of percentage changes, i.e. growth rates of total assets (ASGRW), total 
loans (LNGRW), net interest income (NIGRW), gross interest income (GIGRW), and, finally, 
total operating income (TOIGRW) which is defined as the sum of net interest and other 
operating income. The summary statistics are shown in Table 5-4 below. 
Table 5-4 Summary statistics of CLE ratio denominators 





Variable name ASGRW LNGRW NIGRW GIGRW TOIGRW 
Mean 17.26% 19.73% 16.46% 15.97% 17.56% 
Median 14.14% 15.50% 11.14% 14.22% 12.32% 
Maximum 180.55% 326.52% 374.24% 507.87% 374.24% 
Minimum -40.07% -28.33% -101.59% -98.57% -100.15% 
Std. Dev. 19.55% 24.63% 33.27% 33.47% 31.16% 
Skewness 2.99 5.42 4.59 7.13 5.00
Kurtosis 20.58 55.32 40.53 99.87 47.64 
      
Observations 526 516 498 488 504 
Cross sections 32 32 31 31 31 
 
One observes lower levels of volatility for changes in stocks (assets and loans) with 
standard deviations of 19.6% and 24.6% respectively, than for the income flow variables which 
each has more than 30% standard deviation. Denominators of ratios based on stocks of assets and 
loans are moreover comparably much larger than income based denominators which helps 
explain the much higher volatility of the income flow based proxies shown in the earlier ratio 
summary statistics of Table 5-3.  
The explanatory variables considered for the model proposed in this chapter are presented 
in the second part of this chapter. We step ahead here and test for an obvious factor which one 
would expect to drive changes in CLE denominators. This factor is the level of nominal interest 
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rates which will affect interest income. Market interest rates will have an immediate impact on 
gross interest income but in the case of net interest income and total operating income the effect 
could possibly cancel out due to an offsetting effect on interest expense. We plot the % changes 
of these three income items against % changes in nominal interest rates for the sub-sample of 
Australian banks in Figure 5-8. 
As expected, nominal interest rates appear to drive levels of gross interest income, in some 
cases flowing through with a small delay. On the other hand, any interactions with the other two 
income items, net interest income and total operating income, are not immediately apparent. To 
test this more formally, we estimate changes in CLE ratio denominators as a linear function of 
contemporaneous and one year lagged nominal interest rate changes for both the Australian and 
New Zealand sub-sample. The results in Table 5-5 confirm the visual impression of Figure 5-8. 
Gross interest income has been one of the five items which is significantly affected by 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in nominal interest rates in both Australia and New 
Zealand.  
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NIGRW – Growth net interest income, GIGRW – Growth gross interest income, TOIGRW – Growth 
total operating income, NOMINT_AU_GRW: growth nominal interest rate AUD (short-term rates 
sourced from Datastream code AUOCFIST)
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Table 5-5 Modelling % changes of CLE ratio denominators as a linear function of point changes 


























































-0.0061 21 322 0.021 
        
New 
Zealand 



































0.0154 10 175 2.365 
        
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Estimation equation for the example of asset growth proxy (ASGRW): 











ASGRW  and 1,,, −−= tititi NOMINTNOMINTNOMINTGRW   
All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors (d.f. corrected). 
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Since the balance sheet items (assets and loans) are much larger than bad debt expense and 
write-offs in the numerator, changes in credit loss experience will be the dominant effect on the 
CLE ratio. Gross interest income is also quite large compared to the CLE numerators but it is 
immediately affected by interest rates in the market. Net interest and total interest income, 
finally, are rather small and the factors that drive them will lead to great volatility in the CLE 
proxy. Overall, therefore, the less volatile balance sheet items (assets and loans) appear to have 
more desirable characteristics for the purpose of CLE ratio denominators. 
5.3.2.3 Analysis of contemporaneous and lead/lag characteristics 
An important question relates to the correlations among the 13 ratios measuring aspects of 
a bank’s CLE. Overall one would expect very high correlations, particularly among those using 
the stock of provision, impaired assets and impaired asset expense. For this purpose, we follow 
the methodology of examining contemporaneous and lead/lag correlations as used, for instance, 
in the research on transmission of economic cycles across nations, regions or industries (an 
example is Grimes, 2005).  
The top block of Table 5-6 shows the matrix of contemporaneous Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficients among the 13 CLEs. High correlations above 0.8, respectively between 
0.6 and 0.8, are highlighted. Not surprising is the very high correlation among the three proxies 
using impaired asset expense in the numerator. There is a moderately high correlation of 0.63 
between impaired asset expense (as % of loans) and the level of impaired assets (as % of total 
assets). A little lower (just under 0.6) is the correlation between impaired asset expense and the 
stock of provisions. Both ratios have been used by researchers and it is important to test how 
robust their estimations would be with the alternative measure. Pain (2003) argues in favour of 
employing impaired asset expense instead of the stock of provisions. This is because stock of 
provisions may give a misleading picture of current credit loss developments as large write-offs 
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There is a very high correlation (0.98) between the overall impaired asset expense and its 
specific component which thus appears to dominate the general (more discretionary) part of total 
bad debt expense (correlation only 0.4). In the case of the stock of provisions, both general and 
specific components have similarly high correlations.  
A further result is that past due assets do not appear to correlate with any other CLE ratio. 
As stated before, assets classified as past due are not considered impaired. The low correlation 
would thus indicate that past due loans are indeed attributable to technical delays in loan 
servicing and not due to fundamental quality problems in the portfolio. Due to this low 
correlation we have omitted past due assets based CLEs in some of the statistics earlier in this 
chapter. 
Neither write-off proxy (NW_LN, GW_LN) exhibits a high contemporaneous correlation 
with the other major CLE measures (0.38 – 0.6) but the picture changes if we consider the 
lead/lag correlation matrix at the bottom of Table 5-6. In this matrix, the diagonal elements 
provide a measure of the degree of persistence of each CLE series. More interesting for study of 
delayed effects between the series are the non-diagonal elements. Where the lead/lag correlation 
(lower block of Table 5-6) exceeds the corresponding contemporaneous value (upper block of 
Table 5-6), one can say that the CLE proxy in the left column leads the proxy in the top row. 
Such instances are highlighted in bold in the lower block of Table 5-6. As an example, the 
contemporaneous correlation between the stock of provisions (PRV_LN) and net write-offs 
(NW_LN) is merely 0.39 while the level of provisions has a higher correlation with write-offs in 
the subsequent period (0.55). This result is highly intuitive since provisions will eventually lead 
                                                 
61
 Formally the accounting relationship between stock of provisions and provision charges is:  
stock of provisionst = stock of provisionst-1 + new charges to P&Lt – [write-offst – recoveriest] + other 
adjustments (i.e. currency translation, provisions of acquired or sold entities) 
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to definite loan derecognitions. Likewise the matrix indicates that after high levels of write-offs, 
the recovery rate will be higher. The correlation of past due assets at time t with other measures 
at t+1 remains very low, reconfirming that past due assets do not contain material information 
about future loan losses. 
For his sample of UK banks Pain (2003) also explores the lead/lag characteristics of loan 
write-offs for individual UK banks and finds that lag coefficients are likely to differ among them. 
Inspired by Pain’s (2003, Table 4, p. 17) approach, we study this question for the major banking 
institutions in the sample as well as for some smaller ones with extended data series (total 13 
banks). The result of this analysis is shown in Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 where we calculate 
correlations of stocks of provisions with subsequent write-offs (Table 5-7) and correlations of 
impaired asset expense with subsequent write-offs (Table 5-8). Contemporaneous correlations 
and correlations of up to four leads are shown in these tables. 
Pain finds correlation coefficients of around 0.7 for the first leads and lower coefficients 
when longer leads are applied to the provisions term;
62
 by contrast, the coefficients seem to be 
substantially higher for many banks in our sample. At the same time we note some extreme 
outliers with New Zealand’s TSB Bank and to a minor extent also Bank of Queensland showing 
very low and even negative correlations in many instances. Both are smaller, retail focused 
institutions where one observes a quite erratic provisioning pattern, particularly with regard to 
general provisioning earlier in the observation period, without subsequent write-offs. Likewise, 
we find low average correlations for BNZ (historically the largest New Zealand Bank) whose 
results are affected by substantial provisions after its 1990-91 de facto collapse which were then 
not all followed by corresponding write-offs but were partially reversed in subsequent years (see 
Figure 5-10 for illustration). Overall banks exhibit very different write-down patterns of loan loss 
                                                 
62
 Note that Pain (2003) calculates up to three period lagged correlations for impaired assed 
expense (termed ‘new provision charges’ in his paper). 
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provisions with some appearing to write them off quicker than others. This can best be seen in 
Figure 5-9 where we visualize results of Table 5-8 for the case of major New Zealand banks.  
Table 5-6 Correlations among CLE proxies (full data sample) 
Contemporaneous correlations 
IAE_LN IAE_NI IAE_GI NW_LN GW_LN RC_LN PRV_LN GE_LN SP_LN IA_A PD_A GEE_LN SPE_LN
IAE_LN 1.00 0.80 0.96 0.46 0.46 0.11 0.60 0.46 0.48 0.63 0.06 0.40 0.98
IAE_NI 0.80 1.00 0.88 0.57 0.56 0.02 0.49 0.20 0.59 0.71 -0.02 0.32 0.91
IAE_GI 0.96 0.88 1.00 0.52 0.51 0.09 0.59 0.40 0.53 0.68 0.04 0.26 0.95
NW_LN 0.46 0.57 0.52 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.39 0.15 0.46 0.60 0.00 -0.07 0.37
GW_LN 0.46 0.56 0.51 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.38 0.15 0.46 0.59 -0.02 -0.14 0.34
RC_LN 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.20 0.24 1.00 0.40 0.30 0.33 0.30 -0.16 -0.17 0.24
PRV_LN 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.39 0.38 0.40 1.00 0.80 0.77 0.77 -0.01 0.00 0.64
GE_LN 0.46 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.80 1.00 0.24 0.38 -0.23 -0.09 0.60
SP_LN 0.48 0.59 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.33 0.77 0.24 1.00 0.81 0.04 0.10 0.41
IA_A 0.63 0.71 0.68 0.60 0.59 0.30 0.77 0.38 0.81 1.00 0.12 -0.27 0.53
PD_A 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.16 -0.01 -0.23 0.04 0.12 1.00 0.02 0.13
GEE_LN 0.40 0.32 0.26 -0.07 -0.14 -0.17 0.00 -0.09 0.10 -0.27 0.02 1.00 0.18
SPE_LN 0.98 0.91 0.95 0.37 0.34 0.24 0.64 0.60 0.41 0.53 0.13 0.18 1.00  
0.XX : in range [0.8 – 1.0] 0.XX : in range [0.6 – 0.8] 
 



























IAE_LN 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.42 0.33 0.54 0.27 0.59 0.51 0.06 -0.13 0.26
IAE_NI 0.22 0.40 0.29 0.58 0.58 0.20 0.48 0.18 0.59 0.60 -0.01 -0.15 0.28
IAE_GI 0.26 0.36 0.34 0.49 0.49 0.31 0.54 0.25 0.60 0.57 0.04 -0.14 0.24
NW_LN 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.31 0.12 0.37 0.36 -0.02 -0.13 0.19
GW_LN 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.18 0.35 0.35 -0.04 -0.16 0.28
RC_LN 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.79 0.35 0.43 0.13 0.25 -0.18 -0.28 0.15
PRV_LN 0.12 0.19 0.16 0.55 0.56 0.43 0.74 0.55 0.62 0.54 -0.03 -0.26 0.11
GE_LN 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.59 0.59 0.33 0.25 -0.17 -0.18 0.04
SP_LN 0.16 0.26 0.21 0.66 0.68 0.40 0.55 0.25 0.66 0.61 0.02 -0.22 0.15
IA_A 0.34 0.40 0.39 0.88 0.89 0.41 0.69 0.38 0.65 0.78 0.07 -0.23 0.34
PD_A 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.03 -0.22 0.09 0.14 0.59 0.01 0.12
GEE_LN 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.11 -0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.15 0.19 -0.32 0.05 -0.09 0.04
SPE_LN 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.58 0.42 0.53 0.40 0.09 -0.12 0.37
0.XX : > than corresponding contemporaneous correlation 
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Table 5-7 Correlation of stock of provisions (PRV_LN) with subsequent loan net write-offs 










AU ANZ 0.68 0.92 0.76 0.42 0.20
AU CoWthBk 0.68 0.85 0.66 0.31 0.12
AU NAB 0.86 0.78 0.49 0.30 0.08
AU StGeorge 0.74 0.67 0.46 0.10 -0.40
AU Westpac 0.80 0.81 0.41 0.09 -0.19
AU BOQ -0.09 0.60 0.29 -0.16 -0.11
AU BkWest 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.50 0.20
NZ ANZ 0.71 0.85 0.66 0.40 0.17
NZ ASB 0.71 0.97 0.66 0.49 0.16
NZ BNZ 0.50 0.59 0.70 0.61 0.44
NZ NBNZ 0.40 0.81 0.43 0.22 0.03
NZ Westpac 0.34 0.51 0.16 0.13 -0.02
NZ TSB Bank -0.09 0.15 0.17 -0.61 -0.37
Overall 0.39 0.55 0.42 0.23 0.15   
Table 5-8 Correlation of impaired asset expense (IAE_LN) with subsequent loan net write-offs 










AU ANZ 0.53 0.86 0.89 0.50 0.27
AU CoWthBk 0.67 0.80 0.86 0.46 0.25
AU NAB 0.73 0.87 0.73 0.54 0.26
AU StGeorge 0.64 0.75 0.44 0.25 -0.14
AU Westpac 0.69 0.97 0.75 0.51 0.21
AU BOQ 0.72 0.26 0.42 -0.06 -0.12
AU BkWest 0.72 0.63 0.76 0.47 0.20
NZ ANZ 0.72 0.85 0.72 0.53 0.37
NZ ASB 0.49 0.82 0.70 0.71 0.59
NZ BNZ 0.20 0.09 0.22 0.35 0.52
NZ NBNZ 0.33 0.80 0.72 0.46 0.29
NZ Westpac 0.78 0.80 0.51 0.20 0.02
NZ TSB Bank 0.31 -0.08 0.33 -0.78 -0.37
Overall 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.20 0.17   
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Figure 5-9 Correlation of impaired asset expense with subsequent loan net write-offs for 
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Pain (2003) also employs an alternative approach for studying the lag characteristics of 
write-offs. In particular, he estimates the write-offs following provisions booked in earlier 
periods by means of a pooled regression model in which write-offs are a linear function of past 
provision charges. The approach more specifically answers questions related to write-down 
patterns of loan loss provisions. This analysis has been conducted for Australasian banks in 
Table 5-9 for the full sample as well as for a number of sub-samples. For the UK, Pain (2003, p. 
17, Table 3)
63
 determines that around 80% of provisions appear to be reflected in write-offs after 
around 3 to 4 years with a mean lag of around 1½ years. For the Australasian banks, the F-
statistics of the multiple regressions are all highly significant. The results indicate that for the 
overall sample about a quarter (25%) of the provision expense is written down in the subsequent 
year, another 30%, 6% and 14% in the following three years. This means that (similar to what 
was found by Pain), on average, three quarters of a year’s provisions expense are extinguished 
from the balance sheet in the subsequent four years. 
The regression results for various Australian and New Zealand sub-samples point to 
distinctive bank specific or possibly country specific write-down patterns. Australian banks write 
off half their provisions expense in the following year while the same coefficient for New 
Zealand banks is lower than 10%. 
The difference could be an effect of banks using their discretion when writing down loans. 
This is shown by the fact that the first two lagged provisions expense terms become consistently 
significant
64
 if we just use the specific component of provisions expense (SPE_LN) while there 
is no significance for the lagged general component (GEE_LN). The results of these estimates 
                                                 
63
 Pain applies his regression to the log transforms of net write-offs/loans and impaired asset 
expense/loans (provision charge in Pain’s terminology). There are numerous observations of negative 
impaired asset expense which would be lost under this approach. These mainly originate from reversals of 
excessive provision stocks after the crisis of the early 1990s. 
64
 When estimating the regression with fixed effects, one finds that the coefficients lose some of 
their significance, however. Note that in this case t-values are still much higher than for the corresponding 
coefficients of the GEE_LN regression. 
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are shown in Table 5-10. Note that the sample period was shortened for this analysis (1988 to 
2005) as a satisfactory reporting of components of impaired asset expense became available only 
around the end of the 1980s (see Figure 5-2 as a reference for the availability of CLE proxies). 
If one considers that impaired asset expense represents management’s best estimate of 
credit losses that have occurred during a period, one would have to be cautious regarding its 
ability to do so based on the above results. For instance, less than half of the bad debt provisions 
translate into actual later write-offs for New Zealand banks. This finding confirms anecdotal 
information that write-offs are considered as true losses by banks for internal purposes whereas 
provisions, even specific ones, are deemed uncertain. On the other hand, one has to consider the 
extended period of generally benign economic climate since the mid 1990s. It is difficult to 
estimate a credit loss distribution without observing extreme events. This can be seen for the 
example of New Zealand ASB Bank’s annual impaired asset expense compared to its loan write-
offs in Figure 5-11. The absolute dollar amount of loan write-offs has hardly changed from 1995 
through to 2005 while ASB has maintained provisioning levels just under 0.4% of total assets 
which themselves have more than quadrupled during the same time period. This implies that 
ASB has been over-provisioning since 1995 with additional provisions not being followed by 
corresponding higher write-offs. In view of long-term lending loss experience in comparable 
banking systems, ASB’s provisions may nevertheless be prudent. 
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Table 5-9 Results of pooled regression of net write-offs/loans as a function of preceding 
impaired asset expense/loans 
 Full sample Australia all banks 
Australia 




5 major banks 





























































Adj. R-squared 0.3290 0.5821 0.8481 0.2626 0.3340 
Cross sections / 
Observations 
29 / 362 20 / 249 4 / 88 9 / 113 5 / 91 
F-statistic **45.247 **87.377 **122.473 **10.970 **11.782 
 
Notes: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Model: 
year  : tN;1,....., sections crossbank  :i;IAE_LN NW_LN
4
1s




NW_LN: net debt write-offs as % of average loans is dependent variable. 
IAE_LN: impaired asset expense as % of average loans. 
All t-statistics adjusted with White diagonal standard errors (d.f. corrected). Estimated for full observation period 
1980 to 2005 without fixed or random effects. 
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Table 5-9 Results of pooled regression of net write-offs/loans as a function of preceding 
impaired asset expense/loans (continued) 
Estimations with fixed bank-specific effects 
 
 Full sample Australia all banks 
Australia 




5 major banks 





























































Adj. R-squared 0.3945 0.6018 0.8430 0.3209 0.3337 
Cross sections / 
Observations 
29 / 362 20 / 249 4 / 88 9 / 113 5 / 91 
F-statistic **8.349 **17.293 **67.754 **5.410 **6.635 
 
Explanations: see Table 5-9 
Estimated with fixed cross-sectional (bank) effect to control for bank-specific levels of net write-offs. 
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Table 5-10 Results of pooled regression of net write-offs/loans as a function of preceding total, 
specific and general impaired asset expense/loans 
Explanatory 
variable 
Total impaired asset 
expense/average loans 
Specific component of 
impaired asset expense/ 
average loans 
General component of 
impaired asset expense/ 
average loans 
 IAE_LN SPE_LN GEE_LN 









































Adj. R-squared 0.3234 0.4707 0.0508 
Cross sections 29 22 20 
Observations 324 221 196 
F-statistic **39.593 **49.901 **3.610 
 
Notes: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Model and estimation as in Table 5-9 for all Australasian banks in sample but data range from 1988 onwards. 




Total impaired asset 
expense/average loans 
Specific component of 
impaired asset expense/ 
average loans 
General component of 
impaired asset expense/ 
average loans 
 IAE_LN SPE_LN GEE_LN 









































Adj. R-squared 0.4509 0.4423 0.1453 
Cross sections 29 22 20 
Observations 324 221 196 
F-statistic **9.288 **7.980 **2.442 
 
As above but estimated with fixed cross-sectional (bank) effect to control for bank-specific levels of net write-offs. 
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5.3.2.4 Recoveries of debts written off 
Unlike provisions, write-offs mean losses with a high degree of probability. Subsequent 
recoveries should thus be comparably small. This section sets out to test this intuitive assumption 
by looking at patterns of bad debt recoveries for banks in the sample.  
We find that over the pooled sample, on average, recoveries amount to 10.9% (median 
value
65
) of same year gross debt written off (see Table 5-11). Due to the underlying growth in the 
loan portfolio, this value will understate true loan loss recovery rates as recoveries are from loans 
                                                 
65
 The median value is more useful as some extreme outliers distort the pooled sample mean. 
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written off in previous years. Table 5-11 also shows summary statistics of recoveries as a 
proportion of gross write offs with a one and two year lag. The median values of the share of bad 
debts subsequently recovered amounts to 13.6% (1 year lag), respectively 15.4% (2 year lag). 
Table 5-11 Summary statistics of recoveries as % of current and past years gross write-offs 
 Recoveries 
 
as % of same year 
gross write-offs 
as % of previous year 
gross write-offs 
as % of 2 year lagged 
gross write-offs 
Mean 16.33% 16.95% 19.77% 
Median 10.90% 13.61% 15.38% 
Maximum 116.60% 104.48% 252.99% 
Minimum 0.00% 0.35% 0.29% 
Std. Dev. 16.95% 15.15% 20.66% 
Skewness 2.37 1.99 5.24 
Kurtosis 10.86 9.11 53.17 
    
Observations 353 339 325 
Cross sections 26 26 24 
 
An alternative approach to gauge this ratio is used by Pain (2003, Chart 9, p. 18). He 
divides the aggregate recoveries by total gross write-offs over the whole 1978 to 2000 
observation period and finds that around 10% of write-offs incurred by 6 leading UK commercial 
banks were subsequently recovered.
66
 His bank specific analysis reveals that this ratio has values 
ranging from around 6% to 13%.  
We replicate Pain’s method for this sample. We limit the analysis to 14 banks with series 
of 12 or more contiguous observations of recoveries and gross write-offs. The results are shown 
in Figure 5-12. The overall cumulative recovery ratio for this sub-sample is 13.9%, i.e. 
comparable to the median value of recoveries over one year lagged gross write-offs found in 
Table 5-11. The bank specific values are quite erratic and range from 3% for Bendigo Bank to 
                                                 
66
 Due to data quality problems, Pain cannot extend his analysis to UK mortgage banks in this case. 
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ASB’s 26%; ratios are higher for New Zealand banks on average. Even entities of the same 
banking group such as ANZ have recovered vastly different amounts as a consolidated group 
(8.7%) compared to 15% in its New Zealand operations. Some banks like ASB and NAB appear 
to use write-offs liberally only to subsequently recover them in substantial amounts. Write-offs 
in their case thus have the characteristic of specific provisions with a high degree of uncertainty 
attached to them.  
Figure 5-12 Cumulative bad debt recoveries as a percentage of cumulative write-offs for 
selected banks with extended time series observation 












































Figure 5-12 shows the range of years used to derive the bank specific cumulative recovery 
rates. It may be the case that the different ratios are the result of differences in the observation 
window. To study this phenomenon in more depth, one can follow recoveries as % of current or 
past years’ gross write-offs through time. This is done for the ratio of recoveries over one year 
lagged year write-offs in Figure 5-13 which reveals considerable variability both across time and 
across countries. Between1980 and the onset of the 1990 financial crisis, this ratio generally 
remained in the 10-15% range. It reaches a nadir at the height of the crisis and subsequently 
peaks when part of these loan losses are recovered in a more benign economic climate. Such a 
trough in recoveries during bad times is also found in research which studies ‘Loss Given 
Default’ (LGD), which equals one minus the recovery rate.
67
  For New Zealand banks, and to a 
lesser extent for Australian banks, recovery rates do not seem to revert to pre-crisis levels, 
however, and have been hovering in the 25-35% range since the mid 1990s. 
 
                                                 
67
 See Allen & Saunders (1999, p. 18-20) for a review of literature related to the cyclicality of 
LGD. 
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Figure 5-13 Australasian banks: average bad debt recoveries as % of one year lagged gross-














































A look at the universe of major banks in Australia (Figure 5-14) and New Zealand (Figure 
5-15) provides further insights. The trough discussed above becomes clearly visible for the 
sample of Australian banks. NAB’s high average loan recoveries contrast with much lower and 
less variable recoveries at AU ANZ. Data quality for New Zealand banks is not as good with 
only NZ ANZ reporting recoveries back to 1980. There is again a striking difference between 
high and very volatile recovery rates at ASB and lower and more stable ratios for NBNZ. Bank 
of New Zealand’s time series also exhibits great volatility from 1995 to 2000 when some past 
large write-offs are reversed. This time period partially coincides with substantial releases of 
provisions at BNZ when it showed impaired asset credits in its P&L for five years from 1993 and 
1997 (see Figure 5-10). 
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Figure 5-14 Major Australian banks: average bad debt recoveries as % of one year lagged 















































Figure 5-15 Major New Zealand banks: average bad debt recoveries as % of one year lagged 
















































There is a lack of literature which has analysed such recovery data.
68
 One can nevertheless 
posit some hypotheses as ideas for continued research on the subject. Much like CLEs in general, 
recoveries are possibly driven by external macro-economic, behavioural and bank specific 
micro-economic factors. 
A key macroeconomic factor mentioned previously is the procyclicality of recoveries with 
lower recoveries in times of crises and higher recoveries in a benign economic climate. 
Another possible driver relates to tax effects of loan write-offs. Some bad debt provision 
expenses of the general type, e.g. determined by statistical methods, might not necessarily 
qualify for tax relief. Conversely, banks may find it easier to convince tax authorities that debt 
write-offs are a genuine, tax-deductible business expense. By generously writing off debts just to 
“recover” them again some years later, banks effectively push tax obligations into the future. 
Write-offs then take on the character of provisions without the definite nature one would expect 
them to have. 
Another factor could be differences in the motivation to signal via loan write-offs. Unlike 
provisions, write-offs remove impaired assets from the bank’s books which could be important 
for a prudential regulator. On the other hand, write-offs have no impact on reported earnings 
(assuming they have been provided for in earlier periods). Reported earnings are most important 
for stock listed companies who thus have less incentive to use this ‘communication tool’. This 
postulated relationship would help explain lower recovery rates for the Australian, (mostly 
exchange listed) sub-sample while non-listed New Zealand banks may emphasize 
communication with the prudential regulator. The increase in recoveries in New Zealand 
coincides with the introduction of the country’s 1995 Registered Bank Disclosure Regime 
(RBNZ, 1995). Likewise, new accounting standards relevant for financial instruments and 
                                                 
68
 Note that literature on recovery rates is typically based on bond market data and not accounting 
data sourced from bank annual reports. 
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institutions came into force at the time
69
 but none of these standards contained specific rules 
regarding derecognitions of loan assets. 
Earlier research on bank specific factors has found recoveries to depend on the type of 
loans written off. Evidence is usually obtained from the bond markets where unsecured claims 
will recover less than collateralized obligations.
70
 Recoveries disclosed by banks are not 
immediately comparable, however. If a loan is written down, it should only be to the extent that 
it is unlikely to be recovered. Management should thus consider quality and asset backing of a 
claim both when it first provides for losses and subsequently writes it off. 
There is reporting of sectoral recoveries for the 4 major Australian banks back to 1995 and 
even to 1988 in the case of NAB. The results of a preliminary analysis of these data is shown in 
Table 5-12 for the ratio of cumulative recoveries over cumulative write-offs by lending segment 
and in Table 5-13 for the average ratio of recoveries over previous year write-offs. The loan 
segmentation is not uniform across the sub-sample but all four banks show real estate lending 
through mortgages separated from lending for construction and development, lending to primary 
industries as well as consumer type personal lending as separate categories. Table 5-13 shows 
both mean and median ratio to highlight the erratic character of observations for some segments. 
A few large recoveries lift the mean ratio even though minimal amounts were recovered in most 
years. Note also that the analysis for banks with the shorter time windows starting in 1995 is 
likely to be biased as they are able to book comparably large recoveries on write-offs of the 
preceding crisis. This is reflected in some extreme ratios in Table 5-13, e.g. 83.8% mean 
recovery in Commonwealth Bank’s finance and insurance segment. 
The most consistent result can be found for the personal lending segment which exhibits 
median recoveries in the 15 to 35% range. This is likely to be the result of generic policies to 
                                                 
69
 Examples are AASB 1033 / FRS-31 (information about financial instruments) and AASB 1032 / 
FRS-33 (disclosure of information by financial institutions). 
70
 See for example Altman & Brady (2001) as quoted in Allen & Saunders (1999, Table 9, p. 18).  
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write-down small consumer loans in default to zero while larger loans, possibly with collateral, 
are assessed on a more individual basis. This would explain generally lower recovery rates for 
other segments which, however, often display quite different ratios between banks. An example 
is mortgage lending where ANZ and Commonwealth Bank recovered less than half as much as 
NBA and Westpac. We attribute this mainly to a lack of common standards as to how to classify 
loans into segments. An example concerns construction loans which Westpac defines as ‘lending 
in the commercial and financial sectors in Australia is for the purpose of the financing of 
construction of real estate and land development projects which cannot be separately identified 
from other lending to these borrowers’ (Westpac 2005 Annual Financial Report). Another 
example is mortgaged lending to the agricultural sector which, for instance, Westpac includes 
with mortgage loans whereas Commonwealth bank characterizes mortgage loans as ‘principally 
owner occupied housing’ (Commonwealth Bank 2005 Financial Report). More concise 
definitions are missing in the banks’ segment reporting. 
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Table 5-12 Major Australian banks – rates of bad debt recoveries by lending segment 
Cumulative recoveries as % of cumulative write-offs 
 AU ANZ 
AU 
CoWthBk AU NAB AU Westpac 
Segment recovery data (domestic) 1992 – 2005 1995 – 2005 1988 – 2005 1995 – 2005 
Government and public authorities 0.0% 0.0% n.a. n.a. 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining 6.5% 23.7% 15.1% 23.9% 
Financial, investment and insurance 12.0% 26.7% 22.0% n.a. 
Real estate – mortgage 3.5% 5.0% 13.1% 11.8% 
Real estate – construction 5.5% 6.9% 5.0% 6.0% 
Personal 15.1% 20.9% 29.8% 24.1% 
Retail and wholesale trade 4.5% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lease financing 13.0% 18.8% 9.0% n.a. 
Other commercial and industrial 1.0% 14.6% 12.3% n.a. 
Entertainment, leisure and tourism 7.0% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Manufacturing 7.7% n.a. 9.5% n.a. 
Overseas lending 9.9% 23.4% 24.5% 6.2% 
Overall domestic and overseas 8.6% 20.6% 21.8% 19.9% 
 
Table 5-13 Major Australian banks – rates of bad debt recoveries by lending segment 
Average recoveries as % of previous year write-offs 
 AU ANZ AU CoWthBk AU NAB AU Westpac 
Segment recovery data 1993 – 2005 1996 – 2005 1989 – 2005 1996 – 2005 
(domestic) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
and mining 15.1% 2.8% 37.2% 23.6% 28.7% 20.0% 14.2% 0.0% 
Financial, investment and 
insurance 24.8% 13.2% 83.8% 41.0% 34.5% 21.9% n.a. n.a. 
Real estate – mortgage 8.4% 5.9% 6.6% 5.0% 19.2% 14.3% 5.6% 0.0% 
Real estate – construction 14.7% 15.4% 18.3% 5.9% 10.5% 10.0% 6.2% 0.0% 
Personal 17.3% 18.2% 27.0% 27.6% 44.9% 34.6% 27.5% 28.2% 
Retail and wholesale trade 5.1% 4.8% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lease financing 24.4% 17.9% 23.9% 22.7% 12.7% 13.6% n.a. n.a. 
Other commercial and 
industrial n.a. n.a. 15.3% 15.7% 17.7% 12.2% n.a. n.a. 
Entertainment, leisure and 
tourism 11.6% 6.9% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Manufacturing 16.0% 4.8% n.a. n.a. 11.3% 9.7% n.a. n.a.
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Overall, we find that recovery rates vary greatly between institutions, across countries and 
also through time. This shows that despite common accounting and prudential standards, banks 
have discretion not only with regard to providing for credit losses but also in the second step 
when loans are finally derecognized. There are interesting hypotheses relating to tax aspects, 
signalling and types of lending which could be used to research this issue further. 
For the study of the overall credit loss experience, recoveries are nevertheless of secondary 
importance. The focus in this research is rather on provisions and net write-offs. This means that 
the relatively small recoveries, in line with most other empirical work, are removed from same 
year gross write-down experience. This is theoretically inferior to adjusting write-offs with 
subsequently reported recoveries but is easier to implement and brings the advantage of extended 
data series as earlier in the observation period the banks often just reported write-off figures net 
of recoveries.  
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5.4 Determinants of credit losses 
The following potential determinants of credit losses are presented as two distinctive 
groups. In the first group are aggregate macroeconomic variables which are period specific for 
their respective system (Australia, New Zealand) but apply to all banks in the cross-section. The 
second are bank specific variables which have mostly been sourced from the database of 
Australasian banks compiled for the purpose of this thesis. Table 5-14 below provides an 
overview of all explanatory variables which are considered for the estimation of the principal 
model introduced at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
Table 5-14  Potential explanatory variables and the expected sign of the regression coefficient 
Aggregate explanatory variable 





Real GDP growth GDPGRW -ve Ability of borrowers to service debt will be 
determined by the economic cycle. 
Unemployment rate UNEMP +ve Unemployment rate is included as it not only 
reflects the business cycle (like GDP growth) 
but also longer term and structural 
imbalances of the economy. 
Liabilities of households and firms 
as % of disposable income 
LIAB_INC +ve The more households and firms in the system 
are indebted, the more financially vulnerable 
they will be. 
Asset prices / interest rates: 
 
Housing price index (changes) 
 
Return on leading share indices  
 
 



















Disturbances in the asset markets can impair 
the value of banks’ assets both directly and 
indirectly (i.e. through reduced collateral 
values). Experience shows that the property 
sector and the share markets may play a 
critical role in triggering losses in the 
banking system. Similar effects are expected 
in a high and volatile interest rate 
environment. 
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Table 5-14  Potential explanatory variables and the expected sign of the regression coefficient 
(continued) 








Past credit expansion as measured 
by asset growth, loan growth and 
total income growth. Relative 
growth measures DVLNGRW and 
DVSYSALLGRW are the point 
differences of a bank’s growth 










Fast growth of the loan portfolio is often 
associated with subsequent loan losses. 
Alternatively, some researchers have argued 
that a slow growing loan portfolio may be 
caused by a weak economy and thus be 
associated with CLE. This effect should, 
however, be picked up by broader activity 
variables like GDPGRW. 
Risk choice 
 













A bank’s deliberate choice to lend to more 
risky borrowers is likely reflected in higher 
interest margins. An uncertain sign arises 
because lower past margins (lagged terms) 
might induce greater risk-taking by bank, as 
argued by Pain (2003, Table 5, p. 24). 
Characteristic of lending portfolio 







The share of comparably lower risk housing 
loans as % of loans proxies a key risk 
characteristic of the bank’s loan portfolio.  
Diversification / systemic 
importance as measured by share of 
system assets, resp. loans. 
SH_SYSASS 
SH_SYSLNS 
-ve A bank’s assets in proportion to the overall 
banking system assets provides a crude proxy 
for loan portfolio diversification.  
Cost efficiency as measured by 
Cost-income ratio 
CIR +ve/(-ve) Inefficient banks can be expected to suffer 
greater credit losses. Alternatively, such 
banks could maintain an expensive credit 
evaluation procedure and will thus exhibit 
lower credit losses. 
Market power as measured by share 
of system assets 
SH_SYSASS 
SH_SYSLNS 
+ve/(-ve) Monopolistic markets structures promote 
lending to young firms which then leads to 
higher credit losses (Petersen & Rajan, 
1995). Conversely, increased competition 
may induce banks to take greater risks. 
Other behavioural aspects 
 
Income smoothing 
Income measured as earnings 
before taxes & provisions as % of 












Some literature has found evidence of banks 
using discretionary provisions to smooth 
earnings for a variety of motivations.  
Capital management 
Capital measured as tier 1 or tier 






General provisions count towards Basel I 
minimum capital and weaker banks might 
thus be tempted to engage in capital 
management through provisioning. 
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5.4.1 Macroeconomic factors 
Macroeconomic influences on asset quality have repeatedly been explored by researchers. 
Firstly, incomes and non-housing wealth of households and firms will typically vary with the 
economic cycle and therefore affect their ability to service debt. To measure the impact of 
changes in aggregate economic activity, it is general practice
71
 to use the real GDP growth rate 
(GDPGRW) as it is the broadest measure of economic activity.  
Secondly, the more households and firms are indebted, the more likely adverse 
macroeconomic shocks will lead to higher levels of defaults (as for example shown in E. P. 
Davis, 1993) and there could well be nonlinearities in the relationship between such shocks and 
defaults. As a measure of household, respectively firm, debt, Salas & Saurina (2002) calculate a 
ratio of household debt over GDP, respectively the liabilities of the corporate sector over its 
market value. Likewise, Pain (2003, p. 24) calculates corporate capital gearing as the sector’s 
interest payments as a proportion of net profits. He also defines household capital gearing as the 
stock of household debt as a proportion of financial and tangible assets. Due to data availability 
issues, we construct a slightly different proxy for household indebtedness. We calculate a ratio of 
household financial liabilities over disposable income (LIAB_INC) as an indicator of the 
households’ ability to service debts. As illustrated in Figure 5-16, households in both Australia 
and New Zealand have been taking on increasingly higher levels of debt since about 1990. 
                                                 
71
 GDP growth has been employed in models of Arpa et al. (2001), Kearns (2004), Pain (2003) and 
Salas & Saurina (2002). 
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Development of asset prices in the economy - particularly asset price shocks - is a third 
macro factor which may weaken borrowers and reduce the value of collateral held by banks. 
Moreover, Pain (2003, p. 21) argues that sharp changes in asset prices may be associated with 
increased fragility of borrowers through more traditional macroeconomic channels. For example, 
swift increases in interest rates can lead to cash-flow problems in both the corporate and 
household sectors, which in turn can lead to borrower default. To test the effect of changes in 
asset prices, we include three explanatory variables in the model. These are the growth rate of 
house prices in Australia and New Zealand (HPGRW_AU, HPGRW_NZ), the annual return of 
the main shares indices (RET_ASX, RET_NZX) as well as the changes in 90 day real and 
nominal interest rates (REALINTGRW, NOMINTGRW) of both currencies. The real interest 
rate is the nominal mid year interest rate adjusted by the percentage change in CPI inflation 
(CPIGRW) observed for this year. 
The above asset price and interest rate proxies are all graphed in Figure 5-17. 
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Change house price index Australia








































































Point change nominal interest rates Australia (90 days)
Point change nominal interest rates New Zealand (90 days)
 
The rate of unemployment (UNEMP) is a final macro variable which we consider as a 
driver of credit losses in the banking system. Kearns (2004, p. 117), for instance, uses it together 
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with GDP growth for a study of provisioning patterns of Irish banks. Earlier it had also been 
employed by Bikker & Metzemakers (2003). These authors argue that while GDP growth 
captures cyclical effects, the unemployment rate also reflects longer term imbalances in the 
economy. It can also be said that the unemployment rate is more directly relevant for the 
financial health of affected households. Figure 5-18 visualizes the jobless rate experience for 
both Australia and New Zealand through the 1980 to 2005 observation period.  



































Unemployment rate New Zealand
 
 
Table 5-15 below provides an overview of sources for all macro data (including auxiliary 
series) considered for the principal model. Table 5-16 presents corresponding summary statistics. 
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Table 5-15  Acronym, source and details of aggregate macro factors (including auxiliary) 
Acronym Description Country Source: Code* (DS, ABS) 
CPIGRW_AU CPI % growth Australia  AU DS: AUQ64..XF 
CPIGRW_NZ CPI % growth New Zealand NZ DS: NZQ64..XF 
GDPGRW_AU GDP % growth Australia AU DS: AUOCFGDP (Source OECD) 
GDPGRW_NZ GDP % growth New Zealand NZ DS: NZOCFGDP (Source OECD) 
HPGRW_AU House price index % change 
Australia 
AU Median House Price All Capital 
Cities RBA, REIA 
HPGRW_NZ House price index % change New 
Zealand 
NZ RBNZ Value of housing stock and 
house prices 
LIAB_INC_AU Liabilities / disposable income AU RBA, ABS 
LIAB_INC_NZ Liabilities / disposable income NZ RBNZ, HHAandL2005webcopy.xls 
NOMINT_AU Nominal short-term interest rates 
Australia (3 months money market 
rates or equivalent) 
AU DS: AUOCFIST, OECD code IRS  
NOMINT_NZ Nominal short-term interest rates 
New Zealand (3 months) 
NZ DS: NZOCFIST, OECD code IRS 
NOMINTGRW_AU Point change of NOMINT_AU AU from NOMINT_AU 
NOMINTGRW_NZ Point change of NOMINT_NZ NZ from NOMINT_NZ 
PSC_AU Private sector credit (PSC) Australia AU RBA: DLCANCS 
PSC_NZ PSC New Zealand NZ RBNZ: PSC(R) excluding repos 
PSCGRW_AU/NZ % change PSC Australia/New 
Zealand Auxiliary series to calculate 
bank specific DVLNGRW series 
AU/NZ from PSC_AU, PSC_NZ 
REALINT_AU Real interest rates Australia AU from NOMINT_AU, CPIGRW_AU 
REALINT_NZ Real interest rates New Zealand NZ from NOMINT_NZ, CPIGRW_NZ 
REALINTGRW_AU Point change of REALINT_AU AU from REALINT_AU 
REALINTGRW_NZ Point change of REALINT_NZ NZ from REALINT_NZ 
RET_ASX Return ASX All Ordinaries index AU DS: AUOSP001F 
RET_NZX Return NZX All Shares index NZ DS: NZOSP001F 
SYSASALL_AU Banking system assets Australia 
Auxiliary to deriving relative size of 
banks in system (SH_SYSASALL) 
and deviation from system growth 
(DVSYSALLGRW) 
AU RBA: B02HIST.XLS BBATA 
(in AUD) 
SYSASALL_NZ Banking system assets New Zealand 
Auxiliary, see SYSASALL_AU 




Growth of banking system assets 
SYSASALL_AU/NZ 
AU/NZ from SYSASALL_AU, 
SYSASALL_NZ 
UNEMP_AU Unemployment rate (level) AU ABS: Series ID A163165V 
UNEMP_NZ Unemployment rate (level) NZ Statistics NZ: Table B.2.3, HFLS 
Series data are for calendar year to 31 December for period data (CPIGRW, GDPGRW, HPGRW, NOMINTGRW, 
PSCGRW, REALINTGRW, RET, SYSASALLGRW) and as of 31 December for point/level data (all other series). 
*Source codes: DS – Datastream code, ABS – Australian Bureau of Statistics code 
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Table 5-16  Summary statistics aggregate macro factors and auxiliary series 
Acronym Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
CPIGRW_AU 5.0% 4.2% 11.2% 0.2% 3.4% 0.412 1.809 26 
CPIGRW_NZ 6.0% 2.9% 17.1% -0.1% 5.7% 0.977 2.377 26 
GDPGRW_AU 3.3% 3.8% 6.6% -0.7% 1.8% -0.667 3.074 26 
GDPGRW_NZ 2.8% 2.8% 8.5% -1.9% 2.2% 0.277 3.287 26 
HPGRW_AU 8.7% 8.4% 38.8% -4.2% 8.6% 1.508 6.757 26 
HPGRW_NZ 10.1% 8.7% 31.6% -2.5% 8.5% 0.703 3.100 26 
LIAB_INC_AU 71% 56% 152% 38% 35% 1.058 2.916 26 
LIAB_INC_NZ 81% 71% 160% 45% 35% 0.722 2.366 26 
NOMINT_AU 9.6% 7.4% 17.6% 4.7% 4.6% 0.409 1.564 26 
NOMINT_NZ 11.0% 9.2% 23.3% 4.8% 5.3% 0.712 2.396 26 
NOMINTGRW_AU -0.16% -0.04% 4.81% -4.64% 2.37% -0.003 2.704 26 
NOMINTGRW_NZ -0.29% -0.16% 8.28% -5.71% 2.78% 0.632 4.948 26 
PSC_AU (AUD bil) 433.0 346.5 1,141.4 69.7 299.7 0.774 2.709 26 
PSC_NZ (NZD bil) 77.2 62.0 201.9 10.9 54.0 0.656 2.463 26 
PSCGRW_AU 12.2% 11.3% 23.9% -1.2% 6.2% -0.120 2.955 26 
PSCGRW_NZ 12.8% 10.9% 31.0% 4.9% 6.9% 1.182 3.664 26 
REALINT_AU 4.6% 4.3% 10.1% 0.5% 2.5% 0.474 2.484 26 
REALINT_NZ 5.0% 5.3% 9.0% -2.8% 2.7% -0.989 4.067 26 
REALINTGRW_AU 0.09% 0.02% 5.99% -3.43% 2.18% 0.917 3.855 26 
REALINTGRW_NZ 0.12% -0.26% 4.89% -3.73% 1.85% 0.767 3.763 26 
RET_ASX 9.0% 8.8% 41.5% -26.6% 14.8% -0.019 3.354 26 
RET_NZX 7.5% 6.3% 57.1% -49.5% 20.9% -0.239 4.291 26 
SYSASALL_AU 
(AUD billion) 491.2 383.0 1,451.1 61.6 392.5 0.984 3.087 26 
SYSASALL_NZ 
(NZD billion) 138.7 126.7 252.3 70.2 61.3 1.856 1.856 18 
SYSASALLGRW_AU 13.6% 12.8% 24.0% 2.8% 6.0% 2.226 2.226 26 
SYSASALLGRW_NZ 7.9% 8.4% 14.4% 0.0% 4.2% 2.498 2.498 17 
UNEMP_AU 7.6% 7.7% 11.1% 5.1% 1.7% 0.371 2.272 26 
UNEMP_NZ 5.7% 5.5% 10.4% 1.9% 2.3% 0.480 2.556 26 
 
5.4.2 Microeconomic or bank specific factors 
This subsection reviews bank specific factors with potential explanatory power over an 
institution’s CLE. The major categories relate to (1) past credit expansion, (2) the risk choice of 
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the bank as, for example, reflected in the composition of its portfolio or the level of collateral 
backing, (3) the efficiency of a bank’s credit risk management, (4) the amount of market power 
of an institution, and, finally, (5) miscellaneous behavioural factors that could potentially 
influence the discretionary element of reported CLEs. A final sub-section provides a description 
and summary statistics of all bank specific series. 
5.4.2.1 Past credit expansion 
Rapid expansion of lending has often been associated with subsequent credit losses when 
banks inadvertently assume far greater credit risk than they realize (e.g. in Clair, 1992). To gain 
market share, a bank may be tempted to compromise on credit quality. Effects of adverse 
selection can occur when incumbent lenders ‘allow’ their doubtful customers to switch the 
banking relationship to the newcomer. 
This phenomenon has often been observed in the context of financial deregulation such as 
for the Scandinavian banking sector where a very rapid credit expansion after the liberalization 
of the system led to substantial credit losses in the early 1990s (Hyytinen, 2002, p. 617). A 
similar sequence of events occurred for several Australasian financial institutions during the 
observation period.  
An alternative school of thought associates low loan growth with rising credit losses. Low 
bank specific credit growth may be induced by a fall in aggregate demand in the economy which 
in turn weakens the borrowers. Moreover, a ‘low growth’ bank may be inefficient and 
consequently suffer greater credit losses. Negative coefficients consistent with this alternative 
hypothesis were found in empirical research by Pain (2003, p. 29) and Cavallo & Majnoni 
(2001). 
Hess & Feng (2007) have proposed a modelling methodology which could potentially take 
both of the above effects into account. They use the squared difference between a bank’s asset 
growth and the average growth of the banking system as a proxy. We would then expect a 
positive relationship between credit losses and a proxy constructed in such a way as banks which 
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either expand very rapidly or fail to grow their portfolios relative to the average may suffer 
greater credit losses. Expanding this idea, one could consider modelling positive and negative 
squared deviations separately which then would allow for different coefficients on positive 
versus negative deviations. 
Previous research generally uses either asset or loan growth as a proxy for bank expansion. 
Salas & Saurina (2002, p. 213) also calculate the expansion rate of the branch network for 
Spanish banks but this data item is not reported consistently by banks in Australasia. Additional 
growth parameter candidates are provided by income data items. We select the growth in total 
operating profit as an alternative proxy. 
The summary statistics of the five growth rate proxies (ASGRW, LNGRW, TOIGRW, 
DVSYSALLGRW, DVLNGRW) across both countries over the full 1980 to 2005 observation 
period are shown in Table 5-17 below. The median growth over the observation period amounted 
to 14.0% for assets (ASGRW) and 15.4% for loans (LNGRW). Median growth in total operating 
income was slightly lower at 12.3%. Not surprisingly, asset and loan growth correlate well (0.88) 
while total operating income growth has a lower but still positive correlation with the other two 
variables. Figure 5-19 displays the dynamics of the three base growth series (ASGRW, LNGRW, 
TOIGRW) over the observation period. It highlights the good correlation between asset and loan 
growth, in particular after 1990. The correlation appears weaker during the earlier period when 
the changing regulatory framework led to changing balance sheet structures of various 
institutions (e.g. former savings banks and building societies). An example is TSB Bank in New 
Zealand. Before becoming a registered bank in 1989, much of its assets were in the form of 
deposits with the country’s trading banks. Only with time did TSB grow its loan portfolio to a 
larger proportion of assets. 
DVSYSALLGRW and DVLNGRW measure the point difference of a bank’s growth rate 
to the growth rate of the overall system. DVSYSALLGRW refers to the difference of ASGRW 
to the growth in total systemic bank assets (SYSALLGRW), while DVLNGRW is the difference 
of LNGRW to growth in total private sector credit (PSCGRW). Not surprisingly, both 
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parameters correlate well with ASGWR and LNGRW. Data series to derive DVSYSALLGRW 
only start 1989 in New Zealand because assets in the banking system were not reported before 
1988. DVLNGRW, on the other hand, is more complete because data on private sector credit 
(PSC) has been reconstructed back to before 1980 for both Australian and New Zealand. 43% 
(199 of 456) and 38% (197 of 513) of observations of DVSYSALLGRW and DVLNGRW, 
respectively, are negative; i.e. growth of the bank was below the system growth in that particular 
year. 
 
Table 5-17 Summary statistics and correlations of parameters to measure credit expansion 











growth of loans 
in system** 
 ASGRW LNGRW TOIGRW* DVSYSALLGRW DVLNGRW 
Mean 17.0% 19.0% 16.5% 4.9% 7.1% 
Median 14.1% 15.4% 12.3% 1.7% 3.3% 
Maximum 180.6% 160.4% 256.7% 170.7% 147.8% 
Minimum -40.1% -28.3% -100.2% -50.1% -39.5% 
Std. Dev. 19.1% 20.6% 25.9% 19.8% 20.7% 
Skewness 3.06 2.97 3.52 3.33 2.87 
Kurtosis 21.91 17.99 28.15 22.89 17.20 
# observations 517 513 494 456 513 
Of which negative 
values 39 32 65 198 197 
 
Cross sections 
(banks) 32 32 31 32 32 
      
Correlations      
 ASGRW LNGRW TOIGRW DVSYSALLGRW DVLNGRW 
ASGRW 1.00     
LNGRW 0.88 1.00    
TOIGRW 0.41 0.38 1.00   
DVSYSALLGRW 0.95 0.82 0.47 1.00  
DVLNGRW 0.82 0.95 0.31 0.86 1.00 
Notes: 
* Total operating income is defined as net interest income (pre-provision) plus other operating income. 
** For a more details on the definition of DVSYSALLGRW and DVLNGRW refer to Table 5-18. 
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5.4.2.2 Risk choice 
Banks make some deliberate decisions as to their exposure to credit risk and these 
decisions are likely to affect their CLE. Two such choices are discussed in the following two 
sub-sections. 
5.4.2.2.1 Pricing of higher risks as reflected by interest margins 
In theory, banks can manage their lending risk by appropriate screening and pricing of 
transactions. This means some banks will deliberately take on more risk but higher expected 
losses will be reflected in higher ex ante margins earned and this in turn will reward the banks’ 
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shareholders to absorb potentially higher unexpected losses
72
. Higher provisions and ultimately 
losses may therefore arise from engaging in such deliberate lending policies. Empirical evidence 
for this effect is provided by Keeton & Morris (1988, Chart 6, p. 16)
73
. Similarly, Sinkey & 
Greenawalt (1991) found that ‘loan-loss rates were positively associated with loan rates, volatile 
funds, and loan volume from the preceding three years’. This implies a bank’s net interest 
margin in lagged form is a suitable proxy to capture the idea that loan risk of past loans is 
subsequently revealed in higher loan losses. 
While the above considerations would call for a positive expected sign for this coefficient, 
Pain (2003, Table 5, p. 24) sees some uncertainty regarding the sign for bank behavioural 
factors. He reasons that lower past margins might induce greater risk-taking by banks which then 
could lead to higher losses. 
5.4.2.2.2 Characteristics of lending portfolio 
Related to effects of higher risk lending is the fact that credit risks vary considerably across 
different loan types. Pain (2003, p. 22) mentions Davis (1993) who had previously investigated 
the variation of credit risk across loans to different sectors in the UK. Such information is also 
available for Australasia. From about the mid 1990s, major Australian (and to a lesser extent 
New Zealand) banks started disclosing credit exposure to various types of lending and associated 
them with corresponding segmental write-offs and/or specific provisions. As shown in Figure 
5-1 earlier in this chapter, NAB was the first bank with complete details available back to 1985. 
While NAB lending losses on residential mortgage loans barely appear in the graph of Figure 
5-20 (median of 0.02% and maximum of 0.12%), real estate development activities and 
                                                 
72
 As an example, in the US a vibrant subprime mortgage lending sector has evolved which has 
accounted for 9% of total loan origination in 2003 (Federal Reserve Board, 2004) 
73
 Note that Keeton & Morris (1988) calculate an excess loan returns as a proxy for deliberate risk 
taking by banks instead of net interest rate margins. 
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commercial and industrial lending have proven much more risky, particularly in the economic 
crisis of the early 1990s. Loss rates on personal lending are higher (median of 1.21% and 
maximum of 1.86%) but appear more resilient to general economic developments. 
Unfortunately, disclosure of such data is limited to larger banks and not consistently reported 
throughout the observation period.  
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As a simpler alternative, the proportion of assets in the various risk buckets under the Basel 
I capital accord provides a measure of riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio. Specifically, since the 
introduction of these capital adequacy guidelines in 1989, banks disclose their share of 
comparably low risk residential mortgage lending as a percentage of total assets. Sometimes 
these series can be extended further back in time because banks provided information about their 
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mortgage lending before 1989. Accordingly, the proportion of housing loans as a percentage of 
total loans has been extracted for the sample of Australasian banks. Figure 5-21 shows the time 
series of the mean proportion of housing loans for three groups of Australian banks. Historically, 
trading banks had very low portions of mortgage lending for regulatory reasons. Housing finance 
was the turf of building societies (and savings banks in New Zealand) and later also state banks. 
Over time, one can observe a steady convergence of lending portfolio structure as the former 
trading banks have increased their mortgage lending. 















































Root as trading bank
 
 
Another characteristic of the lending portfolio is its diversification and authors like Keeton 
& Morris (1988, footnote 8, p. 10)
74
, Salas & Saurina (2002) and Pain (2003) all include 
                                                 
74
 Morris & Keeton (1988) decompose variations in loan losses into a variance due to differences in 
loan specialization and into variances due to different loss rates for the same type of loans. 
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diversification measures as bank-specific explanatory variables (Herfindahl index of the loan 
portfolio and relative size). If consistent segment lending data are missing (as in the case of 
Australasian banks), researchers have also simply used the size of the bank, typically relative to 
the sector as a whole as a crude measure of diversification. We present this proxy in more detail 
in section 5.4.2.4 below where it is also used it to gauge the level of market power. 
5.4.2.3 Effectiveness of monitoring 
Monitoring of borrowers is a key element of an effective credit policy. Berger & De Young 
(1997) employ Granger-causality techniques to test effects of cost efficiencies on subsequent 
loan losses. They find that measured cost efficiency precedes reductions in problem loans and 
thus conclude that “cost efficiency may be an important indicator of future problem loans and 
problem banks”.  
These results have been taken up by both Pain (2003) and Salas & Saurina (2002) who use 
the cost income ratio
75
 (CIR) as a proxy for bank efficiency as an explanatory variable in their 
loan loss provision models. As shown in Hess & Francis (2007)
76
, CIR as an efficiency measure 
is quite contentious because different business profiles may make it difficult to compare CIRs 
across a group of banks. Even though efficiency studies in banking are generally based on so-
called X-efficiency methods (e.g. data envelopment analysis), CIR remains a widely used 
benchmark among bank practitioners and financial analysts. It is useful as a comparative 
yardstick as long as one compares institutions of similar funding and asset structure. 
The expected sign for the CIR coefficient should be positive (i.e. inefficient banks have 
higher credit losses) but Pain (2003, p. 23) cautions that inefficient banks might be ‘generally 
                                                 
75
 CIR is defined as non-interest expense (essentially operational expense) over total operating 
income consisting of net interest income and other operating income. 
76
 The authors (Figure 3) illustrate with a numerical example that a bank can improve its CIR 
without efficiency gains simply by shifting from a deposit to a wholesale funding structure (ceteris 
paribus). 
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inefficient’ but not necessarily slack in their credit monitoring. Such banks might in fact put too 
many resources into credit quality screening and will thus exhibit below average credit losses. 
Figure 5-22 illustrates that average CIRs for both Australian and New Zealand banks have 
been decreasing steadily over the observation period. A marked decline started in the mid 1990s. 
After the virtual disappearance of the cooperative and state banking sectors in Australasia, this 
trend seems to be driven by more shareholder value oriented corporate policies.  






































5.4.2.4 Market power 
Some research postulates that the structure of the credit market can affect the banks’ loan 
loss experience. Petersen & Rajan (1995) find that significantly more young firms obtain 
external financing in concentrated markets than in competitive markets. They argue that a 
monopolistic creditor shares in the future surplus generated by the firm through the future rents 
he is able to extract. This means he can backload interest payments over time, subsidizing the 
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firm when young or distressed and extracting rents later. Following this line of argument, one 
would expect a positive coefficient, i.e. increased provisions, associated with a bank’s market 
power. 
On the other hand, increased competition may induce banks to take on greater risks to 
offset the squeeze on margins. If this effect is stronger, banks with less market power would 
suffer greater credit losses (negative coefficient). 
There are a number of approaches that have been employed to proxy the market power of 
banks. Salas & Saurina (2002, p. 213), for instance, calculate a branch market share in each 
Spanish province for each year and then derive a weighted average. Pain (2003, p. 29) uses total 
assets as a share of total UK banking sector assets. The approach employed here is similar to 
Pain. The first proxy ratio, the share of total system assets (SH_SYSASALL), uses total 
domestic assets of banks (SYSASALL_AU, SYSASALL_NZ) as reported in Reserve Bank 
statistics (RBA, RBNZ) as the denominator. The system asset series SYSASALL_NZ is not 
complete for New Zealand, however, as it starts in 1988 only
77
. Accordingly, we define a second 
proxy ratio, share of total system loans (SH_LNS), which uses private sector credit (PSC_AU, 
PSC_NZ) as denominator. The PSC series for both Australia are complete or can be 
reconstructed back to 1980. Unlike SH_SYSASALL which uses total assets of the bank as 
numerator, the numerator of the SH_LNS ratio is the bank’s total loans in a particular year. 
The above approach ensures that the market power of the banks is measured against assets 
and loans of all intermediaries in the financial system and not just those institutions included in 
the sample in line with selection criteria. On the other hand, the Reserve Bank statistics just 
report on domestic assets and loans. This implies that the denominator of these proxies will not 
consider overseas activities when gauging systemic importance of a bank. A substantial portion 
                                                 
77
 For Australia, RBA provide total asset series for banks bank back to 1975. Note that these 
figures include just domestic bank assets (RBA Table B02 – Banks Assets). For New Zealand where 
overseas operations of banks have played a comparably minor role, the time series are available from 
1988 onwards only (RBNZ statistic C4 - Balance sheets: M3 institutions) 
  241
of assets and loans of the four major Australian banks have been tied up in overseas ventures, 
most notably their subsidiaries in New Zealand but also in Europe, Asia and North America. 
Unfortunately, the quality of reporting earlier in the observation period does not allow for a 
break-down of domestic vs. overseas assets and loans. This means the numerator of the two 
proxies cannot be adjusted consistently to take into account domestic activities only
78
. Overall, 
the effect of omitting overseas assets when calculating these ratios will still be limited since the 
domestic activities dominate for all banks in the sample and the smaller numerator has the 
decisive impact on the value of the ratio.  
5.4.2.5 Other behavioural aspects 
A final set of possible bank specific variables relate to behavioural factors. The credit 
policy adopted by banks (risk choice) is one, as discussed above. It has a direct bearing on the 
level of subsequent bad debts. There are, however, other behavioural variables which have been 
suggested as determinants for the level of reported loan loss provisions (see chapter 2 literature 
review for an extended discussion of these factors). It is not the main thrust of this thesis to 
explore them in detail but two major ones shall be considered for the model. 
5.4.2.5.1 Income smoothing 
Smoothing reported income by means of discretionary provisions was explored as one of 
the first topics in research on bad debt provisions (starting with Greenawalt & Sinkey Jr., 1988). 
Based on analytical results by Fudenberg & Tirole (1995), one would predict that for banks with 
good (poor) current performance and expected poor (good) future performance, managers will 
save income for (borrow income from) the future by reducing (increasing) current income 
                                                 
78
 Pain (2003) has the benefit of access to confidential raw data of domestic assets and loans 
reported by individual banks to the Bank of England in the 1980s. Such data form the basis for macro-
economic money supply and banking system statistics on an aggregate basis. 
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through loan loss provisions (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003). This hypothesis would 
thus call for positive coefficients of an earnings proxy. We include earnings before taxes and 
loan loss provision over average total assets (EBTP_AS) and over equity respectively 
(EBTP_EQ) as potential explanatory variables
79
. It is likely that EBTP_AS and EBTP_EQ will 
only be suitable for models explaining CLE variables with a discretionary element (e.g. 
provisions expense, stock of general provisions). 
Figure 5-23 and Figure 5-24 show the development of EBTP_AS and EBTP_EQ for both 
Australian and New Zealand banks. One observes a substantial shift in level for New Zealand 
banks (mainly for EBTP_EQ) after the crisis of the early 1990s. It is possible that the 
comparably abrupt financial liberalization in New Zealand starting in 1984 lured many financial 
institutions into higher margin, i.e. more risky, activities until the true extent of bad loans 
became apparent in the subsequent crises. Against this, the time series for Australian banks looks 
uneventful.  
Note that for New Zealand, the EBTP_EQ time series is presented both including and 
excluding Westpac’s NZ division (NZ Westpac) as it reported disproportionate values for some 
years (1995, 1996). Unlike its other overseas-owned peers, NZ Westpac has not been operating 
as a locally incorporated entity during the observation period. Its pro-forma capital was set at 
extremely low levels until it issued a subordinated equity instrument to a subsidiary of its 
Australian parent bank in 1997. 
                                                 
79
 This approach to earnings proxy modelling (using average assets) is widely used in the relevant 
literature, e.g. in Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas (1999) and more recently Kearns (2004). 
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Figure 5-23 Mean annual earnings before provisions & taxes as % of average assets 
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Figure 5-24 Mean annual earnings before provisions & taxes over assets (EBTP_EQ) for 
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5.4.2.5.2 Capital management 
A further important behavioural factor concerns the incentive to manage regulatory capital 
ratios. The stock of general provisions affects regulatory capital because it counts towards 
regulatory capital up to certain limits (since 1989 under Basel I rules). Consequently, there is an 
expectation that institutions with low capital ratios will increase provisions in order to raise 
capital adequacy ratios (negative coefficient on capital proxy). The first researcher to postulate 
such a connection for an earlier US capital ratio regime was Moyer (1990) and seminal work on 
the impact of the Basel capital adequacy rules is from Kim & Kross (1998) and Ahmed, Takeda, 
& Thomas (1999). 
As shown in Figure 5-25 and Figure 5-26, most banks have been clearly exceeding the 8% 
minimum capital ratio since introduction of Basel I. Capitalization of New Zealand banks has 
been stronger on average. One notes extremely high maxima for New Zealand which are the 
ratios for small TSB Bank (mean 15.7% for 1988 to 2005). Other banks with consistently high 
ratios are Bank of Queensland (12.0%), Adelaide Bank (11.5%), Bendigo Bank (11.1%) and St. 
George Bank (11.0%). They can all be characterized as predominantly retail institutions which, 
according to the above hypothesis, would have little incentive to engage in capital management 
through provisioning. Traditional trading banks, on the other hand, exhibit slightly lower average 
ratios but still above 10%. One institution with lower ratios is ASB Bank (mean 9.6% for 1988 to 
2005). 
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5.4.2.6 Description and summary statistics of bank specific series 
Table 5-18 provides an alphabetical list of all bank specific variables used in this thesis 
together with a description, method of calculation and data sources. Table 5-19 shows the 
corresponding summary statistics for these variables. Note that the two tables also include 
auxiliary series like ASSETS_AU and ASSETS_NZ used to derive other proxies.  
Finally, Figure 5-27, Figure 5-28 and Figure 5-29 show the data availability of the bank 




Table 5-18  Acronym, source and details on bank specific series (including auxiliary series) in 
alphabetical order 
Acronym Description, calculation Source  
ASGRW Growth rate assets calculated as % changes in period end assets.  ASSETS_AU, 
ASSETS_NZ 
ASSETS_AU Total period end assets of Australian banks (in AUD) From sample. 
ASSETS_NZ Total period end assets of NZ banks (in NZD) 
Auxiliary series to derive ASGRW and SH_SYSASALL 
From sample 
CIR Cost income ratio defined as non-interest expense as % of total 
operating income (measure of cost efficiency) 
From sample 
DVLNGRW Point deviation of a bank’s loan growth (LNGRW) from system 
loans growth PSCGRW_AU,NZ (see macro series Table 5-15) 
From sample, 
PSCGRW_AU,NZ 
DVSYSALLGRW Point deviation of a bank’s asset growth (ASGRW) from system 




EBTP_AS Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions as % of average 
period assets 
From sample 
EBTP_EQ Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions as % of average 
period equity 
From sample 
HS_LN Housing loans (Basel I definition) as % of total loans From sample 
LNGRW Growth rate loans calculated as % changes in period end net loan 
balance 
From sample 
LOANS_AU Total period end loans reported Australian banks (in AUD) From sample. 
LOANS_NZ Total period end loans reported NZ banks (in NZD) 
Auxiliary series to derive LNGRW and SH_SYSLNS 
From sample 
NIM Net interest margin calculated as interest income (annualized) as 
% of average period assets 
From sample 
SH_SYSASALL The bank's total assets (ASSETS) as % of SYSASALL_AU, NZ  
Measure of systemic importance and asset diversification 
ASSETS_AU,NZ, 
SYSASSALL_AU,NZ 
SH_SYSLNS The bank's total loans as % of PSC_AU, NZ 
Measure of systemic importance and asset diversification 




TOIGRW % increase in total operating income (annualized) from bank 
annual reports. Total operating income is defined as sum of net 
interest income (before credit provisions) and other operating 
income 
From sample 
TR1_RWA Tier I capital as % of risk weighted assets (Basel I definitions) From sample 
TR12_RWA Tier I+II capital as % of risk weighted assets (Basel I definitions) From sample 
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Table 5-19  Summary statistics of bank specific series (including auxiliary series) 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs. Cross sect. 
ASGRW 17.0% 14.1% 180.6% -40.1% 19.1% 3.06 21.91 517 32 
ASSETS_AU 
(AUD mil) 
43,326 9,197 19,588 74 76,298 2.66 10.44 355 22 
ASSETS_NZ 
(NZD mil) 
11,945 6,351 85,301 217 13,853 1.90 7.96 192 10 
CIR 65.0% 65.6% 131.7% 18.0% 12.3% 0.12 5.61 519 31 
DVLNGRW 7.1% 3.3% 147.8% -39.5% 20.7% 2.87 17.20 513 32 
DVSYSALLGRW 4.9% 1.7% 170.7% -50.1% 19.8% 3.33 22.89 456 32 
EBTP_AS 1.7% 1.6% 17.0% -1.5% 1.1% 7.14 88.87 477 32 
EBTP_EQ 30.4% 27.1% 207.9% -14.0% 20.2% 4.62 36.35 475 32 
HS_LN 52.7% 54.1% 96.2% 0.0% 21.9% -0.40 2.65 323 27 
LNGRW 19.0% 15.4% 160.4% -28.3% 20.6% 2.97 17.99 513 32 
LOANS_AU 
(AUD mil) 
28,466 6,893 260,053 36 48,657 2.53 9.33 349 22 
LOANS_NZ 
(NZD mil) 
9,559 4,433 69,139 102 11,612 1.90 7.59 187 10 
NIM 3.34% 3.06% 11.07% 0.51% 1.43% 1.97 9.18 510 31 
SH_SYSASALL 9.9% 4.3% 45.2% 0.1% 10.8% 0.98 2.81 489 32 
SH_SYSLNS 8.0% 3.4% 34.4% 0.0% 8.3% 0.90 2.79 536 32 
TOIGRW 16.5% 12.3% 256.7% -100.2% 25.9% 3.52 28.5 494 31 
TR1_RWA 8.1% 7.7% 16.5% 4.1% 2.2% 1.54 5.74 306 27 
TR12_RWA 10.9% 10.6% 18.4% 5.8% 1.8% 1.22 5.36 325 28 
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Figure 5-27 Percentage of banks reporting bank specific proxies during observation period (Full sample) 
AU+NZ 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ASGRW 92% 86% 69% 79% 86% 80% 92% 93% 96% 93% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 89% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CIR 69% 79% 75% 89% 81% 88% 96% 96% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 95% 95% 94% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DVLNGRW 92% 86% 69% 79% 81% 76% 85% 89% 96% 93% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DVSYSALLGRW 69% 64% 50% 47% 48% 48% 54% 56% 59% 93% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 89% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
EBTP_AS 69% 71% 56% 47% 48% 60% 77% 78% 89% 93% 93% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 95% 95% 94% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
EBTP_EQ 69% 71% 56% 47% 48% 60% 77% 78% 89% 93% 93% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 95% 95% 94% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 94%
HS_LN 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 15% 19% 30% 39% 46% 56% 67% 96% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
LNGRW 92% 86% 69% 79% 81% 76% 85% 89% 96% 93% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NIM 62% 71% 63% 74% 81% 88% 88% 93% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 88% 94% 94%
SH_SYSASALL 77% 79% 63% 58% 62% 60% 62% 63% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SH_SYSLNS 92% 93% 94% 89% 90% 88% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TOIGRW 46% 64% 63% 63% 81% 68% 81% 85% 93% 93% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TR1_RWA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 37% 50% 61% 56% 74% 96% 96% 88% 95% 95% 94% 89% 94% 94% 94% 88% 88% 88%
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Figure 5-28 Percentage of banks reporting bank specific proxies during observation period (Australian sub-sample) 
Australia 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ASGRW 90% 82% 80% 82% 77% 80% 88% 88% 94% 89% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 85% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CIR 70% 73% 80% 82% 69% 87% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 92% 92% 92% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DVLNGRW 90% 82% 80% 82% 77% 80% 88% 88% 94% 89% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DVSYSALLGRW 90% 82% 80% 82% 77% 80% 88% 88% 94% 89% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 85% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
EBTP_AS 70% 73% 70% 64% 54% 73% 75% 76% 94% 94% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 92% 92% 92% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
EBTP_EQ 70% 73% 70% 64% 54% 73% 75% 76% 94% 94% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 92% 92% 92% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 91% 91%
HS_LN 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 25% 29% 41% 50% 61% 76% 82% 94% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
LNGRW 90% 82% 80% 82% 77% 80% 88% 88% 94% 89% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NIM 70% 73% 70% 82% 77% 93% 94% 88% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 91% 91% 91%
SH_SYSASALL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SH_SYSLNS 90% 91% 90% 91% 92% 93% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TOIGRW 40% 64% 70% 73% 69% 67% 81% 82% 88% 89% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TR1_RWA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 53% 61% 78% 71% 82% 100% 100% 88% 100% 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 91% 91% 91%
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Figure 5-29 Percentage of banks reporting bank specific proxies during observation period (New Zealand sub-sample) 
NZLD 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ASGRW 100% 100% 50% 75% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CIR 67% 100% 67% 100% 100% 90% 90% 100% 100% 100% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DVLNGRW 100% 100% 50% 75% 88% 70% 80% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DVSYSALLGRW 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
EBTP_AS 67% 67% 33% 25% 38% 40% 80% 80% 80% 90% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
EBTP_EQ 67% 67% 33% 25% 38% 40% 80% 80% 80% 90% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HS_LN 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 20% 20% 20% 40% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
LNGRW 100% 100% 50% 75% 88% 70% 80% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NIM 33% 67% 50% 63% 88% 80% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 83% 100% 100%
SH_SYSASALL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SH_SYSLNS 100% 100% 100% 88% 88% 80% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TOIGRW 67% 67% 50% 50% 100% 70% 80% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TR1_RWA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 30% 30% 30% 60% 88% 88% 88% 86% 86% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 80% 80%


































5.5 Chapter summary and conclusion 
This chapter firstly introduced the principal model to explore the credit loss dynamics in 
Australasian banking. It represents a reduced form approach to explaining the banks’ credit loss 
experience (CLE) which is in line with the dominant body of literature in this area. This means 
we examine potential drivers of credit losses without modelling the precise mechanism by which 
such an effect is transmitted on CLE. This generic model will be the foundation for evaluating 
various functional forms in the subsequent estimation and results chapter.  
Previous international literature has hardly explored the characteristics of various proxies 
available which can be used to gauge a bank’s CLE. The historical data gathered for the 
Australasian banking system indicates that correlations among some of them are rather weak 
even though they have been employed by earlier research. It is found that CLE ratios using 
balance sheet items like total assets or loans as a reference appear more suitable as CLE proxies. 
They should be preferred over ratios based on income items (such as total operating income) 
because they are less sensitive to the vagaries of the denominator which is comparably large in 
the case of total loans or assets. 
The review of CLE ratios also includes an analysis of loan write-off patterns with 
subsequent recoveries. In theory, impaired asset expense (loan provisioning) should eventually 
be followed by corresponding loan write-offs. Unlike Pain’s UK sample, it is difficult to 
recognize a consistent lag pattern of loan write-offs for banks in Australasia. Due to the benign 
economic climate since the banking crisis of the early 90s, some banks have steadily increased 
their provisioning in line with growing loan portfolios but have not been faced with a 
corresponding need for write-offs. As to recoveries as the last stage in the life cycle of bad debts, 
13.9% of bad debts written off are subsequently recovered but there is again a significant 
variability of this value among banks. Some appear more inclined for quicker write-offs (which 
then leads to higher recoveries) while others delay write-offs until a loss becomes virtually 
certain. Recovery rates also differ for various types of loans which could relate to the differences 
  254
in the predictability of losses in the various segments. A detailed exploration of causes which are 
at the root of such heterogeneity in debt write-off and recovery patterns is beyond the scope of 
this project. Such research could potentially provide interesting insights into behavioural factors 
affecting financial reporting by banking institutions. 
The second part of this chapter presents explanatory variables of credit losses. We split 
them into aggregate macroeconomic or system factors and microeconomic or bank specific 
factors. They are summarized in Table 5-14 on page 222. 
Aggregate factors include real GDP growth rate as the broadest measure of economic 
activity and the unemployment rate as a proxy of systemic imbalances and household economic 
distress. Moreover, the indebtedness of households and firms serves as a proxy for financial 
vulnerability in times of crises. In line with earlier studies, we also propose a number of asset 
price shock proxies including returns in the property and share markets as well as interest rate 
changes.  
Microeconomic or bank specific factors firstly include the effect of past credit expansion 
which could have a positive or negative effect on credit losses. A bank with very fast growth 
might burden itself with unknown credit risk while low growth for some banks might indicate 
operational issues that lead to subsequent increase in credit losses.  
Credit losses will also vary with the risk choice of the banking institution. They might 
engage in deliberate high risk lending which they then compensate with adequate pricing of such 
loans. As in previous research, the net interest margin is used to test for such effects. A further 
choice relates to the composition of the lending portfolio which will have a direct effect on the 
subsequent credit loss experience. Unfortunately, consistent reporting of segment credit exposure 
for Australian banks is missing so we use residential mortgage lending as a proportion of total 
loans as a proxy. Since housing loans are considered lower risk than other types of lending 
(consistent with our data series), they are awarded a 50% risk weight under Basel I capital 
adequacy rules. As a crude measure of portfolio diversification we propose systemic importance 
as a further proxy, calculated as the bank’s assets as % of total system assets. 
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A bank’s cost income ratio is a widely accepted yardstick for a bank’s efficiency by 
practitioners. In line with literature, we employ it test the effect of inefficiencies, especially with 
regard to the monitoring of the loan portfolio, on subsequent losses. 
Another bank specific factor tested is the potential effect of market power where Petersen 
& Rajan (1995) argue that a monopolistic lender will finance younger firms more easily because 
it will be able to extract future rents. This means market power should be associated with higher 
credit losses. We model market power as the percentage share of total system assets for the 
particular bank. This proxy thus has a dual function of gauging both market power and portfolio 
diversification. 
We finally propose to test for the effect of income smoothing and capital management. 
Previous literature has explored such phenomena for provisions, i.e. a CLE ratio with a high 
element of discretion. For the effect of income smoothing, it is argued that a bank’s manager will 
attempt to postpone above average earnings into the following year by setting higher loan loss 
provisions. Conversely, in times of weak results, the bank will be tempted to shore up its 
reported profit by lowering discretionary provisions. In a similar vein, weakly capitalized banks 
will be tempted to show higher general provisions since they count - up to a certain threshold - 




6 Model Estimation and Results 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter conducts the estimation of determinants of credit losses in Australasia in line 
with the methodology of the previous chapter. The principal estimation model defined there (see 
Equation 6-1 below) is generic, encompassing a large number of potential functional forms. 
Equation 6-1 Principal model 











− δβ  
Where  
CLEit Credit loss experience for bank i in period t 
xkit Observations of the potential explanatory variable k for bank i and period t 
uit Random error term with distribution N(0,Σ), 
Σ Variance-covariance matrix of σit error terms 
n Number of banks in sample 
T Years in observation period 
K Number of explanatory variables 
z Maximum lag of the explanatory variables of the model 
q Maximum lag of the dependent variable of the model 
 
There are a number of potential proxies measuring a bank’s credit loss experience (CLE) 
which have been presented in the methodology chapter. The model specification and major 
estimation is conducted for impaired asset expense (IAE_LN) as the dependent variable. Note 
that IAE_LN was chosen as the main proxy because it has sensible all-round properties and it is 
most widely used in the literature.
80
 
                                                 
80
 Examples listed in the literature review of this thesis include Arpa, Giulini, Ittner, & Pauer 
(2001), Pain (2003), Bikker & Hu (2001), Valckx (2004) among many others. 
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Next, a total of 20 macro- and bank specific explanatory variables have been identified as 
potential drivers of a bank’s credit losses. This chapter conducts a primary evaluation and 
selection of regressors based on economic arguments in the spirit of Verbeek (2004). A basic 
model formulation, Equation 6-2 presented on page 273, includes three alternative macro-proxies 
for the state of the economy as regressors as well as a total of 7 other aggregate and bank-
specific explanatory variables. It is estimated as a distributed lag model for the combined 
Australasian data sample over both the full 1980 to 2005 period and shorter 1990 to 2005 sample 
period. The latter period allows for a richer choice of bank-specific control parameters. Likewise, 
Equation 6-2 is estimated for separate Australian and New Zealand country samples. 
The version of this basic form which is found to provide the best explanatory power is 
designated as the ‘preferred model’ (Equation 6-3, page 286) to be used as the basis for some of 
the alternative specifications that test the robustness of the results for Equation 6-2. In particular, 
this model is estimated with alternative CLE variables including the level of provisions 
(PRV_LN), net and gross write-offs (NW_LN, GW_LN) as well as the level of impaired assets 
(IA_A). This should be of considerable interest to other researchers since to our knowledge no 
other study seems to have considered more than two alternative measures of CLE when 
exploring drivers of bank credit losses. The analysis potentially allows for novel insights into the 
characteristics of alternative CLE proxies applicable to a wide range of studies. 
A further estimate of the preferred model analyses the particular effect of past bank 
expansion with the inclusion of long-lagged growth proxies into the model. There is a final 
estimate of the preferred model which is modified by the addition of a country dummy and 
interaction terms. This last analysis more formally examines country specific effects which 
might be present. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section 6.2 reviews regressor selection methods 
and panel estimation techniques employed in this thesis. Section 6.3 then presents the 
considerations for deriving a concrete formulation of the principal model as shown in Equation 
  259
6-1 above. Section 6.4 conducts the model estimates and discussion of results before section 6.5 
concludes and summarizes the findings of the chapter. 
 
6.2 Review of model selection and estimation methods 
6.2.1 Regressor selection methods 
When specifying a model, one has to consider in principle two potential misspecifications 
of the equation. On one hand, one may omit one of more variables which are relevant, i.e. have a 
non-zero coefficient. This can lead to ‘omitted variable bias’ in the OLS estimator. Alternatively, 
one may include too many irrelevant variables. At first glance, this may appear as less of a 
problem since estimates are unbiased and these redundant variables just show as insignificant 
parameters in the model results. However, such unrestricted formulations will usually have a 
higher variance and thus be less efficient. 
Many methods have been proposed for selecting suitable explanatory variables in multiple 
regressions. There are two classical methods typically employed. Forward selection (or simple to 
general approach) starts with the regression constant only and then adds variables. By contrast, 
backward elimination for variable selection (general-to-specific modelling approach) involves 
the sequential deletion of variables by means of various error or information criteria. These are 
however purely data-based methods and it is generally argued (e.g. in Amemiya, 1980; Verbeek, 
2004) that it is good practice to select the set of potentially relevant variables on the basis of 
economic arguments rather than statistical ones, i.e. mechanical reliance on goodness of fit 
should be avoided. Verbeek sees particular dangers of pure data mining with the forward 
selection method. He also warns against including too many initial variables in the backward 
elimination method since this is likely to lead to multicollinearity so that almost none of the 
variables appear significant. 
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In line with the above thoughts, the regressor selection process in this thesis is primarily 
driven by economic considerations. We will select a set of economically sensible base 
formulations of which the model with the best explanatory power is designated as the ‘preferred 
form’. Explanatory power is assessed based on the adjusted R-square measure and information 
criteria. In particular, we consider the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) which take into account the trade-off between (1) the 
better fit of the model with many variables and (2) the model's complexity. Models with lower 
AIC and BIC are preferred (Akaike, 1974; Schwarz, 1978; Verbeek, 2004).  
6.2.2 Form of regression model 
The generic form of the principal model (Equation 6-1) allows for a variety of model 
forms. It is firstly open with regard to the number of lagged terms of a particular explanatory 
variable included in the model. In the spirit of regressor selection discussed above, we consider 
lags which, based on economic arguments, would sensibly have an impact on a bank’s credit loss 
experience. 
Secondly, the principal model allows for lags of the dependent CLE variable as 
explanatory variables. This autoregressive modelling approach has been used by a number of 
researchers (Pain, 2003, p. 31 (as an alternative to his main approach); Quagliariello, 2004, p. 18; 
Salas & Saurina, 2002, p. 214). It can be motivated as in Kim & Santomero (1993) as a 
consequence of Bayesian models used by banks when forecasting loan losses. Such models 
update projected loan losses as a function of new information obtained from the new audit and 
the historical variance of loan loss rates over the bank's previous history.  
For the modelling in this thesis, no lagged terms of the dependent CLE variable have been 
included. Instead we capture dynamic effects by use of a distributed-lag (DL) model with current 
and lagged values of the explanatory variables as regressors. One can interpret this as replacing 
the lagged CLE variable by its own explanatory terms. 
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The choice of a DL model is also motivated econometric considerations. Wilson & Butler 
(2007), who review appropriate panel estimation techniques, note that no particular statistical 
complications arise in adding lagged values of the independent variables as opposed to adding 
lagged dependent variables (as long as the explanatory values are uncorrelated with the error 
term). Should these errors be auto correlated or heteroskedastic, they can be dealt with as they 
would be in the static model. On the other hand, including lagged terms of the dependent 
variable on the right hand side of the equation violates the exogeneity assumption for regressors 




6.2.3 Panel estimation techniques 
Panel data are repeated observations on the same set of cross-section units, collected over a 
number of periods. Because one is repeatedly observing the same units, it is usually no longer 
appropriate to assume independence of observations. By using estimation methods for panel 
data, it is possible to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity. 
6.2.3.1 Fixed and random effects 
Models can be estimated with both fixed and random cross-sectional effects:  
 
itiititit XConstY εδβ +++=   
where Yit is the dependent variable for cross-section i at time t, Xit is a vector of regressors, 
εit are the error terms for cross-sectional units observed for dated periods, Const is the overall 
constant in the model and δi  represent cross-section specific effects (random or fixed). More 
generally, one could also include period effects in an analogous way. However, for this 
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 The method generally used is the generalised method of the moments (GMM) estimator inspired 
by Arellano & Bond (1991) to tackle dynamic panels. 
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investigation period effects have not been considered since in this case all regressors would have 
to vary across individual banks, e.g. no common GDP growth parameter for all Australian banks 
would be possible (Osbat, 2004, p. 8b). 
The fixed effects portion of specifications is handled using orthogonal projections. In the 
simple one-way fixed effect specification, these projections involve the approach of removing 
cross-section specific means from the dependent variable and exogenous regressors, and then 
performing the specified regression on the demeaned data (Baltagi, 2001; Quantitative Micro 
Software, 2005, p. 863). More generally, the estimation software employed in this project 
(Eviews) applies the results from Davis (2002) for estimating multi-way error components 
models with unbalanced data. Eviews also provides tools to test for redundant coefficients and 
fixed effects (Wald test, Quantitative Micro Software, 2005, p. 926). 
As an alternative to the bank-specific fixed effects model, estimates can be conducted with 
a country specific dummy variable (AU_DMY), set to one for Australian banks and zero for 
New Zealand banks. This design allows testing of country specific slopes of explanatory 
variables through addition of interaction terms in addition to a pure country-specific intercept. In 
the thesis this estimation method is applied for a formal test of potential country effects which 
might be present.  
The random effects specification, finally, assumes that the corresponding effects are 
realizations of independent random variables with mean zero and finite variance. Most 
importantly, the random effects specification assumes that the effect δi is uncorrelated with the 
idiosyncratic residual εit (Quantitative Micro Software, 2005, p. 859-871). 
6.2.3.2 White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors 
White (2007) has derived a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator 
which provides correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form, all provided that no serial correlation is present. All error 
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estimates use this adjustment instead of the standard OLS formula (see Quantitative Micro 
Software, 2005, p. 471-473). 
 
6.3 Model formulation 
This section presents the process for deriving a concrete formulation of the principal model 
shown as Equation 6-1 in the introduction to this chapter. Firstly, subsection 6.3.1 explains and 
justifies the choice of impaired asset expense (IAE_LN) as the major dependent CLE variable 
over a range of alternatives. Other CLE proxies are, however, employed for alternative model 
estimates as robustness checks later in this chapter. Subsection 6.3.2 then presents the selection 
of regressors.  
6.3.1 Choice of dependent CLE variable 
6.3.1.1 Impaired asset expense as primary CLE variable 
The methodology chapter introduced and analyzed numerous potential proxies to measure 
a bank’s credit loss experience (CLE). In this chapter, estimates are conducted for impaired asset 
expense as % of loans (IAE_LN) as the primary CLE variable. There are three reasons for this 
choice. 
Firstly, IAE_LN is the most commonly used proxy of a bank’s CLE in the literature.
82
  The 
choice of IAE_LN will thus facilitate comparisons with previous studies. 
Secondly, the methodology chapter presented an extended analysis of characteristics of 
CLE proxy variables. None of the proxies was found to have perfect properties, but IAE_LN 
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 Because of differing accounting notations, this proxy is, however, named in a number of 
different ways such as “new charge of total loan-loss provisions” in Pain (2003, p. 37), “risk provisions” 
in Arpa et al. (2001, p. 95) or simply “loan loss provisions” in Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Yang (2005). 
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appeared to have the fewest deficiencies. For one, the pure stock of provisions (STK_PRV), or 
its changes between years, can be distorted (i.e. reduced) by write-offs of earlier year provisions 
while impaired asset expense will pick up loan-write-offs immediately following a default event. 
Similarly, the delayed nature of write-offs is the main reason why write-off based proxies 
(NW_LN, GW_LN) have limitations even though they more accurately reflect true ex-post credit 
losses. In fact, the methodology chapter showed that IAE_LN appears to overstate actual credit 
losses as only 75% of the impaired asset expense is written down in the following 4 years. 
Impaired assets based measures (e.g. IA_A), as for instance used by Salas & Saurina (2002), lack 
information about the severity of the impairment. The level of impairment for non-performing 
loans backed by residential mortgages, for example may not be comparable to impaired personal 
lending without tangible collateral. 
Thirdly, the IAE_LN time series provides the maximum number of observations over the 
1980 to 2005 period. It was one of the earliest data items related to credit losses reported by 
banks in Australasia. As shown in Table 6-1, there are 488 observations for 32 banks in the 
sample and only the static stock of provisions (PRV_LN) has a higher number of observations 
(511). This means IAE_LN provides a good coverage over the whole sample period, in particular 
covering the times of soaring credit losses in the late 80s and early 90s and the immediately 
preceding years. 
6.3.1.2 Alternative CLE variables 
With IAE_LN as the main dependent variable, this thesis nevertheless estimates models 
using alternative CLE variables. The purpose is to conduct robustness checks by gauging 
differences in the results created by the choice of the CLE variable. To our knowledge, no other 
study has looked at more than two alternative measures of CLE when exploring drivers of bank 
credit losses. This analysis provides novel insights into the characteristics of these proxies 
beyond the pure Australasian focus of this research. 
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One CLE variable used by some researchers is the stock of provisions. Recent examples 
include Bikker & Metzemakers (2003) and Kearns (2004) who both introduce levels of loan loss 
provisions (which they call “loan loss reserves”) as an alternative to impaired asset expense. One 
can motivate this choice by the intuition that ongoing loan loss provisions (impaired asset 
expense) reflect discretionary managerial decisions at a point in time. Loan loss reserves, on the 
other hand, reflect the year-on-year accumulated net provisioning that ought to primarily reflect 
expected loan losses (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2003, p. 7). They argue that investors, regulators, 
management and auditors would see these loan loss reserves as important information regarding 
the credit portfolio’s quality. 
A third CLE variable explored in this thesis is the level of gross impaired assets (IA_A). 
Researchers who have employed it include Keeton (1999) who looks at determinants of the 
‘share of delinquent loans’ and more recently Salas & Saurina (2002) who study the ‘ratio of 
problem loans’. More importantly, it is also used by APRA researchers Esho & Liaw (2002, 
Table 3, p. 26) when they study the level of impaired assets of 16 Australian banks from 1991 to 
2001 as part of an investigation into the appropriate level of risk weights for housing loans. The 
availability of this CLE variable is, however, severely restricted in the first decade of the 1980 to 
2005 observation period. This means that only models with data from 1990 onwards can be 
estimated with IA_A. 
A final CLE variable considered are net write-offs as % of loans. No other research 
appears to have used this variable as a dependent variable in a model explaining credit losses. 
Even though NW_LN will be closer to actual credit losses, it is a delayed measure relative to the 
time of the credit event (as mentioned above). One would expect longer lags of explanatory 
variables to be significant in comparison to estimates (of the same model) using impaired asset 
expense (IAE_LN) as a dependent variable. 
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Table 6-1 Observations and cross sections of selected CLE proxies over 1980-2005 period 
CLE proxy Description Observations Cross sections 
(banks) 
IAE_LN Imp. Asset exp as % of loans 488 32 
IAE_NI Impaired asset expense as % net interest income 478 31 
IAE_GI Impaired asset expense as % gross interest income 471 31 
NW_LN Net debt write-offs as % of loans 475 32 
GW_LN Gross debt write-offs as % of loans 359 26 
RC_LN Recoveries as % of loans 355 26 
PRV_LN Provisions total as % of loans 511 32 
GE_LN General provisions total as % of loans 462 30 
SP_LN Specific provisions total as % of loans 437 30 
IA_A Impaired assets as % total assets 314 28 
PD_A Past due loans as % total assets 244 25 
GEE_LN General provision expense as % of loans 306 25 
SPE_LN Specific provision expense as % of loans 329 26 
Note: CLE variables in bold are used in the model estimates. Due to limited availability, IA_A and GW_LN are 
used for shorter period (1990 to 2005) estimates only. RC_LN, as the last stage in the life-cycle of a credit loss 
provision, is also used for model estimates (1990 to 2005 period only) to explore potential loss recovery patterns. 
 
6.3.2 Selecting regressors 
The methodology chapter listed a total of 20 macro- and bank specific explanatory 
variables which have been identified as potential drivers of a bank’s credit losses. The selection 
of regressors will, in essence, follow the practice advocated by Verbeek (2004) with potentially 
relevant variables selected based on economic arguments. As shown in Table 6-2 
(macroeconomic variables) and Table 6-3 (bank specific variables), they can in turn be grouped 
into economically relevant functional sub-groups in which proxies can be expected to measure 
similar effects.  
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Table 6-2 Grouping of drivers of a bank’s CLE into functional groups: macro variables 
Functional group Regressor Acronym Expected sign
State of the economy 
(cycles, structural) 
Real GDP growth GDPGRW -ve 
Unemployment rate (level, change) UNEMP, ∆UNEMP +ve 
    
Vulnerability to economy Liabilities of households and firms as 
% of disposable income 
LIAB_INC +ve 
    
Asset price shock proxies Effects of asset prices / interest rates   
 Return on leading share indices RET_SHINDX -ve 
 Housing price index (changes) HPGRW -ve 





Other % change in consumer price index CPIGRW +ve/-ve 
6.3.2.1 Selection of macro variables 
The macro variables GDPGRW and UNEMP in Table 6-2 measure the state of the 
economy, both cyclically (mainly GDPGRW and changes in UNEMP) and possibly structurally 
(level of UNEMP). At least one of these proxies has to be a cornerstone of any macro-prudential 
model formulation considered here. 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the level of indebtedness of private households 
(LIAB_INC) has steadily increased since 1990 while asset quality in the Australasian banking 
has improved at the same time. At first glance, this is counter-intuitive, implying that higher 
levels of debts in the economy reduce credit losses in the financial system. Rather, we interpret 
this result as an example of an endogeneity in which buoyant economic conditions both increase 
lending and decrease impaired asset expense. Moreover, it can be argued that a rise in household 
debt represents a rational response to the deregulation of the financial system, which allows 
consumers to smooth their consumption more efficiently over their life cycle (Australia 
Treasury, 2005, p. 54). These structural changes would then allow for higher level of borrowings 
without necessarily increasing credit risks. All in all, these complications do not make it 
advisable to include LIAB_INC as an exogenous driver of credit losses. Future research could 
look at models considering the endogeneities and structural factors affecting this variable. 
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Omitting this parameter from the final analysis has a precedence in Pain (2003, p. 29), who finds 
the variable not generally significant and thus drops it from the final regression specification. 
There are a number of asset shock parameters among the macro proxies of which 
RET_SHINDX and HPGRW provide the most direct and immediate measure. They are the two 
primary candidates for inclusion into the preferred model. 
The transmission effect of changes in interest rates on asset quality is more complex as 
financial institutions both pay and earn interest. One could expect non-linear effects as sudden 
increases will impact borrowers and thus loan defaults more than gradual and/or expected 
increases. Nominal interest rates are approximately a linear combination of real interest rates 
(NOMINT) and the percentage rate of CPI inflation (CPIGRW). The Fisher hypothesis (Fisher, 
1930) generally associates an increase in CPI with an equivalent point increase in NOMINT
83
. It 
thus seems sensible to drop the point change in nominal interest rates (NOMINTGRW) as a 
variable in such regressions, replacing it with REALINTGRW and CPIGRW. 
CPIGRW may have ambiguous effects on a bank’s CLE since a rise in CPIGRW raises 
nominal interest rates, placing greater strains on debt servicing, while increasing asset values 
(but not liability values) so improving solvency of borrowers. 
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 See Fahmy & Kandil (2003) for further references of research into the Fisher effect. 
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Table 6-3 Grouping of drivers of a bank’s CLE into functional groups: bank specific 
variables 
Functional group Regressor Acronym Expected sign
Past credit expansion proxies Growth rate bank assets ASGRW +ve / (-ve) 
 Growth rate bank loans LNGRW +ve / (-ve) 
 Growth rate bank total income TOIGRW +ve / (-ve) 
 Point deviation of a bank’s loan growth 
(LNGRW) from system loans growth 
DVLNGRW +ve / (-ve) 
 Point deviation of a bank’s asset 
growth (ASGRW) from system asset 
growth 
DVSYSALLGRW +ve / (-ve) 
    
Risk characteristics Pricing of risks as measured by net 
interest margins 
NIM +ve/(-ve) 
 Housing loans (Basel I definition) as % 
of total loans 
HS_LN -ve 
    
Systemic importance / market 
power / diversification 
Share of system assets SH_SYSASALL +ve/-ve 
 Share of system loans SH_SYSLNS +ve/-ve 
    
Other variables Cost efficiency: Cost-income ratio 
(level) 
CIR +ve/(-ve) 
 Income smoothing: 
Earnings before taxes and provisions as 






    
 Capital management / risk choice 
Tier I/II capital as % of risk weighted 




6.3.2.2 Selection of bank-specific variables 
The first functional group of bank specific variables in Table 6-3 are proxies measuring 
past credit expansion (ASGRW, LNGRW, TOIGRW, DVLNGRW, DVSYSALLGRW
84
). It 
does not appear likely that these proxies would measure substantially different effects and not 
more than one should be included as a candidate for the preferred formulation.  
                                                 
84
 The series for DVSYSALLGRW, defined as the point deviation of a bank’s asset growth 
(ASGRW) from system asset growth, is incomplete for New Zealand and thus needs to be omitted from 
further consideration. 
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The categorization into functional groups for the remaining bank specific variables is 
somewhat less clear-cut. Most of them gauge a variety of characteristics or effects.  
NIM, HS_LN, SH_SYSASALL, SH_SYSLNS, TR1_RWA and TR12_RWA are all 
variables which give an indication of the institution’s risk characteristic. SH_SYSLNS is 
preferred over SH_SYSASALL as data on total system credit are available for both Australia and 
New Zealand over the full 1980 to 2005 period.
85
 A formulation over a shorter period should 
consider alternatives like HS_LN (available from 1990). Likewise, TR1_RWA and TR12_RWA, 
available after 1990, gauge the risk-adjusted capitalization of the bank. 
Other bank-specific variables such as the earning proxies EBTP_AS and EBTP_EQ as well 
as cost efficiency CIR may also be considered as regressors. Earnings smoothing activities by 
means of discretionary provisions have been documented in a variety of studies (see chapter 5). 
High CIR may reflect inefficiencies that are symptomatic of poor bank management (in turn 
possibly poor risk management). Alternatively, a bank with a high CIR may devote substantial 
resources to monitoring and managing risks, so reducing CLEs. Thus the sign on CIR is 
indeterminate. 
 
6.4 Estimates and discussion of results 
This section firstly presents estimation results for a set of base models (Equation 6-2 in 
section 6.4.1) formulated in line with the considerations of the previous section. The base model 
with the best explanatory power is then designated as the ‘preferred’ model, Equation 6-3, and 
employed in alternative formulations as robustness checks. Specifically, Equation 6-3 is 
estimated with alternative CLE proxies as dependent variables in section 6.4.2 and with 
additional bank growth proxies added in section 6.4.3. Section 6.4.4, finally, conducts a more 
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 Note that that the total amount of banking system assets is available for New Zealand from 1986 
onwards only. 
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formal test of country effects through the addition of a country dummy and interaction terms 
(formulation of Equation 6-4).  
As an overview, Table 6-4 below lists all the models and results tables shown in this 
section. 
 
Table 6-4  Overview of models estimated 
Acronym Results table Description Estimation methods 
Eq6_2_1980_2005 Table 6-5, p. 275 Base formulation (Equation 6-2) 
Combined data sample 1980 to 2005 
White, cross-section 
fixed and random 
effects 
Eq6_2_1980_2005
Australia / NZ 
Table 6-6, p. 276 Base formulation (Equation 6-2) 
1980 to 2005 with separate estimation for 
Australian and New Zealand banks 
White, cross-section 
fixed effects 
Eq6_2_1990_2005 Table 6-7, p. 277 Base formulation (Equation 6-2) 
Combined data sample 1990 to 2005 
White, cross-section 




Table 6-8, p. 287 Preferred model (Equation 6-3) 
Combined data sample 1980 to 2005 for  





Table 6-9, p. 288 Preferred model (Equation 6-3) 
Combined data sample 1990 to 2005 for  
CLE variables (IAE_LN, PRV_LN, IA_A, 
NW_LN, GW_LN, RC_LN) 
White, cross-section 
fixed effects 
Eq6_3_Growth Table 6-10, p. 293 Preferred model (Equation 6-3) 
with additional lagged bank-specific growth 
variables (ASGRW, TOIGRW, DVLNGRW) 
Combined data sample for 1980 to 2005 and 
1990 to 2005. 
White, cross-section 
fixed effects 
Eq6_4_1980_2005 Table 6-11, p. 299 Preferred model with country-specific 
interaction terms (Equation 6-4) 
Combined data sample 1980 to 2005 




6.4.1 Estimates of basic model form 
6.4.1.1 Description of basic model form 
The first set of estimates is conducted with the basic formulation of Equation 6-2 which 
explains impaired asset expense as % of loans (IAE_LN) as a function of three alternative sets of 
macro variables proxying the state of the economy: GDPGRW, change in UNEMP (∆UNEMP) 
and level of UNEMP. Each set includes the contemporaneous and two lagged (annual) values to 
capture dynamic effects of these explanatory variables. There are two asset shock variables 
(RET_SHINDX, HPGRW) which are considered in this model. The impact of interest rate 
moves (REALINTGRW) is omitted from the basic model because (1) this proxy lacked 
explanatory power on a stand-alone basis (results not shown but available on request) and (2) it 
correlates quite strongly with the above economic state variables as shown in the appendix to this 
chapter in Table 6-12 for Australia and Table 6-13 for New Zealand. CPIGRW, on the other 
hand, is included as a macro explanatory variable. 
As to bank-specific variables, the basic form includes the earnings proxy EBTP_AS with 
up to two lags
86
, the size proxy SH_SYLNS (no lags
87
), the net interest margin (NIM) and the 
efficiency measure CIR (2 lags each). Bank growth parameters (e.g. ASGRW) were not included 
in the model because the effects of expanding the loan portfolio are likely more delayed than the 
other parameters. This implies that one would need to test their impact for possibly up to four 
lags, which, in turn, leads to a loss of more than 10% of pooled observations because of the 
many shorter bank data series in the sample. The effect of past credit expansion will be tested 
later in this chapter as a separate investigation. 
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 EBTP_AS was chosen over EBTP_EQ. It provides a more stable measure and does not rely on at 
times erratic equity values reported by some of the subsidiary banks (e.g. Westpac shown in Figure 5-24) 
87
 No lags have been included for the relative size proxy SH_SYSLNS because dynamic aspects of 
growth are better captured with asset growth proxies. 
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Some important bank-specific variables have been consistently reported only after 1990. 
These include information on the composition of the lending portfolio such as the share of 
housing loans (HS_LN) and measures related to the Basel I risk ratios such as TR1_RWA. 
Accordingly, these two control variables have been added in Equation 6-2 for estimates of the 
more recent 1990 to 2005 observation period.  
The appendix to this chapter shows the contemporaneous correlations amongst all the 
bank-specific variables in Table 6-14. Moreover, Table 6-15 presents the contemporaneous and 
1-year lagged correlations of the two major macro variables (GDPGRW, ∆UNEMP) with these 
bank-specific variables.  






















































































CLEi,t is the major CLE variable IAE_LN (impaired asset expense as % of loans) for bank i at 
time t and the explanatory variables on the right hand side of the equation are as explained in 
Table 6-2 and Table 6-3. 
Alternative 
macro factors 







proxies for 1990 
to 2005 period 
Error term 
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6.4.1.2 Estimation results for basic model form 
The following three tables present the estimation results for the basic formulation of 
Equation 6-2. Table 6-5 firstly estimates the model for the combined Australasian sample over 
the full 1980 to 2005 sample period. There are estimates using each of the alternative economic 
state variables (GDPGRW, ∆UNEMP, UNEMP) and each set is estimated with both fixed and 
random effects models. Table 6-6 repeats these estimates separately for the group of Australian, 
respectively New Zealand, banks (fixed effects model estimation only). Table 6-7, finally, 
conducts the same estimates as in Table 6-5 but for the shorter 1990 to 2005 period. It includes 
two additional bank-specific control variables (HS_LN and TR1_RWA) as discussed above. 
The discussion of results in the following sections is structured as follows. Section 6.4.1.3 
first reviews the results for the macro factors and section 6.4.1.4 the results for bank-specific 




Table 6-5 Estimation results for alternative forms of basic model Equation 6-2 for combined 



































Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group
Constant -0.0222 ** -3.24 -0.0225 ** -3.40 -0.0276 ** -4.35 -0.0200 ** -3.39 -0.0212 ** -4.19 -0.0263 ** -4.76
GDPGRW -0.0178 -0.41     -0.0138 -0.33     
GDPGRW(-1) -0.0447 -1.28     -0.0400 -1.25     
GDPGRW(-2) -0.0202 -0.57     -0.0070 -0.20     
UNEMP-UNEMP(-1)   0.0711 0.78     0.0921 1.07   
UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2)   0.1373 * 2.36     0.1465 ** 2.86   
UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3)   0.0920 * 2.05     0.0885 * 1.99   
UNEMP     0.0394 0.37     0.0572 0.52
UNEMP(-1)     0.1891 1.44     0.1616 1.34
UNEMP(-2)     -0.1192 * -2.07     -0.1320 * -2.39
RET_SHINDX -0.0121 * -2.19 -0.0147 * -2.32 -0.0142 * -2.21 -0.0116 * -2.11 -0.0124 -1.88 -0.0127 -1.93
RET_SHINDX(-1) -0.0012 -0.35 0.0009 0.21 0.0013 0.31 -0.0005 -0.15 0.0025 0.64 0.0022 0.54
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0037 0.61 0.0088 1.27 0.0047 0.74 0.0035 0.61 0.0086 1.36 0.0044 0.73
HPGRW -0.0128 -1.32 -0.0170 -1.76 -0.0147 -1.50 -0.0127 -1.44 -0.0152 -1.71 -0.0124 -1.24
HPGRW(-1) -0.0027 -0.41 -0.0017 -0.22 0.0018 0.20 -0.0030 -0.47 0.0018 0.26 0.0049 0.56
HPGRW(-2) -0.0033 -0.50 -0.0013 -0.20 0.0060 0.81 -0.0016 -0.26 0.0024 0.39 0.0090 1.36
CPIGRW -0.0317 -0.86 -0.0028 -0.07 -0.0270 -0.61 -0.0373 -0.96 -0.0067 -0.17 -0.0344 -0.72
CPIGRW(-1) 0.0514 0.80 0.0417 0.78 0.0712 1.23 0.0517 0.84 0.0429 0.82 0.0673 1.20
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0550 * 2.40 0.0361 1.63 0.0461 * 2.01 0.0531 * 2.27 0.0213 1.16 0.0245 1.35
EBTP_AS 1.1170 ** 12.29 1.0935 ** 12.18 1.1258 ** 12.78 1.0921 ** 12.42 1.0748 ** 12.16 1.0982 ** 12.88
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.1560 -1.60 -0.1565 -1.61 -0.1476 -1.57 -0.1701 -1.91 -0.1706 -1.89 -0.1653 -1.90
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.1293 -1.62 -0.1416 -1.73 -0.1284 -1.59 -0.1472 -1.76 -0.1547 -1.88 -0.1527 -1.87
SH_SYSLNS 0.0369 1.85 0.0395 * 2.06 0.0416 * 2.15 0.0083 0.66 0.0046 0.54 0.0053 0.62
NIM -0.2351 * -2.31 -0.2059 * -2.01 -0.2872 ** -2.94 -0.2411 * -2.20 -0.2238 -1.89 -0.2758 * -2.50
NIM(-1) 0.0656 0.56 0.0218 0.18 0.0583 0.49 0.0759 0.66 0.0316 0.26 0.0649 0.54
NIM(-2) -0.1734 -1.84 -0.1616 -1.71 -0.1769 -1.91 -0.1847 * -2.31 -0.1674 * -2.18 -0.1680 * -2.18
CIR 0.0580 ** 4.55 0.0573 ** 4.58 0.0536 ** 4.13 0.0601 ** 4.60 0.0613 ** 4.64 0.0582 ** 4.47
CIR(-1) -0.0058 -0.49 -0.0075 -0.64 -0.0086 -0.72 -0.0049 -0.40 -0.0070 -0.57 -0.0068 -0.57
CIR(-2) -0.0154 -1.64 -0.0155 -1.65 -0.0173 -1.90 -0.0165 * -2.05 -0.0153 -1.87 -0.0164 * -2.07
HS_LN             
TR1_RWA             
Estimation code
Cross-sections included 29 29 29 29 29 29
Observations 401 396 401 401 396 401
Adjusted R^2 0.714 0.729 0.720 0.698 0.713 0.705
F-Statistics 20.929 ** 22.298 ** 21.523 ** 42.924 ** 45.552 ** 44.459 **
Schwarz criterion -6.163 -6.201 -6.184 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike info criterion -6.671 -6.714 -6.692 0.000 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.923 2.032 1.950 1.800 1.803 1.751
Full sample 1980 - 2005, all banks
Estimated with cross-section fixed effects Estimated with cross-section random effects
 
Notes:  
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Variables as defined in Table 6-1 (dependent variable), Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 (explanatory variables) 
All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors (d.f. corrected). 
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Table 6-6 Estimation results for alternative forms of basic model Equation 6-2 for Australian 
and New Zealand banks sample, full 1980 – 2005 sample period 
Eq6_2_1980_2005


































Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group
Constant -0.0182 * -2.15 -0.0193 * -2.46 -0.0334 ** -3.98 -0.0251 ** -3.55 -0.0257 ** -3.70 -0.0270 ** -3.97
GDPGRW -0.1527 ** -2.63     0.0750 1.01     
GDPGRW(-1) -0.0726 -1.54     -0.0440 -1.08     
GDPGRW(-2) -0.0239 -0.58     -0.0676 -1.26     
UNEMP-UNEMP(-1)   0.2384 ** 2.96     -0.2289 -1.26   
UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2)   0.1840 * 2.37     0.0822 0.80   
UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3)   0.2208 ** 4.04     0.1052 1.27   
UNEMP     0.2582 ** 3.02     -0.2099 -1.18
UNEMP(-1)     0.0529 0.51     0.3452 1.88
UNEMP(-2)     -0.1025 -1.48     -0.0387 -0.29
RET_SHINDX -0.0085 -1.65 -0.0203 ** -3.91 -0.0097 -1.74 -0.0192 -1.72 -0.0196 -1.81 -0.0201 -1.80
RET_SHINDX(-1) 0.0109 * 2.04 0.0142 ** 2.77 0.0084 1.50 -0.0072 -1.39 -0.0050 -0.95 -0.0043 -0.81
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0117 1.59 0.0275 ** 3.87 0.0063 0.90 -0.0007 -0.11 -0.0002 -0.03 -0.0027 -0.42
HPGRW -0.0155 -1.52 -0.0392 ** -4.29 -0.0125 -1.33 -0.0086 -0.66 -0.0041 -0.31 -0.0101 -0.71
HPGRW(-1) 0.0141 1.75 0.0085 1.00 0.0233 * 2.05 0.0055 0.41 0.0035 0.29 0.0037 0.29
HPGRW(-2) 0.0077 1.04 0.0016 0.20 0.0143 1.55 0.0036 0.30 -0.0036 -0.27 0.0016 0.12
CPIGRW -0.1154 ** -2.64 -0.0570 -1.79 -0.0655 -1.90 -0.0113 -0.17 -0.0770 -0.75 -0.0753 -0.72
CPIGRW(-1) 0.0669 1.13 0.1320 ** 2.87 0.0862 * 2.07 0.0762 0.92 0.1111 1.22 0.1318 1.24
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0080 0.22 -0.0572 -1.89 -0.0171 -0.58 0.0380 0.97 0.0840 1.22 0.0940 1.24
EBTP_AS 1.0692 ** 7.17 1.0449 ** 7.37 1.0963 ** 7.54 1.1441 ** 8.12 1.1471 ** 8.26 1.1619 ** 8.38
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.3934 ** -2.76 -0.3863 ** -2.85 -0.3685 ** -2.61 -0.1351 -1.38 -0.1264 -1.30 -0.1300 -1.36
EBTP_AS(-2) 0.0539 0.51 0.0488 0.49 0.0364 0.34 -0.2187 * -2.30 -0.2032 * -2.22 -0.2035 * -2.26
SH_SYSLNS 0.0067 0.29 0.0293 1.83 0.0223 0.96 0.0486 1.40 0.0494 1.45 0.0517 1.46
NIM -0.1774 -1.14 -0.1726 -1.16 -0.2250 -1.57 -0.2335 -0.81 -0.3126 -1.19 -0.3457 -1.40
NIM(-1) 0.1016 0.53 0.0499 0.25 0.0916 0.43 -0.0126 -0.08 0.0411 0.27 0.0513 0.37
NIM(-2) -0.1822 -1.14 -0.1883 -1.19 -0.2488 -1.47 -0.0596 -0.56 -0.0931 -0.82 -0.1011 -0.89
CIR 0.0681 ** 4.70 0.0646 ** 4.84 0.0616 ** 4.37 0.0684 ** 4.65 0.0656 ** 4.62 0.0610 ** 3.23
CIR(-1) -0.0048 -0.41 -0.0091 -0.82 -0.0093 -0.81 -0.0337 -1.35 -0.0295 -1.32 -0.0329 -1.41
CIR(-2) -0.0181 -1.65 -0.0191 * -1.99 -0.0214 * -2.18 -0.0081 -0.47 -0.0095 -0.57 -0.0114 -0.70
Estimation code
Cross-sections included 20 20 20 9 9 9
Observations 271 267 271 130 129 130
Adjusted R^2 0.648 0.691 0.658 0.790 0.794 0.792
F-Statistics 13.129 ** 15.522 ** 13.694 ** 17.130 ** 17.488 ** 17.354 **
Schwarz criterion -6.198 -6.307 -6.228 -5.761 -5.773 -5.772
Akaike info criterion -6.757 -6.872 -6.786 -6.445 -6.460 -6.456
Durbin-Watson stat 1.856 2.120 1.946 2.106 2.085 2.092
Australian banks 1980 - 2005 New Zealand banks 1980 - 2005
Estimated with cross-section fixed effects
 
Notes: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Variables as defined in Table 6-1 (dependent variable), Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 (explanatory variables) 
All equations estimated with cross-section fixed effects. All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors 
(d.f. corrected). 
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Table 6-7 Estimation results for alternative forms of basic model Equation 6-2 for combined 



































Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group
Constant 0.0034 0.27 0.0032 0.26 0.0033 0.27 -0.0146 ** -2.71 -0.0156 * -2.37 -0.0191 ** -3.22
GDPGRW -0.0495 -1.13     -0.0313 -0.56     
GDPGRW(-1) -0.0342 -0.71     -0.0197 -0.41     
GDPGRW(-2) -0.0353 -1.17     -0.0243 -0.76     
UNEMP-UNEMP(-1)   0.0185 0.30     0.0589 0.91   
UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2)   0.1124 1.62     0.1231 1.69   
UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3)   0.1380 * 2.40     0.1382 * 2.33   
UNEMP     0.1476 1.39     0.0943 1.13
UNEMP(-1)     0.1477 1.43     0.1754 1.76
UNEMP(-2)     -0.1078 -1.39     -0.1903 * -2.42
RET_SHINDX -0.0010 -0.12 -0.0004 -0.06 -0.0023 -0.34 -0.0026 -0.37 -0.0030 -0.54 -0.0051 -0.83
RET_SHINDX(-1) 0.0007 0.10 0.0044 0.90 0.0038 0.75 0.0013 0.18 0.0049 0.93 0.0030 0.57
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0078 1.39 0.0112 1.86 0.0065 0.97 0.0084 * 2.10 0.0093 * 2.07 0.0050 0.80
HPGRW -0.0031 -0.37 -0.0125 * -2.02 -0.0104 -1.72 -0.0056 -0.53 -0.0124 -1.90 -0.0084 -1.30
HPGRW(-1) -0.0149 -1.50 -0.0131 -1.55 -0.0061 -0.54 -0.0222 * -2.34 -0.0121 -1.60 -0.0106 -0.92
HPGRW(-2) -0.0124 -1.56 -0.0113 -1.45 -0.0017 -0.20 -0.0066 -0.97 -0.0051 -0.74 0.0040 0.48
CPIGRW 0.0482 1.08 0.0518 1.05 0.0677 1.38 0.0560 1.50 0.0470 1.03 0.0712 1.61
CPIGRW(-1) -0.0024 -0.05 0.0728 1.84 0.0334 0.96 -0.0087 -0.15 0.0686 1.66 0.0147 0.40
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0923 1.69 0.0557 1.33 0.0526 1.18 0.1413 ** 3.18 0.0475 1.46 0.0428 1.07
EBTP_AS 0.9517 ** 5.23 0.9515 ** 5.25 0.9275 ** 5.39 1.1519 ** 9.70 1.1541 ** 9.27 1.1537 ** 9.81
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.3785 ** -3.35 -0.3803 ** -3.33 -0.3774 ** -3.45 -0.4100 ** -4.02 -0.4095 ** -3.95 -0.4148 ** -4.08
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.0269 -0.24 -0.0182 -0.15 -0.0396 -0.34 0.1327 1.54 0.1148 1.21 0.1231 1.43
SH_SYSLNS 0.0361 * 2.47 0.0292 * 2.12 0.0332 * 2.22 -0.0068 -1.32 -0.0014 -0.19 -0.0065 -1.29
NIM -0.3225 ** -3.04 -0.3370 ** -3.00 -0.4157 ** -3.52 -0.4170 ** -3.80 -0.4168 ** -3.96 -0.3902 ** -3.29
NIM(-1) -0.0028 -0.02 -0.0102 -0.08 -0.0479 -0.38 0.1023 0.79 0.0591 0.48 0.0798 0.64
NIM(-2) 0.1048 0.90 0.0724 0.64 0.0343 0.30 -0.0669 -0.70 -0.0467 -0.47 -0.0923 -1.02
CIR 0.0437 ** 5.47 0.0428 ** 5.42 0.0360 ** 4.46 0.0611 ** 5.70 0.0611 ** 5.84 0.0608 ** 5.61
CIR(-1) -0.0115 -1.22 -0.0140 -1.44 -0.0178 -1.81 -0.0160 -1.66 -0.0164 -1.67 -0.0173 -1.80
CIR(-2) -0.0109 -1.23 -0.0120 -1.38 -0.0170 -1.96 -0.0126 -1.44 -0.0103 -1.17 -0.0150 -1.75
HS_LN -0.0160 * -2.29 -0.0155 * -2.29 -0.0138 * -2.08 -0.0031 -1.23 -0.0048 -1.49 -0.0028 -1.09
TR1_RWA -0.0801 * -2.39 -0.0761 * -2.25 -0.0854 * -2.57 -0.0248 -1.27 -0.0293 -1.13 -0.0191 -0.98
Estimation code
Cross-sections included 26 26 26 26 26 26
Observations 266 266 266 266 266 266
Adjusted R^2 0.794 0.802 0.803 0.747 0.744 0.756
F-Statistics 21.878 ** 22.919 ** 23.078 ** 33.554 ** 33.097 ** 35.279 **
Schwarz criterion -6.618 -6.657 -6.663 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Akaike info criterion -7.292 -7.331 -7.337 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Durbin-Watson stat 2.115 2.171 2.205 1.684 1.887 1.707
Short sample 1990 - 2005, all banks
Estimated with cross-section fixed effects Estimated with cross-section random effects
 
Notes:  
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Variables as defined in Table 6-1 (dependent variable), Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 (explanatory variables) 
All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors (d.f. corrected). 
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6.4.1.3 Discussion of results: macro factors 
As shown in Table 6-5, GDP growth and both the change and level of the unemployment 
rate have the expected effects on a bank’s annual loan loss provisions with the coefficients 
showing the expected signs for lag zero and one. The result is virtually the same as found by 
Kearns (2004, p. 118) for a smaller and shorter sample of Irish banks. He writes: “the level of 
provisioning increases contemporaneously with the unemployment rate but not with the current 
rate of GDP growth. GDP growth affects the level of provisioning with a lag of one year; the 
unemployment rate is the most significant macroeconomic factor affecting the rate of 
provisioning”. 
Other research generally finds similar qualitative results (e.g. signs of coefficients) but the 
concrete sensitivities of impaired asset expense to GDP growth and changes to unemployment 
often remain unreported (e.g. in Kearns, 2004 cited above). In this thesis they turn out to be an 
(annualised) decline in IAE_LN in the range of 5-6% per percentage point increase in the past 
two year cumulative GDP growth rate, respectively a 21-24% rise for each point increase in the 
unemployment rate (cumulative increase over a two year period
88
). It is generally difficult to 
compare these sensitivities to results of other studies due to differences in model design (e.g. 
alternative dependent CLE variables and different variable transformations). The sensitivities in 
Australasia seem nonetheless lower with regard to GDP growth compared with the international 
studies of Bikker & Hu (2001, Table 3, p. 12) for banks from 29 countries from 1979-1999 and 
Valckx (2004, Table 1, p. 7) with data drawn from OECD bank profitability statistics for all 15 
EU countries from 1979 to 2001. 
As to country-specific differences between Australia and New Zealand, Australia’s 
estimation results are in line with the findings above but show greater sensitivities to GDP 
growth (see Table 6-6, columns 1 to 3). Conversely, for the New Zealand sample, the effects of 
                                                 
88
 The % sensitivity ranges are determined as the sum of the contemporaneous and one-year lagged 
coefficients for GDPGRW, respectively ∆UNEMP, for each the fixed and random effects models. 
  279
GDPGRW, ∆UNEMP and UNEMP seem less pronounced and more delayed as none of the 
contemporaneous proxies shows the expected sign of the coefficient or any significance (see 
Table 6-6, columns 4 to 6). 
The return on the national share indices ASX, respectively NZX, is one of the asset shock 
proxies included in the basic model form of Equation 6-2. Its contemporaneous term is found 
significant for the overall sample. It is slightly less significant for the sub-samples of Australian 
banks and New Zealand banks but shows the expected negative sign. 
HPGRW, the other asset shock proxy, appears to have a comparably lower explanatory 
power as none of the coefficients shows significant t-statistics. This result makes intuitive sense 
as the major banking crisis in Australasia around 1990 was not triggered by asset shocks 
emanating from the housing market but rather by asset quality problems in the corporate and 
commercial property sector.  
The base formulation of Equation 6-2 also considers the growth of CPI (CPIGRW) as a 
proxy. Interestingly, the results in Table 6-5 show coefficients without consistent signs or 
significance for the contemporaneous and one year lagged term of CPIGRW. There is thus no 
indication of short-term beneficial effects of inflation on bank credit losses. On the contrary, a 
significant adverse long-term impact on a bank’s CLE emerges as the two-year lagged CPIGRW 
shows a positive sign and is generally significant. Despite potential short-term improvements of 
credit quality due to inflation, our results are consistent with the research which postulates costs 
of inflation in the long-run (e.g. Lucas, 2000). 
6.4.1.4 Discussion of results: bank specific factors 
Estimates in Table 6-5 show consistently positive relationships between the level of 
provisioning (IAE_LN) and the banks’ pre-provision earnings (EBTP_AS), confirming previous 
results for other markets supportive of an income smoothing pattern (e.g. Arpa, Giulini, Ittner, & 
Pauer, 2001, p. 107 for Austria; Bikker & Hu, 2001 for 26 OECD countries; Bikker & 
Metzemakers, 2003 for US, EU; Cavallo & Majnoni, 2001 for G10 countries; Greenawalt & 
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Sinkey Jr., 1988 for US; Kearns, 2004 for Ireland). Lagged terms of EBTP_AS show negative 
and often significant coefficients which support the theory that necessary provisions are 
postponed into the following year if earnings are low in that particular time period. 
While these results are roughly consistent across the Australian and New Zealand sub-
samples, Australian institutions seem to postpone required provisions for shorter periods (the 
first lag of EBTP_AS is significant in Table 6-6, columns1-3) while New Zealand banks seem to 
smooth over longer cycles (the second lag is significant in Table 6-6, columns 4-6). One could 
hypothesize that Australian banks, which are mostly exchange listed, have less discretion in 
smoothing income as opposed to their (mostly) non-listed New Zealand counterparts. This 
question could warrant further investigation. 
The size proxy, SH_SYSLNS, defined as the share of a bank’s system loans, gauges both 
risk diversification and market power of banks. It is consistently positive for all estimates, 
indicating higher levels of provisioning for larger banks. The coefficient values are significant at 
5% for the fixed effect ∆UNEMP and UNEMP equations shown in Table 6-5, columns 2 and 3. 
We see this result as a reflection of structural heterogeneity of the sample as smaller banks are 
predominantly housing lenders with comparably lower levels of provisioning requirements. 
However, we cannot rule out the market power hypothesis which postulates that monopolistic 
market structure promotes lending by larger banks to young firms which then leads to higher 
credit losses (Petersen & Rajan, 1995).  
The positive coefficient indicates that size does not appear to be a suitable proxy for risk 
diversification (and thus lower overall provisions) as smaller banks, though not diversified, have 
gravitated towards lower risk activities. Overall it is important to include this variable in the 
model as it helps control for institution specific characteristics. Note that a size proxy has also 
been used by Pain (2003, Table 7, p. 28) who finds no significance for contemporaneous but 
some positive significance for one year lagged size for a more homogenous and smaller balanced 
sample of seven UK commercial banks. 
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The coefficients for the net interest margin (NIM) in Table 6-5 generally turn out negative 
and mostly significant for the contemporaneous and twice-lagged term. Few researchers have 
included net interest margin proxies into their formulations. Pain (2003) finds consistently 
positive and in some regressions
89
 significant coefficients for the lagged level of net interest 
margins. This reflects the timing between the pricing of past loans and subsequently realized 
credit losses. 
The interpretation of our results is somewhat more ambiguous. Negative coefficients for 
lagged terms could in principle be attributed to behavioural incentives which induce low margin 
banks to seek greater risks (as argued by Pain, 2003, p. 24). This would, however, not explain the 
negative coefficients of the contemporaneous terms. An intuitive explanation may be of a 
structural nature as larger banks tend to exhibit lower interest rate margins as indicated by a 
negative and significant correlation of -22% between size (SH_SYSLNS) and NIM (see Table 
6-14 in the chapter appendix). Larger banks derive a higher portion of their profit through off-
balance sheet business while smaller players rely more on their lending income. 
Other researchers have also been faced with conflicting results for the NIM coefficients. 
Salas & Saurina (2002, Table 2, p. 218) report positive but insignificant values for lagged NIM 
terms of Spanish commercial banks but a significant negative value for the sub-sample of 
savings banks. Given such inconclusive results, the effect of net interest margins will require 
further exploration. 
Highly significant contemporaneous coefficients of the cost-income ratio proxies (CIR) 
and generally negative coefficients for lagged terms indicate that high and increasing cost-
income ratios (lower operational efficiencies) are associated with higher levels of impaired 
assets. The results, which are consistent across the overall (Table 6-5) and country sub-samples 
(Table 6-6), lend support to the hypothesis that operational problems at banks (high CIR) go 
                                                 
89
 For a sub-sample of 5 UK mortgage banks Pain (2003, Table 8, p. 30) finds high significance for 
one-year lagged NIM. 
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hand in hand with poor credit risk management and thus higher loan losses. Conversely, they 
appear to reject the alternative theory which postulates that extensive costly monitoring (high 
CIR) leads to better asset quality (i.e. negative coefficient for CIR). 
Our results for CIR support Berger & De Young (1997) who found ‘cost efficiencies to 
precede reductions in problem loans’. The results are also generally in line with Salas & Saurina 
(2002, Table 2, p. 218) who find positive, but not always significant coefficients. Mixed results 
were, however, reported by Pain (2003, Table 7 & 8, p. 28,30) with positive coefficients for UK 
commercial banks but negative and significant coefficients for mortgage banks. 
The significance found here makes it imperative to use the CIR as a control parameter even 
though the cost-income ratio, which is widely used by practitioners, is contentious as an 
efficiency measure. For one, it is not a relative efficiency measure as illustrated in the earlier 
Figure 5-22 (chapter 5) which shows CIR declining for both Australian and New Zealand banks 
brought about by factors such as technical innovation and revisions of business models. The 
short-comings of this measure are, for example, reviewed in Hess & Francis (2007, Figures 1 and 
3), who conclude that, among other things, this ratio is affected by the characteristics of the 
bank’s operation and high CIR banks might easily achieve similar returns for their shareholders 
as they more efficiently use their balance sheets (higher capital efficiency). One could look into 
replacing CIR by alternative measures of bank efficiencies like the ones used in frontier 
efficiency analysis (X-efficiency) derived through parametric and non-parametric techniques.
90
  
6.4.1.5 Discussion of results: model over shorter 1990-2005 sample period 
The results found in Table 6-7 for the shorter 1990 to 2005 sample period are broadly 
consistent with the results discussed in the previous two sections. This section discusses the few 
                                                 
90
 Berger & Humphrey (1997) review the wide literature which has applied such techniques for 
bank efficiency studies. For Australia, Avkiran (2000) uses Malmquist productivity indices to explore 
productivity of the four major and six regional Australian banks over a 1986 to 1995 period. 
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differences observed and reviews the results for the additional explanatory variables added to the 
shorter period model. 
The sensitivity of credit losses to the two-year cumulative changes in the unemployment 
rate (∆UNEMPt+ ∆UNEMPt-1) appears slightly lower (range of 13-18%) but the model based on 
∆UNEMP still appears to be the one with the best explanatory power based on coefficient t-
statistics and information criteria. 
Of the asset shock proxies, RET_SHINDX loses its significance and even the expected 
negative coefficient for the lagged terms. On the other hand, developments in the property sector 
(HPGRW) have more significant effects on loan losses in the banking sector. Moreover, 
coefficients of HPGRW are consistently negative for this sample period. One could argue that 
the effect of the 1987 share crash could have affected the results for the overall sample period. A 
smooth share market may thus have a weaker effect on credit losses in the banking system. 
The regressions of Table 6-7 include two additional explanatory variables (HS_LN, 
TR1_RWA) which only became available with the introduction of the Basel I capital accord. As 
can be seen in Table 6-14 in the chapter appendix, there is a positive and statistically significant 
positive correlation of 42% between these two parameters which indicates comparably higher 
capitalization for banks lending predominantly to the housing sector.
91
 
The results show that lower risk banks as measured by healthier (higher) Tier I capital 
ratios (TW1_RWA) report significantly lower loan loss provisions as shown in the fixed effects 
model column 1 to 3. Note that one finds equally negative coefficients when running these 
regressions with the overall capital ratio including both Tier I and II capital (TW12_RWA, 
results not reported). For perspective, annual impaired asset expense increases by about 8% for 
each percentage point decrease in the Tier I capital adequacy ratio.  
                                                 
91
 Basel I capital adequacy rules grant 50% risk weights to housing portfolios which tends to lift 
capital adequacy ratios. 
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A potential interpretation for the negative sign of the capital ratio is provided by the capital 
management hypothesis. General provisions have counted towards Basel I minimum capital and 
weaker banks might thus have been tempted to engage in capital management through 
provisioning. Our results would thus confirm some of the effects found by Kim & Kross (1998) 
and Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas (1999) in studying the impact of the Basel capital adequacy 
rules. 
It seems, however, doubtful whether Basel I rules contribute materially to the patterns 
found in Australasia. Most banks have been consistently far above the minimum levels of capital 
required (as shown in Figure 5-25 and Figure 5-26 in chapter 5) and would hence have limited 
incentive to supplement their capital via provisions. Moreover, research into the determinants of 
bank capital ratios such as Alfon, Argimon & Bascuñana-Ambrós (2004) for the UK identifies a 
myriad of factors which affect capital holding of banks. Alfon et al. (2004, p.12) for example 
report an inverse relationship between bank size and capital which can also be found in this 
sample of Australasian banks. This inverse relationship becomes apparent in Table 6-14 which 
shows a significant correlation coefficient of minus 39% between TR1_RWA and SH_SYLNS, 
the size proxy of banks in the sample. 
The negative and significant coefficient for HS_LN (share of housing loans in portfolio) is 
very intuitive since these loans generally require lower provisions. One notes that smaller 
institutions have a preponderance of home lending as can again be seen in Table 6-14 
(correlation HS_LN with SH_SYSLN is minus 31%). 
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6.4.2 Estimates for alternative CLE variables 
Section 6.3.1.2 introduced a number of alternative CLE variables, some of which have 
been used by earlier research. In this section, we estimate one version of the base formulation of 
Equation 6-2 with these alternative dependent variables. The model version is selected based on 
the best explanatory power found for the regressions with the impaired assets expense proxy 
(IAE_LN) in the previous section. It is designated as the ‘preferred model’ 
6.4.2.1 Selection of a preferred model form 
Based on the estimation results for the base formulation of Equation 6-2, we select the 
preferred model form of Equation 6-3. These results reveal that the change in unemployment 
(∆UNEMP) appears to have the best explanatory power among the three major state of the 
economy proxies. As shown in Table 6-5, its coefficients are more significant and the model 
shows a better fit with higher adjusted r-squared values. Likewise, the information criteria 
(Schwarz, Akaike) for equations estimated with ∆UNEMP are lower.  
Even though we have concluded that ∆UNEMP is the preferred regressor for the state of 
the economy, the explanatory power of GDPGRW and particularly the level of unemployment 
(UNEMP) are of almost equivalent quality. This is illustrated by the fact that, when the same 
equations as shown in Table 6-5 are estimated for the shorter 1990 to 2005 observation period in 
Table 6-7, one finds that UNEMP has slightly better explanatory power. 
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CLEi,t is one of the dependent CLE variables IAE_LN, PRV_LN, IA_A, NW_LN, GW_LN, 
RC_LN for bank i at time t as explained in Table 6-1. Explanatory variables as defined in Table 
6-2 and Table 6-3. 
 
6.4.2.2 Estimation results for alternative CLE dependent variables 
The following tables present the results of estimating the preferred form of Equation 6-3. 
Table 6-8 estimates the model for impaired assets expense (IAE_LN), stock of provisions 
(PRV_LN) and net write-offs (NW_LN) with observations of the whole 1980 to 2005 period. 
Further potential dependent variables were reported consistently only later so Table 6-9 estimates 
the preferred model for the shorter 1990 to 2005 period with the level of impaired assets 
(IA_AS) and gross-write-offs (GW_LN) in addition to the above dependent variables. Moreover, 
Table 6-9 (column 6) estimates Equation 6-3 with loss recoveries (RC_LN) as dependent 





proxies for 1990 
to 2005 only 
Error term 
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Table 6-8 Estimation results for alternative CLE variables (Equation 6-3, 1980-2005) 
Eq6_3_1980_2005 
















Independent IAE_LN PRV_LN NW_LN
Sample Group
Constant -0.0225 ** -3.40 -0.0409 ** -3.13 -0.0384 ** -2.81
UNEMP-UNEMP(-1) 0.0711 0.78 0.1148 0.96 0.0578 0.79
UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2) 0.1373 * 2.36 0.0658 0.67 0.0424 0.56
UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3) 0.0920 * 2.05 0.1968 ** 2.77 0.1582 ** 2.96
RET_SHINDX -0.0147 * -2.32 -0.0128 * -2.09 -0.0049 -1.19
RET_SHINDX(-1) 0.0009 0.21 -0.0133 -1.91 -0.0013 -0.36
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0088 1.27 0.0002 0.02 -0.0010 -0.21
HPGRW -0.0170 -1.76 -0.0085 -0.91 -0.0028 -0.46
HPGRW(-1) -0.0017 -0.22 0.0049 0.42 -0.0096 -1.50
HPGRW(-2) -0.0013 -0.20 -0.0160 -1.55 0.0066 0.59
CPIGRW -0.0028 -0.07 -0.0122 -0.27 0.0227 0.95
CPIGRW(-1) 0.0417 0.78 0.0166 0.36 -0.0392 -1.47
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0361 1.63 0.0045 0.10 -0.0239 -1.06
EBTP_AS 1.0935 ** 12.18 0.7598 ** 4.45 0.3208 1.54
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.1565 -1.61 0.3594 ** 3.42 0.1678 * 2.10
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.1416 -1.73 0.1402 1.18 0.4088 * 2.22
SH_SYSLNS 0.0395 * 2.06 0.0708 * 2.15 0.0070 0.50
NIM -0.2059 * -2.01 0.0000 0.00 -0.1866 -1.17
NIM(-1) 0.0218 0.18 -0.1898 -1.18 -0.0072 -0.05
NIM(-2) -0.1616 -1.71 -0.1707 -1.38 -0.1919 -1.31
CIR 0.0573 ** 4.58 0.0514 ** 2.62 0.0480 1.68
CIR(-1) -0.0075 -0.64 0.0237 1.32 0.0353 1.29
CIR(-2) -0.0155 -1.65 -0.0081 -0.79 -0.0153 -1.34
HS_LN       
TR1_RWA       
Estimation code
Cross-sections included 29 29 29
Observations 396 396 391
Adjusted R^2 0.729 0.698 0.478
F-Statistics 22.298 ** 19.282 ** 8.155 **
Schwarz criterion -6.201 -5.589 -6.010
Akaike info criterion -6.714 -6.102 -6.527
Durbin-Watson stat 2.032 0.879 1.449
Estimated with cross-section fixed effects
Full sample 1980 - 2005, all banks
 
Notes: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Variables as defined in Table 6-1 (dependent variables), Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 (explanatory variables) 
All equations estimated with cross-section fixed effects. All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors 
(d.f. corrected) 
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Table 6-9 Estimation results for alternative CLE variables (Equation 6-3, 1990-2005) 
Eq6_3_1990_2005 


































Independent IAE_LN PRV_LN NW_LN IA_A GW_LN RC_LN
Sample Group
Constant 0.0032 0.26 -0.0426 -1.52 -0.0088 -0.49 -0.0504 -1.55 -0.0171 -0.85 -0.0013 -1.78
UNEMP-UNEMP(-1) 0.0185 0.30 -0.1417 -0.72 -0.0844 -0.93 -0.1785 -0.79 -0.0960 -0.90 -0.0105 -1.89
UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2) 0.1124 1.62 0.0457 0.22 0.0675 0.65 0.1578 0.72 0.0343 0.27 -0.0124 * -2.28
UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3) 0.1380 * 2.40 0.2857 1.76 0.1697 * 1.99 0.6258 ** 3.75 0.2073 1.96 0.0098 * 2.45
RET_SHINDX -0.0004 -0.06 -0.0071 -0.70 0.0138 1.89 0.0151 1.17 0.0196 * 2.13 -0.0001 -0.18
RET_SHINDX(-1) 0.0044 0.90 -0.0112 -1.04 -0.0064 -1.12 -0.0081 -0.58 -0.0097 -1.39 0.0003 0.64
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0112 1.86 -0.0095 -0.67 0.0049 0.87 0.0134 0.86 0.0031 0.44 0.0001 0.22
HPGRW -0.0125 * -2.02 -0.0070 -0.40 -0.0035 -0.44 -0.0293 -1.50 -0.0013 -0.14 -0.0004 -0.60
HPGRW(-1) -0.0131 -1.55 -0.0182 -0.80 -0.0231 * -2.27 -0.0327 -1.23 -0.0295 * -2.55 -0.0006 -1.00
HPGRW(-2) -0.0113 -1.45 -0.0225 -1.52 -0.0127 -1.43 -0.0404 * -2.37 -0.0176 -1.60 -0.0009 -1.94
CPIGRW 0.0518 1.05 0.0659 0.71 0.1468 ** 3.00 0.1785 1.74 0.1751 ** 3.11 -0.0032 -1.07
CPIGRW(-1) 0.0728 1.84 0.1477 1.14 -0.0094 -0.16 0.2819 1.94 -0.0134 -0.20 0.0067 1.59
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0557 1.33 -0.0271 -0.31 0.0479 1.08 0.0491 0.45 0.0830 1.60 0.0002 0.06
EBTP_AS 0.9515 ** 5.25 0.8146 ** 4.02 -0.1101 -0.45 1.0347 ** 4.38 -0.0815 -0.32 0.0079 1.61
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.3803 ** -3.33 0.4506 ** 3.18 0.1886 1.20 0.6280 ** 3.36 0.1761 1.01 0.0041 0.90
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.0182 -0.15 -0.0239 -0.11 0.4530 ** 2.97 -0.8510 ** -2.92 0.4338 ** 2.61 -0.0049 -0.67
SH_SYSLNS 0.0292 * 2.12 0.1397 ** 2.98 0.0029 0.16 0.1756 ** 3.67 0.0025 0.13 0.0021 * 2.50
NIM -0.3370 ** -3.00 -0.2037 -1.14 0.2672 1.91 0.0035 0.01 0.3249 * 2.45 0.0225 ** 2.65
NIM(-1) -0.0102 -0.08 -0.4178 * -2.37 -0.2264 -1.56 -0.7908 * -2.54 -0.2723 -1.62 -0.0069 -0.70
NIM(-2) 0.0724 0.64 0.1228 0.73 -0.4283 ** -3.66 0.3857 1.46 -0.4645 ** -3.61 -0.0178 * -2.16
CIR 0.0428 ** 5.42 0.0777 ** 4.28 0.0035 0.35 0.1102 ** 4.41 0.0054 0.51 0.0008 1.30
CIR(-1) -0.0140 -1.44 0.0139 1.13 0.0618 ** 3.51 0.0392 * 2.19 0.0683 ** 3.99 0.0010 * 2.29
CIR(-2) -0.0120 -1.38 0.0062 0.32 -0.0255 -1.68 -0.0356 -1.49 -0.0252 -1.49 0.0008 1.50
HS_LN -0.0155 * -2.29 -0.0332 ** -4.25 -0.0129 -1.76 -0.0459 ** -3.81 -0.0127 -1.63 -0.0004 -1.23
TR1_RWA -0.0761 * -2.25 -0.0624 -1.50 -0.0312 -0.96 -0.0657 -1.05 0.0058 0.15 0.0022 1.01
Estimation code
Cross-sections included 26 26 26 25 21 21
Observations 266 266 266 251 224 223
Adjusted R^2 0.802 0.744 0.825 0.835 0.844 0.715
F-Statistics 22.919 ** 16.723 ** 26.433 ** 27.301 ** 28.512 ** 13.667 **
Schwarz criterion -6.657 -5.853 -6.556 -5.395 -6.494 -12.546
Akaike info criterion -7.331 -6.527 -7.229 -6.083 -7.179 -13.233
Durbin-Watson stat 2.171 0.555 1.724 0.878 1.773 1.218
Short sample 1990 - 2005, all banks
Estimated with cross-section fixed effects
 
Notes: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Variables as defined in Table 6-1 (dependent variables), Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 (explanatory variables) 




6.4.2.2.1 Stock of provisions or level of impaired assets as dependent variables 
The stock of provisions (PRV_LN) represents the accumulation of annual net provisions 
over the previous years. This means, unlike impaired asset expense as a point in time estimate of 
new net provisions, PRV_LN is a ‘memory’ measure of all asset quality problems of the current 
and past years which have not yet been resolved through write-offs. This characteristic can be 
detected in the comparatively higher significance of longer lag terms of explanatory variables in 
Table 6-8. Contemporaneous and one-year lagged changes in unemployment, for instance, have 
little significance for current levels of provisions which are driven by changes in unemployment 
in the more distant past (column 2 of Table 6-8). Similar observations can be made for the effect 
of share price and housing market performance, pre-provision earnings (EBTP_AS) and to some 
extent also for the other bank-specific explanatory variables. 
Impaired assets represent the gross book value of these assets composed of the specific 
provisions made plus the assets’ net realizable value.
92
 Accordingly, Table 5-6 in chapter 5 
illustrated that the ratio of impaired assets to total assets (IA_A) correlates more strongly with 
specific provisions (SP_LN) than with overall provisions (PRV_LN). At the same time, this 
definition reveals the major weakness of IA_A because the extent of impairment will vary 
between loan types and possibly other factors. This issue is highlighted in Figure 6-1 which 
shows the ‘provision content’ of impaired assets for Australian and New Zealand banks through 
time.
93
 In this figure, the specific provisions as % of gross impaired assets range from below 
25% to above 45%. These are annual average values across the Australian, respectively New 
Zealand, banks. It does not reveal the even greater variance across single institutions. 
                                                 
92
 This definition is generally used but some banks (e.g. St. George Bank) do not seem to report all 
assets as impaired for which specific provisions were shown.  
93
 Even though specific provisions as % of impaired assets were comparably low earlier in the 
period, this is probably due to the fact that banks seem to have used a more extensive definition of 
impaired asset than later, when purely assets with specific provisions are reported as impaired. 
  290
The regression results for IA_A shown in column 4 of Table 6-9 thus reveal great 
similarity with those for the stock of provisions. One again notices a memory effect because 
impaired assets may be the consequence of events in earlier periods. 
An alternative proxy would be first differences in IA_A which would address the high 
positive serial correlations present in the pooled equations of this level variable (as indicated by 
the value of the DW statistics below 1). However, this approach would suffer from uncertainties 
as to factors which determine the removal of impaired assets from the balance sheet. The same 
considerations apply to PRV_LN. Serial correlation is also present there but first differences are 
affected by the erratic nature of write-offs which reduce the level of provisions without actual 
improvement in credit quality.  
In summary, the IAE_LN proxy appears to have superior properties capturing the CLE of a 
bank compared to the level proxies PRV_LN and IA_A. 
Figure 6-1 Specific provision component of gross impaired assets for Australian and New 








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Australian banks
New Zealand Banks
Specific provisions as % of gross impaired assets
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6.4.2.2.2 Net and gross write-offs (NW_LN, GW_LN) as dependent variables 
This section discusses the results of equations estimated for the write-off proxies NW_LN 
and GW_LN (column 3 in Table 6-8, columns 3 and 5 in Table 6-9). 
In theory, GW_LN appears superior for measuring write-offs compared to net write-offs 
(NW_LN) which is affected by recoveries of debts written off in earlier years. In practice, 
however, results for the two variables reviewed below are almost identical, given that recoveries 
represent a relatively small amount. 
Chapter 5 identified the typical lag patterns of write-offs following provisioning for bad 
debt. It was found that approximately 75% of annual provision expense is written off over the 
subsequent four years. The delayed nature of write-offs shows up in the estimation results of 
Table 6-8 and Table 6-9. Just as for the level of provisions, longer lags of explanatory variables 
become more significant relative to the IAE_LN regressions. This can best be seen for the sets of 
coefficients for ∆UNEMP and EBTP_AS.  
6.4.2.2.3 Recoveries of previous year bad debts (RC_LN) as dependent variable 
For completeness, column 6 of Table 6-9 also shows the model estimated for debt 
recoveries (RC_LN). Recoveries are the last stage in the life cycle of a bad debt provision and, 
whatever effect is found for IAE_LN, should thus appear with even more distant lags. All 
expected signs should be reversed as recoveries can be seen as negative write-offs. Given that the 
preferred model contains explanatory variables with a maximum lag of two, it is not surprising 
that relatively few coefficients in this regression turn out significant. 
The interesting result relates to the observation that recoveries in good (bad) times seem to 
be higher (lower) which is also observed for recovery rates on defaulted bonds. This can be seen 
by negative coefficients for the contemporaneous and one year lagged coefficients of ∆UNEMP 
in column 6 of Table 6-9 (one-year lagged coefficient significant at 5% level). This phenomenon 
can likewise be detected if one employs GDPGRW as the main macro state variable in which 
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case the contemporaneous coefficient becomes positive (results not shown but available on 
request). 
Time varying characteristics of bond recoveries with some evidence of lower recoveries 
during recession have been documented by Altman & Kishore (1996, Table 1, p. 58) but Allen & 
Saunders (1999, p. 17-21), who review the literature on cyclical effects affecting the severity of 
credit losses, note a general lack of research in this area.
94
 Accordingly, further analysis of 
recovery rates of banks through the cycles could deepen the understanding of this important issue 
for credit risk modelling. 
 
6.4.3 Assessing the effect of a bank’s past expansion 
This section explores the effect of a bank’s past credit expansion on subsequent credit 
losses. Intuitively, rapid growth of bank lending is associated with lower monitoring efforts or 
with a decision to relax credit criteria which is then followed by a deterioration of the quality of 
loan portfolios.  
We conduct our estimates with the preferred formulation of Equation 6-3 to which we add 
contemporaneous and lagged terms of a bank growth proxy. We pick ASGRW, TOIGRW and 
DVLNGRW of the five bank growth proxies shown in the earlier Table 6-3. ASGRW provides 
an absolute balance sheet growth measure while TOIGRW gives an indication of net interest and 
non-interest income growth. DVLNGRW is chosen as a relative growth proxy. Lags of up to 
four years of these proxies are added to Equation 6-3. The long lags are chosen because the 
implications of imprudent lending in times of strong expansion might not become apparent for 
some time. Impaired asset expense (IAE_LN) is again the dependent variable. 
                                                 
94
 They conclude that “it is unclear whether generally observed higher loss given default (LGD) 
during a recession are only a bad realization on a fixed loss distribution or represent an actual shift in ex 
ante LGD”. 
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Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group
Constant -0.0256 ** -3.71 -0.0266 ** -3.77 -0.0244 ** -3.66 0.0034 0.27 0.0028 0.22 0.0061 0.48
UNEMP-UNEMP(-1) -0.0376 -0.43 -0.0342 -0.37 -0.0139 -0.16 -0.0230 -0.33 0.0778 1.09 0.0174 0.21
UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2) 0.2442 ** 3.76 0.1512 * 2.17 0.2565 ** 3.87 0.1348 1.93 0.1557 1.90 0.1474 1.79
UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3) 0.0519 1.04 0.1132 1.90 0.0734 1.37 0.0962 1.63 0.1070 1.78 0.1263 1.86
RET_SHINDX -0.0144 * -2.34 -0.0126 * -2.10 -0.0147 * -2.17 -0.0008 -0.14 -0.0032 -0.60 -0.0007 -0.10
RET_SHINDX(-1) -0.0017 -0.33 0.0008 0.13 -0.0021 -0.36 0.0065 1.24 0.0029 0.68 0.0062 1.19
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0085 1.23 0.0086 1.07 0.0110 1.48 0.0117 1.82 0.0054 1.09 0.0129 1.69
HPGRW -0.0190 -1.86 -0.0211 -1.88 -0.0198 -1.76 -0.0126 -1.95 -0.0224 ** -3.45 -0.0155 * -2.06
HPGRW(-1) -0.0045 -0.61 -0.0101 -1.35 -0.0043 -0.61 -0.0131 -1.38 -0.0049 -0.63 -0.0112 -1.07
HPGRW(-2) 0.0056 0.79 0.0035 0.52 0.0069 0.98 -0.0090 -1.21 -0.0048 -0.69 -0.0085 -1.09
CPIGRW 0.0005 0.01 -0.0345 -0.60 -0.0029 -0.06 0.0395 0.75 0.0031 0.08 0.0357 0.62
CPIGRW(-1) 0.0641 1.22 0.1111 1.65 0.0716 1.20 0.0623 1.47 0.0760 1.86 0.0728 1.49
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0167 0.63 0.0383 1.23 0.0298 1.22 0.0662 1.38 -0.0243 -0.91 0.0648 1.23
EBTP_AS 1.0481 ** 10.16 1.1022 ** 10.64 1.0506 ** 10.29 0.9578 ** 5.71 1.0482 ** 7.55 0.9518 ** 5.83
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.2148 * -2.19 -0.1464 -1.27 -0.1998 * -1.99 -0.4095 ** -3.66 -0.4589 ** -4.11 -0.3955 ** -3.85
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.1719 -1.73 -0.1178 -1.31 -0.1406 -1.51 0.0028 0.02 0.0895 0.73 0.0074 0.06
SH_SYSLNS 0.0511 * 2.28 0.0504 * 2.33 0.0488 * 2.24 0.0401 * 2.24 0.0249 1.80 0.0367 * 2.09
NIM -0.1619 -1.24 -0.1327 -0.97 -0.2441 -1.84 -0.3016 ** -2.79 -0.2434 -1.96 -0.3361 ** -3.05
NIM(-1) 0.0764 0.57 -0.0215 -0.13 0.1352 0.86 0.0116 0.08 0.0866 0.62 -0.0218 -0.13
NIM(-2) -0.2233 * -2.14 -0.2377 -1.84 -0.2735 * -2.25 0.0647 0.52 -0.1686 -1.16 0.0750 0.55
CIR 0.0635 ** 4.65 0.0579 ** 4.72 0.0631 ** 4.81 0.0448 ** 5.95 0.0597 ** 7.19 0.0443 ** 5.68
CIR(-1) -0.0080 -0.57 -0.0076 -0.65 -0.0068 -0.50 -0.0162 -1.66 -0.0187 -1.93 -0.0176 -1.80
CIR(-2) -0.0193 * -2.02 -0.0126 -1.33 -0.0197 * -2.04 -0.0130 -1.43 -0.0164 -1.65 -0.0123 -1.36
HS_LN       -0.0170 * -2.37 -0.0175 * -2.42 -0.0173 * -2.42
TR1_RWA       -0.1059 * -2.52 -0.0657 -1.82 -0.1003 * -2.39
ASGRW -0.0028 -1.10     -0.0027 * -2.11     
ASGRW(-1) -0.0015 -0.73     -0.0018 -0.80     
ASGRW(-2) 0.0034 1.45     0.0026 1.77     
ASGRW(-3) 0.0042 * 2.17     0.0035 1.85     
ASGRW(-4) 0.0068 ** 2.75     0.0069 * 2.29     
TOIGRW   -0.0027 -1.00     -0.0042 -1.74   
TOIGRW(-1)   -0.0025 -0.77     -0.0041 -1.03   
TOIGRW(-2)   -0.0003 -0.17     0.0011 0.66   
TOIGRW(-3)   0.0016 0.70     0.0010 0.59   
TOIGRW(-4)   0.0047 * 2.37     0.0042 * 2.42   
DVLNGRW     -0.0016 -0.53     -0.0022 -1.33
DVLNGRW(-1)     -0.0013 -0.65     -0.0012 -0.59
DVLNGRW(-2)     0.0056 * 2.07     0.0030 1.83
DVLNGRW(-3)     0.0041 * 2.11     0.0029 1.61
DVLNGRW(-4)     0.0083 ** 2.65     0.0068 1.71
Estimation code
Cross-sections included 28 27 28 25 25 25
Observations 362 348 358 256 264 254
Adjusted R^2 0.748 0.766 0.758 0.817 0.809 0.814
F-Statistics 20.831 ** 22.462 ** 21.663 ** 22.438 ** 22.080 ** 21.926 **
Schwarz criterion -6.088 -6.147 -6.112 -6.606 -6.598 -6.579
Akaike info criterion -6.680 -6.745 -6.708 -7.354 -7.329 -7.331
Durbin-Watson stat 2.119 2.099 2.117 2.192 2.121 2.158
Estimated with cross-section fixed effects
Full sample 1980 - 2005, all banks Short sample 1990 - 2005, all banks
 
Notes: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Variables as defined in Table 6-1 (dependent variable), Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 (explanatory variables) 
All equations estimated with cross-section fixed effects. All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors 
(d.f. corrected) 
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Table 6-10 reports on the results of these estimates. Columns 1 to 3 are separate estimates 
for each of the above growth proxies for the 1980 to 2005 period. Columns 4 – 6 repeat estimates 
for the shorter 1990 to 2005 period. One notes that around 10% of observations are lost for the 
ASGRW regression (Table 6-10, column 1) compared to the estimates without asset growth 
proxies in column 1 of the earlier Table 6-8. Even more observations are lost for estimates with 
the TOIGRW and DVLNGRW proxies. This can be explained by the many banks in the sample 
with shorter data series, particularly earlier in the observation period. Accordingly, fewer 
observations are lost for the short period model in columns 4-6 as the structure of the 
Australasian banking industry became more settled. 
An interesting result emerges in Table 6-10 as signs and significance of the coefficients are 
affected by the lags considered. Contemporaneous growth appears to be associated with lower 
credit losses (negative coefficients). On the other hand, terms lagged 2 years and more generally 
have the expected unfavourable effect (positive coefficient). These positive coefficients are 
moreover generally significant. This pattern is most pronounced for the ASGRW and 
DVLNGRW proxies. One could thus conclude that at the time of the expansion, management has 
a too optimistic judgment of the true risks associated with their strategy, an assessment which 
has to be corrected in subsequent years.  
Our findings appear to explain some of the controversy in the literature regarding the effect 
of past credit growth as these studies typically look at one or just two lags of the growth 
parameter. Pain (2003, p. 29), for instance, discovered negative and in some cases significant 
coefficients for his one-period lagged growth proxy even though he notes that the coefficients are 
“very small”. Likewise Cavallo & Majnoni (2001, p. 20) state that “the loan growth rate has a 
negative sign implying that provisions tend to decrease as a share of total assets when the 
increase of new lending and the decrease of monitoring tend to reinforce the risk exposure of 
banks portfolios.” Note that Cavallo & Majnoni (2001) use contemporaneous loan growth as 
their proxy. This means both Pain (2003) and Cavallo & Majnoni (2001) have apparently 
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measured effects of current lending growth as opposed to the impact of banks ‘buying market 
share’ at the expense of subsequent asset quality as studied in work of Clair (1992).  
Our results are similar to Salas & Saurina (2002, Table 2, p. 218) who also study lags up to 
4 years and generally find negative coefficients for shorter lags but positive coefficients for 
longer lags of asset and branch network growth. While partially significant, their results are less 
clear-cut since they use an alternative CLE proxy in the form of a ‘problem loan ratio’, 
corresponding to the level of impaired assets IA_A in this thesis. As mentioned above, this level 
variable is likely to provide a blurred picture of the credit events in a particular period since the 
level of impaired assets will be the consequence of loan defaults and debt workouts possibly 
many years ago. 
 
6.4.4 Formal test of country-specific effects 
Table 6-6 showed estimates for the separate sub-samples of Australian and New Zealand 
banks. This section sets out to test country-specific effects more formally. For this purpose, the 
preferred model Equation 6-3 is modified by the addition of a country dummy variable 
(AU_DMY) set to one for Australian banks and zero for New Zealand banks. This is to test for a 
fixed effect across all Australian banks relative to their New Zealand counterparts in the sample. 
Moreover, interaction terms are added to explore whether regression coefficients found in the 
earlier models are significantly different for banks in the two countries. If they were significant, 
it would be questionable whether data from both countries should be used in a pooled sample. 
This modified model is shown as Equation 6-4 below.  
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AU_DMYi is a dummy variable set to one for Australian banks and zero for New Zealand banks. 
CLEi,t is the major CLE variable IAE_LN (impaired asset expense as % of loans ) for bank i at 
time t and the explanatory variables on the right hand side of the equation are as explained in 














Results of estimating versions of Equation 6-4 are shown in Table 6-11. The first 
specification in column 1 of Table 6-11 introduces just a country-specific intercept which is 
found to be significant and positive. This means that the level of provisioning has, on average, 
been significantly higher for Australian banks. This is not unexpected since the New Zealand 
banking sector has, for the most part, been dominated by Australian parent banks which have 
conducted their more risky commercial and international lending through their head banks. This 
effect possibly shows up here because there is a limited choice of proxies to control for loan 
portfolio composition. 
Next, formulations including interaction terms are considered. These results are shown in 
columns 2 to 4 of Table 6-11. In general, there are few individual country-specific effects present 
for the majority of proxies, in particular for bank-specific variables. Moreover, the country-
specific intercept (coefficient of AU_DMY) becomes insignificant in regressions including all 
interaction terms (Table 6-11, column 4).  
There are some notable exceptions, however, where one observes significant interaction 
terms. These mainly concern the impact of macro-variables on bank credit loss experience. 
Firstly, changes in unemployment appear to have different effects on Australian and New 
Zealand banks (Table 6-6, columns 2 and 4). This is reflected in a significant positive coefficient 
for the interaction term of contemporaneous ∆UNEMP (Table 6-11, column 4). This confirms 
our observation in the earlier discussion of section 6.4.1.3 that effects of macro state variables 
seemed slightly more delayed for the New Zealand compared to the Australian sample. 
Moreover, results for New Zealand were found to be less pronounced which could be due to 
lower test power resulting from fewer observations, making it harder to reject the null hypothesis 
of a zero effect.  
The second difference between Australia and New Zealand relates to the effect of the asset 
price shock proxies. While the contemporaneous effect of RET_SHINDX has been similar in 
both countries, booming share markets have led to significantly higher provisioning at Australian 
banks in subsequent years (first and second lag interaction terms are significantly positive). This 
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effect is not noticeable for New Zealand banks. Housing price developments have the expected 
effect on credit losses in Australia (negative significant coefficients of contemporaneous term for 
HPGRW) while this effect is again hardly detectable for the New Zealand banks. 
For the bank-specific variables, there is only one significant interaction term for the two-
year lagged earnings proxy of EBTP_AS. This confirms our observation of different income 
smoothing patterns for Australian versus New Zealand banks (as discussed in section 6.4.1.4). 
All in all, one can nevertheless conclude that the pooling of Australian and New Zealand 
data appears to be a sensible approach. The differences observed mainly relate to timing 
differences for impacts of macro variables but there do not appear to be fundamentally different 
effects present. 
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Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group
Constant -0.0239 ** -4.77 -0.0275 ** -5.61 -0.0136 * -2.35 -0.0185 ** -2.65
UNEMP-UNEMP(-1) 0.0825 0.99 -0.1846 -1.17 0.1073 1.24 -0.1983 -1.18
UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2) 0.1335 * 2.57 0.1294 1.50 0.1083 * 2.02 0.0807 0.80
UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3) 0.0856 * 2.00 0.0710 1.16 0.0941 * 2.10 0.0958 1.32
RET_SHINDX -0.0141 * -2.19 -0.0193 * -2.02 -0.0152 * -2.29 -0.0200 -1.93
RET_SHINDX(-1) 0.0007 0.17 -0.0093 * -2.25 0.0007 0.20 -0.0078 -1.83
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0070 1.09 0.0008 0.15 0.0070 1.08 -0.0009 -0.17
HPGRW -0.0138 -1.56 0.0095 0.96 -0.0142 -1.54 0.0011 0.09
HPGRW(-1) 0.0014 0.20 0.0094 0.80 0.0041 0.58 0.0102 0.88
HPGRW(-2) 0.0007 0.11 -0.0031 -0.23 -0.0036 -0.61 -0.0030 -0.22
CPIGRW -0.0049 -0.12 -0.0406 -0.48 -0.0043 -0.10 -0.0639 -0.67
CPIGRW(-1) 0.0435 0.83 0.0903 1.10 0.0447 0.86 0.1055 1.20
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0212 1.17 0.0355 0.82 0.0221 1.15 0.0530 0.93
EBTP_AS 1.0840 ** 12.49 1.0841 ** 11.36 1.0269 ** 10.96 1.0419 ** 7.24
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.1679 -1.85 -0.1837 * -2.06 -0.1319 -1.78 -0.1668 * -2.18
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.1511 -1.89 -0.1492 -1.88 -0.3167 ** -3.88 -0.2929 ** -3.40
SH_SYSLNS 0.0088 1.24 0.0122 1.72 0.0159 0.82 0.0179 0.91
NIM -0.2318 * -1.97 -0.2779 * -2.29 -0.1252 -0.46 -0.2185 -0.88
NIM(-1) 0.0362 0.31 0.0887 0.75 -0.0333 -0.25 0.0678 0.48
NIM(-2) -0.1567 * -2.09 -0.1498 -1.87 -0.0900 -0.93 -0.1050 -0.98
CIR 0.0609 ** 4.68 0.0590 ** 4.58 0.0630 ** 2.94 0.0583 ** 3.93
CIR(-1) -0.0068 -0.57 -0.0072 -0.60 -0.0197 -0.79 -0.0216 -1.06
CIR(-2) -0.0152 -1.87 -0.0128 -1.51 -0.0221 -1.55 -0.0129 -0.94
AU_DMY 0.0030 ** 3.63 0.0071 ** 3.59 -0.0096 -1.32 -0.0028 -0.33
AU_DMY*(UNEMP-UNEMP(-1))   0.3997 * 2.30   0.4419 * 2.39
AU_DMY*(UNEMP(-1)-UNEMP(-2))   0.0690 0.62   0.0853 0.70
AU_DMY*(UNEMP(-2)-UNEMP(-3))   0.1573 * 1.97   0.1261 1.44
AU_DMY*RET_SHINDX   -0.0003 -0.03   0.0010 0.09
AU_DMY*RET_SHINDX(-1)   0.0226 ** 3.82   0.0215 ** 3.60
AU_DMY*RET_SHINDX(-2)   0.0248 ** 3.21   0.0257 ** 3.00
AU_DMY*HPGRW   -0.0475 ** -3.73   -0.0366 * -2.55
AU_DMY*HPGRW(-1)   -0.0028 -0.18   -0.0001 -0.01
AU_DMY*HPGRW(-2)   0.0100 0.65   0.0045 0.29
AU_DMY*CPIGRW   -0.0160 -0.18   0.0173 0.17
AU_DMY*CPIGRW(-1)   0.0499 0.55   0.0241 0.25
AU_DMY*CPIGRW(-2)   -0.0939 -1.79   -0.1074 -1.68
AU_DMY*SH_SYSLNS     -0.0095 -0.50 -0.0086 -0.42
AU_DMY*EBTP_AS     0.0439 0.28 0.0175 0.09
AU_DMY*EBTP_AS(-1)     -0.2458 -1.56 -0.2247 -1.46
AU_DMY*EBTP_AS(-2)     0.4263 ** 3.42 0.3994 ** 3.19
AU_DMY*NIM     -0.0731 -0.21 0.0177 0.06
AU_DMY*NIM(-1)     0.1011 0.44 -0.0024 -0.01
AU_DMY*NIM(-2)     -0.1331 -0.70 -0.0966 -0.54
AU_DMY*CIR     0.0068 0.26 0.0113 0.56
AU_DMY*CIR(-1)     0.0100 0.37 0.0104 0.45
AU_DMY*CIR(-2)     0.0043 0.25 -0.0054 -0.32
Cross-sections included 29 29 29 29
Observations 396 396 396 396
Adjusted R^2 0.717 0.728 0.725 0.734
F-Statistics 44.596 ** 31.174 ** 32.613 ** 25.207 **
Schwarz criterion -6.490 -6.379 -6.395 -6.279
Akaike info criterion -6.732 -6.741 -6.737 -6.742
Durbin-Watson stat 1.790 1.849 1.823 1.854
1980-2005, all banks
 
Notes: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
AU_DMY is a dummy variable set to one for Australian banks and zero for New Zealand banks. Other 
variables as referenced in Equation 6-4. All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors (d.f. corrected) 
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6.5 Chapter summary and conclusions 
This chapter presents and discusses the estimation results for a variety of models of 
impaired asset expense and alternative CLE variables for the Australasian banking system. 
Impaired asset expense as % of loans (IAE_LN) is chosen as the major dependent CLE 
variable because it measures estimated credit losses in a particular period and it is a data item 
reported by banks in Australasia for most of the 1980 to 2005 observation period. Accordingly, 
the model is primarily derived and estimated with this CLE variable but a preferred model form 
is then also estimated with alternative CLE proxies. 
The results confirm that economic cycles and changes in asset prices are an important 
influence on loan loss provisioning. Of the three state variables considered, the change in 
unemployment was found to possess superior explanatory power. The returns on the respective 
national share markets show the expected negative sign, with coefficients that are mostly 
significant. The performance of the housing market also has an impact even though this 
phenomenon is mainly observed for the sub-sample of Australian banks. Rises in CPI appear to 
drive increases of provisions in the banking system with a delay of two years. 
The most significant results for bank specific variables are found for the pre-provision 
earnings proxy (EBTP_AS). This is in line with findings in previous literature lending support to 
the income smoothing hypothesis which postulates that banks tend to increase (decrease) 
discretionary provisions in good (weak) years. Efficient banks, as measured by the cost-income 
ratio (CIR), show distinctively lower provisions. This implies that efficient banks also have their 
credit risk management under control. The comparative size of a bank (SH_SYSLNS) and the 
net interest margin (NIM) also turned out as significant control parameters. Larger banks show, 
on average, higher provisions and wider net interest margin (a characteristic of smaller retail 
banks / housing lenders) brings about lower provisioning requirements. 
Two additional specific risk proxies became available with the introduction of the Basel 
capital accord in 1988 as banks started reporting capital adequacy ratios. One finds that better 
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capitalized banks (as measured by the Basel I risk adjusted capital ratio) and banks with lower 
risk housing loans have, on average, suffered lower credit losses. 
To gauge country specific effects, separate estimates are conducted for the sub-sample of 
Australian, respectively New Zealand, banks. One generally finds similar dynamics for both 
countries which provides justification for pooling all Australasian banks into one sample. On 
average, Australian banks have shown higher provisions. The New Zealand banking sector has, 
for the most part, been dominated by Australian parent banks which apparently have conducted 
their more risky commercial and international lending through their head banks.  
A special investigation is conducted on the effects of past expansion, which makes it 
meaningful to include bank past growth proxies over many lags. It is found that faster growth is 
reflected in higher subsequent credit losses with a delay of 2 to 3 years as expanding banks seem 
to loosen lending criteria but are not able to accurately appraise required provision at the time.  
The estimates for alternative CLE variables reveal the ‘memory character’ of both the 
stock of provisions (PRV_LN) and impaired assets (IA_A), two level variables which are 
affected by credit events possibly many years back. Accordingly, the effect of changes in credit 
quality is less apparent and somewhat delayed in the results for these CLEs. Both results for net 
and gross write-off proxies are very similar. One observes the lagged nature of write-offs which, 




6.6 Chapter appendix tables 














CPIGRW_AU   1.000        
GDPGRW_AU   -0.331  1.000       
HPGRW_AU   0.109  0.293  1.000      
LIAB_INC_AU   -0.565 **  0.089  -0.018  1.000     
REALINTGRW_AU   -0.028  0.496 *  0.071  -0.029  1.000    
RET_ASX   -0.061  0.210  -0.051  0.003  -0.145  1.000   
UNEMP_AU   0.042  -0.362  -0.208  -0.659 **  -0.295  0.020  1.000  
∆UNEMP_AU  0.328  -0.807 **  -0.318  -0.232  -0.275  -0.430 *  0.402 *  1.000 
 
Note: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level. 
Correlations between non-pooled country series 
 
 















CPIGRW_NZ   1.000        
GDPGRW_NZ   -0.151  1.000       
HPGRW_NZ   0.603 **  0.369  1.000      
LIAB_INC_NZ   -0.642 **  0.208  -0.088  1.000     
REALINTGRW_NZ   0.177  0.369  0.348  -0.253  1.000    
RET_NZX   0.277  0.348  0.357  -0.107  -0.035  1.000   
UNEMP_NZ   -0.620 **  -0.298  -0.707 **  -0.060  -0.361  -0.330  1.000  
∆UNEMP_NZ  0.192  -0.605 **  -0.194  -0.447 *  0.293  -0.253  0.145  1.000 
Note: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level.  
Correlations between non-pooled country series. 
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Table 6-14 Correlations between selected bank-specific variables 
 ASGRW CIR EBTP_AS NIM SH_ 
SYSLNS 
HS_LN TR1_RWA 
ASGRW   1.000       
CIR   0.030  1.000      
EBTP_AS   -0.083  -0.362 **  1.000     
NIM   0.148 **  0.041  0.371 **  1.000    
SH_SYSLNS   -0.058  -0.288 **  0.087  -0.218 **  1.000   
HS_LN  0.031  0.028  -0.228 **  -0.059  -0.313 **  1.000  
TR1_RWA  0.025  -0.188 **  0.055  0.278 **  -0.386 **  0.421 **  1.000 
Note: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level. 
Correlations for balanced pooled sample (pairwise missing deletions) 
 
 
Table 6-15 Contemporaneous / lagged correlations of GDPGRW and ∆UNEMP with selected 
bank-specific variables 
 GDPGRW GDPGRW(-1) GDPGRW(-2) ∆UNEMP ∆UNEMP(-1) ∆UNEMP(-2) 
ASGRW  0.028  0.035  0.040  -0.023  -0.014  0.027 
CIR  -0.060  -0.069  -0.085  0.121 **  0.135 **  0.097 * 
EBTP_AS  -0.112 *  -0.070  -0.015  0.138 **  0.043  -0.021 
NIM  -0.137 **  -0.120 **  -0.085  0.170 **  0.155 **  0.142 ** 
SH_SYSLNS  0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.038  -0.036  -0.030 
HS_LN 0.131 *  0.052  -0.054  -0.196 **  -0.135 *  0.007 
TR1_RWA 0.175 **  0.084  0.006  -0.190 **  -0.135 *  -0.054 
Note: 
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level. 






7 Thesis summary and conclusions 
This thesis studies the key drivers of credit losses in the Australasian banking system. An 
understanding of such factors is of importance for financial industry and regulatory authorities 
alike. Banks require this information for managing their credit risk exposure while agencies in 
charge of macro-prudential supervision are concerned with parameters affecting overall system 
stability.  
7.1 The data base 
This thesis compiles, presents and analyses a comprehensive data sample of financial and 
credit loss information of 23 Australian and 10 New Zealand banks for the period 1980 to 2005. 
The sample includes all registered banks operating during this time with activities in retail and/or 
rural banking but excludes institutions that are predominantly wholesale and/or merchant banks. 
Because databases of third party providers do not have the required coverage and do not supply 
information so far back, the data needs to be extracted from original financial accounts published 
by banks. The observation period allows a data analysis encompassing the major banking system 
crises in both New Zealand and Australia which occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The thesis illustrates how reporting of credit provisioning and loss information has been 
subject to great variations both amongst banks and through time. Initial reporting is thinner with 
often just the stock of provisions shown. Later reports benefit from a wider range of credit loss 
related information including the level of impaired assets, geographical and sectoral break-downs 
of provisions, write-offs and recoveries. One notes that exchange listed banks generally provide 
a superior disclosure quality compared to public-sector owned and cooperative type institutions 
which were numerous and often key players of the banking system in the first half of the 
observation period. 
This heterogeneity requires a standardized way of capturing this information. For this 
purpose, we propose a typology in chapter 4 which classifies (1) the reporting of stock of 
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provisions, (2) the type of transactions shown in the provisioning accounts, (3) the nature of 
accounting for write-offs and (4) the way recoveries of claims previously written off are shown. 
A total of 27 reporting types are identified which allows extracting these data along equivalent 
informational content into a standardized template. The typology and data template developed 
here should be equally useful for application in other geographic areas. The study of credit risks 
requires long data series typically not available from standard sources and this is where the 
techniques developed in this thesis will provide value to a range of researchers. 
7.2 The principal model and evaluation of dependent variables 
We propose a principal model which represents a reduced form approach to explaining 
banks’ credit losses. Thus we study potential drivers of credit losses without modelling the 
precise mechanism by which these proxies affect credit losses. The advantage of this approach is 
the ability to include a wider range of explanatory variables whose actions on the dependent 
variable are often complex and indirect. 
An important issue in the formulation of this model relates to the choice of an appropriate 
proxy to track credit losses of a bank. Candidates include flow parameters such as impaired asset 
expense and write-offs and level variables such as the stock of provisions (both general and 
specific component) and impaired assets. Virtually no comparative analysis on the properties of 
these proxies has been conducted by existing literature even though our investigation reveals 
that, among other things, some of them correlate rather poorly. This means one would have to 
exercise caution when comparing results of previous research if they have employed different 
dependent CLE proxies. 
It is found that credit loss experience (CLE) ratios using balance sheet items like total 
assets or loans as a denominator to be appropriate CLE proxies. They are preferred over ratios 
based on income items (such as total operating income) because they are less sensitive to the 
vagaries of the denominator which is comparably large in the case of total loans or assets. 
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Overall, the ratio of impaired assets as % of loans (IAE_LN) seems to have the most 
desirable properties for the empirical research undertaken, despite not being a completely 
accurate picture of credit losses in an ex-post sense. Advantages of this ratio are that it gauges 
perceived credit losses at the time of the actual event, it has good data availability throughout the 
observation period and it is widely used in the literature which allows for a comparison of 
results. 
7.3 Empirical results 
The principal model explains credit losses as a function of both aggregate macro and bank-
specific explanatory variables. For the empirical investigation it is formulated in the form of a 
distributed lag (DL) model which captures the dynamics of the system through the inclusion of 
contemporaneous and lagged terms of the explanatory variables. 
The results confirm results of earlier literature for other geographic regions that economic 
cycles and changes in asset prices are an important influence on loan loss provisioning. Of the 
state of the economy parameters, changes in unemployment show a slightly better explanatory 
power than GDP growth and level of unemployment.  
A proxy tracking the return of share markets is included as an asset price shock proxy. 
Results show negative and partially significant coefficients but it becomes less significant for 
estimates over a shorter observation period 1990 to 2005 where share markets have experienced 
a smoother run (unlike the 1987 share market crash). Another proxy tracking the performance of 
markets is the housing price index. Overall it has slightly poorer explanatory power than the 
share market but shows higher significance in estimates for the Australian sub-sample. A further 
macro variable, lagged CPI growth, has a significant negative long-term impact on a bank’s 
CLE, raising credit losses. 
Bank-specific variables include the pre-provision & tax earnings proxy (EBTP_AS) which 
is significant and positive, meaning that Australasian banks appear to use bad debt provisions for 
income smoothing activities.  
  308
Further bank-specific variables control for institution specific characteristics. There is a 
size proxy with a positive coefficient, indicating that larger banks are provisioning more on 
average. The net income margin, both contemporaneous and lagged, has a negative coefficient, 
i.e. banks with higher interest margins suffer lower credit losses.  
The analysis also finds significantly positive contemporaneous coefficients of the cost-
income ratio proxies (CIR), indicating that high and increasing cost-income ratios (lower 
operational efficiencies) are associated with higher levels of impaired assets. The results lend 
support to the hypothesis that operational problems at banks (high CIR) go hand in hand with 
poor credit risk management and thus higher loan losses. Conversely, they seem to reject the 
alternative theory postulating that extensive costly monitoring (high CIR) leads to better asset 
quality (i.e. negative coefficient for CIR).  
For estimates of the shorter 1990 to 2005 sample period there is the choice of two further 
bank-specific variables which only became available with the introduction of the Basel capital 
accord in 1988. One finds that better capitalized banks (Basel I risk adjusted capital ratio) and 
banks with lower risk housing loans have, on average, suffered lower credit losses. All these 
results are intuitive since retail banks focussed on residential housing lending are typically 
smaller, have a greater reliance on balance sheet business (net interest margin) and benefit from 
preferential treatment of their assets under Basel I (lower risk weights for housing loans). 
Clear results are found for the effects of past bank expansion where our test design 
includes bank past growth parameters with up to four (annual) lags. Faster growth is reflected in 
higher subsequent credit losses with a delay of 2 to 3 years as expanding banks appear to loosen 
lending criteria but are not able to accurately appraise required provision at the time. By contrast, 
previous literature like Cavallo & Majnoni (2001) and Pain (2003) had found inconclusive 
results when they just included single short lagged growth proxies into their equations. Our 
approach could thus help detect similar effects of rapid bank growth in other international bank 
samples. 
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The sample includes banks from both Australia and New Zealand whose credit loss 
patterns could be different. One finds generally similar dynamics for both countries which 
provides justification for pooling banks into one sample. On average though, Australian banks 
have shown higher provisions than New Zealand banks. The New Zealand banking sector has, 
for the most part, been dominated by Australian parent banks which have conducted their more 
risky commercial and international lending through their head banks. 
An important part of the empirical investigation relates to estimating the models for 
alternative CLE proxies instead of the main proxy impaired asset expense as discussed above. 
The analysis reveals the ‘memory character’ of level CLE variables such as stock of provisions 
and impaired assets which may be affected by credit events many years into the past. 
Accordingly, the effect of explanatory variables appears less distinct and also somewhat delayed. 
The delayed nature of both net and gross write-off proxies are even more pronounced. While 
they may provide a more accurate picture of actual ex-post credit losses, the discretion of banks 
of when to derecognize lost claims limits the sensible use of write-off proxies in such models. 
7.4 Reflections on contributions of this thesis and further directions of 
research 
The contributions of this thesis are best placed into two key areas. The first one relates to 
the Australasian focus of this research which is the first of its kind in terms of the 
comprehensiveness of the bank sample and the length of the time period studied. Secondly, there 
are findings in this thesis which may potentially find applications for comparable research in 
other banking markets.  
The dynamic of credit losses in the Australasian banking system is a comparably little 
researched area. Either this market has been covered as part of a global, more general study (e.g. 
in Bikker & Hu, 2001; Bikker & Metzemakers, 2003; Cavallo & Majnoni, 2001) or as part of 
some specific study on aspects of loan quality in Australasia, e.g. APRA’s investigation into the 
relative riskiness of loan assets in the various Basel I risk buckets (Esho & Liaw, 2002). The 
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time period covered in all of the above studies has never exceeded 10 years but for insights into 
the nature of credit cycles. Longer periods, such as the 26 years used in this thesis, appear more 
sensible. Ideally the observation horizon should be extended even further into the past. As 
specific reporting of credit losses is virtually non-existent in those times, future research would 
thus have to identify suitable credit loss proxies, e.g. derived from general bank profitability, to 
gain insights into longer-term dynamics of credit losses in banking. 
To study such long time horizons, it is necessary to compile a dedicated database. Earlier 
research has mostly relied on external data providers to obtain both financial and credit loss 
related information. While this saves time, it leaves control over how these data are extracted to a 
third party and, more importantly, such data would not generally be available before about 1990. 
This thesis turns to the original published accounts of the comprehensive sample of Australasian 
banks. It develops and implements a methodology of extracting the credit loss data with 
equivalent informational content, a method which could find applications in other banking 
markets as well. The main benefit is a richer selection of data items related to the credit loss 
experience of the banks. This then allows for a comparative analysis of the many potential CLE 
dependent variables. Results indicate that one has to exercise caution when comparing such 
studies using differing definitions of CLE. Continued research might thus look into relationship 
patterns of such CLE proxies using larger, possibly global data samples. In particular, one might 
seek methods of extracting loan loss recovery rates from such data as this parameter is a key 
input of credit risk models. 
Further avenues of research lie in the continued refinement of the modelling approach 
applied in this thesis. We pointed to the advantage of our reduced form model approach which 
provides the possibility of including a range of explanatory variables whose actions on the 
dependent variable are often complex and indirect. It has, however, its limitations as it does not 
explicitly link the drivers of loan losses to the loan loss experience itself. This issue emerges 
when we compare our results with those for other banking markets. We generally observe 
qualitatively similar effects of key macro and bank-specific variables but their significance 
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and/or the timing can often be rather different. This means our approach is very suitable for an 
overall perspective of loss drivers but for more specific research questions into the mechanism of 
how slower economic growth, for instance, translates into credit losses one will need structural 
models. The standard structural credit risk models derived from Merton (1974) discussed in 
reference works such as Saunders & Allen (2002), Crouhy, Galai, & Mark (2001) or Schmid 
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